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ABSTRACT
An attempt is made in this work to study the Sudan Government's 
military response to the complex problems presented by actual 
or potential oppositiom tô its rule, especially in the Northern 
(Muslim) Sudan, between 1899 and 1925 - 26,
Chapter I discusses the danger to internal security from 
organised Mahdist resistance, from the defeat of the Khalifa 
'Abdallahi at Karari in September 1898 till his death in November
1899.
Chapter II deals with the shortcomings of the Egyptian 
army as an instrument of military security, with special reference 
to the mutiny of the Sudanese battalions in 1900.
Chapter III discusses Islamic resistance movements (Mahdists 
and Millenarian) as a threat to security in the Northern Sudan 
during the period 1900 - 1908,
Chapter IV describes the pacification of the Nuba Mountains, 
partly to deny the use of this region to actual or potential 
resistance movements.
Chapter V deals with the role of British military officers 
and of the British garrison in the Sudan.
Chapter VI reviews the problem of security in the Sudan during 
the First World War and discussed the question of the re-organisation 
of the Egyptian army.
Chapter VII relates to the future status of the Sudan and 
to the military implications of a possible change of status. It 
also discusses the impact of the Egyptian Revolution of 1919 on 
Sudanese Nationalism during the:- period 1919 - 1922,
Chapters VIII and IX continue the story of the crisis that 
began in 1919. They throw light on the activities of the 
Egyptian Nationalists in the Sudan; on the Sudanese insurrection 
of 1924; and on the military response of the Sudan Government 
to these events.
Chapter X discusses the serious threat to security posed 
by the Neo-Mahdists and by the educated Sudanese Nationalists.
The revision of the Governmental policy in order to contain 
these threats to security in the Sudan is also the theme:.:'of 
this chapter.
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The overthrow of the Mahdist State in September 1898 
was followed by the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, 
popularly known as the ’Cbndominium Agreement*, on 19th January 
1899. According to the terms of this Agreement, the supreme 
military and civil command was vested in the Governor-General, 
vdio was to be appointed on the recommendation of the British 
Government by the giedive of Egypt, and who could only be 
removed with the consent of the British Government. These 
provisions in the Agreement made Britain the de facto ruler 
in the Sudan. In future the responsibility for maintaining law 
and order in the country lay with the Governor-General, who 
now became the all-powerful head of the new Sudan Government.
On the re-occupation of the Sudan, the new Government 
faced numerous problems, both external and internal, whose 
solution seemed hard to find. The dangers from European powers 
like France, Italy and the Congo State under King Leopold, whose 
colonies were co-terminous with the Sudan, formed an external 
threat to the Sudan Government. This, however, falls beyond 
the scope of the present studÿ and is, therefore, not discussed.
The long frontier with Ethiopia in the east was another source 
of constant anxiety to the Sudan authorities. The Bthippian 
frontier problem, althou^ formally 'external*, had important 
repuroussions, from time to time, on the internal security of
the Sudan. The unsettled borderlands - not so much a frontier
a
as a 'march* - were/traditional refuge for resistors, and for 
others who found a strong government inconvenient. The principal 
anxiety of the Sudan authorities was to safeguard, as fltr as possible, 
the Sudan from incursions from Ethiopia and to persuade the
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Ethiopians to administer the frontier areas more closely and
directly, so as to make these areas less attractive to outlaws.
The establishment of a Sultanate in Darfur, in the west,
under *Ali Dinar, although not a serious threat to security in
the Sudan, was a source of considerable inconvenience to the Sudan
authorities. The Sudan-Darfur border tribes frequently crossed
and re-crossed the border which sometimes led to disputes. Since
’Ali Dinar claimed the ri^t to deal with the tribes directly^
such as Rizaiqat and Kababish who were under the Sudan Government,
the Sudan officials found it difficult to establish security
in these parts. Im March 1900 an attnmpt was made by Wingate to
bring Darfur under direct administration. He wired to Cromer
asking him whether he thou^t it desirable to hoist the British
and Egyptian flags at al-Pasher, the capital of Darfur; he was
confident that *Ali Dinar would fly them if instructed to do so.(l) 
Cromer, however, thou^t it inadvisable to ask *Ali Dinar to fly
the flagm;(^). In subsequent telegrams to Lord Salisbury, the
British Foreign Secretary, Cromer recalled that a fundamental part
of the original British policy, when Gordon was sent to the
Sudan in 1884, was to re-instate the rule of the local Sultans.
That pmlioy had failed at that time, but it could be revived
under the more favourable circumstances now prevailing in Darfur (5),
He was clearly in favour of governing Darfur throu^ *Ali Dinar
and not through an Anglo-Egyptian agency. According to him it was
(1) Theobald, A.B., *Ali Dinar, Last Sultan of Dyfur, (London 1965) 
P.58, PO 403; Wingate to Cromer, No.298, 27 March 1900.
(2) PO 403, Cromer to Wingate, 29 March 1900.
(3) Gp:siti#lpTheoba% Ai*,, P. 38
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probable that the province might prove an additional financial 
burden. ’Ali Dinar was at the time friendly, but his friendship 
could easily be converted into hostility. Under these circumstances 
Cromer wondered whether it was necessary or desirable to insist 
too strongly on an outward and visible sign of allegiance on the 
part of ’Ali Dinar(l). Salisbury replied expressing full agreement 
with his views(2), in the meantime, Wingate had received a request 
from ’Ali Dinar for six flags, three Egyptians and three British 
to be hoisted in various places in Darfur^Wingate delayed 
his reply for a month and then said that the flags must be placed 
under the protection of a specially selected armed guard and that 
he would like to know what steps ’Ali Dinar would take to 
protect them. Here the matter ended^^\
However uneasy the relations were between the Sudan 
Government and’Ali Dinar, until 1909 the latter did not show 
open hostility to the Sudan Government. The French occupation 
of Wadai in 1909, however, drove ’Ali Dinar to despair. He 
complained bitterly to the Sudan authorities against the French 
activities in the west. But the Sudan Government could not help 
him. The solution to the Darfur problem lay with the British 
Government and to them friendship with France was of more vital 
importance than the relations between an ’African despot’ and 
the Sudan authorities. In despair and frustration ÎAli Dinar 
then turned against the Sudan Government and its officials,
(1) Op cit. Theobald, A.B. P.38
(2) Ibid.
(3) IMd F. 39
(4) Ibid. MoSt of the information on 'Ali Dinar is taken from 
Dr. A.B. Theobald’s work, ’Ali Dinar, Last Sultan of Darfur. 
Dr. Theobald has discussed in detail the relationship between 
the Sudan Government and ’Ali Dinar.
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whom he blamed for conspiring with the French against him. The 
outbreak of the First World War and the deposition of the ^ edive 
’Abbas further unsettled ’Ali Dinar. The desperate letters 
he addressed to the religious SMykhs in the Sudan and the 
defiant attitude he adopted towards the frontier officials 
converted him into a potentially dangerous element in the Sudan 
at a time when no subversive activity could be tolerated, and 
exposed him to the invasion of his territories by the Sudan 
Government.
Within the Sudan itself there was much inflammable 
material with which the Sudan Government had to deal. The 
Sudan is a vast country of about a million square miles. It 
extends from the Egyptian frontier at latitude 20%over a 
distance of approximately I4OO miles as far south as latitude 
4°N. The east west distance is approximately 1200 miles. The 
principal feature of the Sudan is the N^le flowing northwards 
right throu^ the country. The pacification of the riverain region 
extending from the Egyptian frontier down to Khartoum, proved 
comparatively easy. This region had always been open to out­
siders and the tribes living there were exposed to foreign 
influences and accustomed to foreign domination. The ’Ababda, 
who roamed the Nubian desert, to the east of the Nile, had 
been masters of the desert road between Egypt and the Sudan 
long before the Egyptian invasion of 1820’s. During 1820 - 21, 
they assisted^’Isma’il Pasha, the son of Muhammad ’Ali, with 
700 tribesmen and 5OOO camels when he invaded the Sudan. Isma’il 
rewarded them by confirming their concessionary rights over the 
desert road.
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Like the ’Ababda, the Kababish, who were masters of 
the route from the western Sudan to Upper Egypt, enjoyed a 
monoply-that of the carrying trade in salt and gum - under the 
Egyptian Government. These desert tribes had little sympathy 
with Mahdiism and had submitted to the Mahdists more out of 
expediency than any conviction of Mahdiism. They lost no time 
in establishing contacts with the Anglo-Egyptian authorities 
at Wadi Haifa and were active during the campaigns of reconquest 
as irregulars. Like them,the tribes in the riverain region 
such as the Shaiqiya, who inhabited the country around the Nile 
from South of Dongola to the 4th cataract and the Ja’aliyinX^), 
whose territory lay to the south of the confluence of the Atbara 
and the Nile, threw in their lot with the invading Anglo-Egyptian 
tropps.
In the eastern Sudan, the Beja figured prominently during 
the I^hdist period. The Beja are divided into a number of tribes 
such as the Amarar, the Beni Amir, Halinqa and Hadindiwa. They 
were little affected by Mahdiism during the early years of the revolt, 
but when ’Uthman Diqna arrived as a Mahdist Missionary in 1883, a 
large section of the Hadindiwa followed him. After the capture of 
Khartoum by the Mahdi in 1885, the rest of the Beja tribes joined 
the successful movement and throughout the Mahdist period they played 
aiy^ ftctive role in the eastern Sudan.
As noticed earlier, the pacification of the riverain 
Sudan north of Khartoum was not a difficult task. The administration 
of the re-occupied territories was immediately taken in hand and 
law and order was established. The pacification of the Gezira and 
Kordofan was, however, far from easy. The landowning tribes of the
(l) The Ja’aliyin were originally Mahdist supporters but during the 
Khalifa’s reign their loyalty to the State was suspected. When in 
1897^ their chief ’Abdallah Wad Sa’d hesitated to carry out the 
Kimlifa’s orders to evacuate Metemma, the town was seized by 
r^hmud Ahmad, the Mahdist Amir, and the tribe dispersed.
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the Gezira and the Baqqara, the cattlemen, of Kordofan, were 
staunch Mahdists. The Baqqara, who had formed the main fitting 
force of the Mahdist-State, would not submit to foreign rule 
without making a struggle for the recovery of their freedom.
In order to appreciate the danger from the Baqqara to security 
in the Sudan, one has to refer to the great role which Mahdiism 
played in their day to day life. According to Willis, "the 
mission of Muhammad Ahmad was a dual one. The Sudan consisted of
■* 9
tribes ravaged by internecine warfare and worn out by extortion 
and oppression from their overlords. What was needed was some 
common bond which could combine the different tribes under one 
flag to east out the oppressor and keep the people from destroying 
one another. That was found in the call of the Mahdi to reform 
the faith and enter on the preparation for the Millenium^ ^ \  ”
The faith that Muhammad Ahmad al Mahdi preached was based on the 
common belief amongst Muslims that a Mahdi (the lightly guided one) 
would appear towards the end of the world, which would then be 
full of sin, to bring it back to the path of justice and rectitude. 
He would also be followed bjr the second coming of al-Nabi ’Isa,
\the Prophet Jesus,Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi made sudcessful use of 
this common belief in starting a movement which, within a few years, 
made him master of the country.
The Mahdi did not establish a new dynasty in the Sudan.
He nominated four Khulafa (Sing, ^alifa, successor). ’Abdallahi 
being the most senio:^succeeded him after his death in 1885. It 
was during ’Abdallahi’s rule that the Baqqara, empecially the
i
(1) C.A. Willis,'Religious Confraternities in the Sudan SNR 4
(1921) P. 189.
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Ta•a*1sim to which he belonged, and the Rizayqat, became most 
powerful in the iudan. The other Baqqara tribes such as the 
Bani Salim, Aw3ad Humayd, the Hawazma, the Messiria and the 
Humr from Kordofan and the Kenana and the Rufa’a from the 
Gezira formed the ruling aristocracy and dominated the Mahdist 
Sudan.
The Mahdist defeat at Karari and the subsequent death 
of the Khalifa stunned the Baqqara and other Mahdists, but their 
faith in Meüidiism survived. The belief in the Mahdi and the 
second coming of al-Nabi ’Isa had so deeply sunk into the 
popular mind that acts of Mahdist devotion continued to be 
practised secretly in the Sudan. Now that the Mahdi had come 
and gone and his Khalifa was dead, the Mahdists awaited expectantly 
the appearance of the Nabi ’Isa, especially in the Gezira and 
Kordofan. Persons claiming to be al-Nabi ’Isa appeared persistently 
over the following two decades, thus creating a considerable 
security problem for the Sudan Government.
N^t all the religious movements in the Sudan were aimed 
at the overthrow of the Government. Some were aimed at restoring 
Islam to its pristine purity and refrained from open subversive 
political activity. The Government, unable to distinguish 
clearly between militant and non-militant religious movements, 
was not prepared to take risks by erring on the side of toleration.
It always feared that apparently harmless movements might turn 
against the Government if they were allowed to grow powerful. The 
Sudan officials, therefore, viewed all popular religious movements 
as potentially dangerous to security and took severe measures to 
suppress them at the very first sign of their appearance. Overt 
acts of Mahdist devotion, such as the visits to the tomb of the Mahdi
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were prohibited; the sale and circulation of the ’Ratib*, a liturgy 
composed by the Mahdi, was forbidden, and even historical text 
books in schools were changed if they contained material which 
might encourage Mahdist feelings.
But it was not always possible to detect religious 
movements at their outset. The religious enthusiasts generally 
operated in the Gezira and Kordofan, the centres of Mahdiism,
Any subversive movement originating in the Gezira had indeed 
little chance of success. If discovered in time, the movement 
could be localised between the Blue and the White Niles and 
suppressed before it had time to spread into Kordofan in the west. 
The suppression of Wad Habuba’s rising in 1908 in the Gezira 
was made easier by the fact that all the Gezira was quicfiy and 
effectively sealed off by the Government from the rest of the 
Sudan.
Kordofan with its l^rge Baqqara tribes and vast area posed 
a more serious security problem to the Sudan Government. The 
BaqqSra were, as noticed earlier, staunch Mahdists, and together 
with the Pellata pilgrims from the west afforded a safe refuge 
in which religious teachers and reformers could preach and gain 
adherents. The main difficulty that the Sudan officials faced 
in Kordofan was the very size of the province. It was large and 
unmapped, the roads were primitive and the hitherto unpacified 
Nuba Mountains in the southern part of the province gave the 
potentially dangerous elements a safe refuge from Governmental 
authority. The Nuba problem was in itself distinct from the dangers 
arising out of Mahdiism and is dealt with in a separate chapter in
17
the thesis; but certain peripheral Nuba hills, such as Taqali, had 
long been exposed to Islamic and Arab influences, and were inclined 
to give shelter to religious teachers who were considered dangerous 
by the authorities. With a skeleton force in Kordofan it was rarely 
possible to detect potentially dangerous activity in the Nuba Moun­
tains before it had manifested itself openly. /
Apart from the danger arising out of Mahdist and other 
analogous movement, the Egyptian array itself became a security risk 
in the Sudan. The Egyptian army had been re-organised in 1882 and 
was composed of Egyptian fellahin and the Sudanese black battalions.
The Egyptian fellahin battalions were generally officered by the 
Egyptians and the black battalions were under British officers.
However, even in the British-officered black battalions, the Junior 
officers were Egyptians, For some time after the re-occupation, 
discontent had been noticed amongst the Junior Egyptian officers.
The immediate cause of the discontent appeared to be the administrative 
economies which Kitchner had initiated. These had affected the pay 
and pensions of the Egyptian officers adversely and led to discontent 
amongst them. At about the same time the South Afrcian war took a 
serious turn and rumours began to circulate that the Sudanese black 
battalions were to be sent there to reinforce British troops. These 
rumours upset the Sudanese battalions. Some of the Junior Egyptian 
officers, who had their own grievances to settle, took advantage of 
their close contact with the black troops and instilled in them a 
mutinous spirit which resulted in the mutiny of 1900^^\ The mutiny 
was, however, confined to the XI and XIV Sudanese battalions and was 
soon crushed. But the incident showed that if the Egyptian army was 
to be depended upon for the maintenance of security in the Sudan, the 
number of Junior Egyptian officers serving with the
(1) Infra,, Ch, 11.
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black battalions should be reduced. Though the number of Junior 
Egyptian officers in the black battalions was gradually reduced 
during the succeeding years, a considerable number had to be 
retained owing to the difficulties in obtaining suitable British 
officers for service in the Sudan. Not the least of these 
difficulties was the reluctance of the War Office to co-operate 
in the provision of attractive conditions of service for seconded 
officers
Moreover, Wingate found it even more difficult to persuade 
the home authorities to station a larger British garrison in the 
Sudan. The barrack accommodation was insufficient and the garrison, 
some two companies during the early years of the re-occupation 
was withdrawn to Egypt during the hot months. The occurrence of 
the mutiny in I9OO and the combined pressure exerted by Cromer 
and Wingate on the home authorities finally resulted in a grant 
of sufficient funds by the British Treasury for the construction 
of additional barracks accommodation^^),
During the First World War the hostile activities of the 
junior Egyptian officers were, however, neutralised by the loyalty 
of the senior Egyptian officers and the support extended to the 
Government by the Sudanese in general including the people of the 
Gezira and the western tribes who, under their acknowledged leader 
al-Sayyid *Abd al Rahman al Mahdi, threw in their wei^t on the 
side of the Government.
The termination of the World War coincided with an outburst 
of popular nationalism in Egypt. Hitherto the Egyptians had not
(1) Infra, Ch. V.
(2) Infra, Ch. V.
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pressed their claims to the Sudan at all, strongly* But from 
1919 onwards, the Sudan became a passion with the Egyptian 
Nationalists, The presence of the major portion of the Egyptian 
army in the Sudan gave them an effective weapon to further their 
ends in that country. The effects of the Egj,^ ptian Nationalist 
propaganda in the Sudan were at first confined to Junior Egyptian 
officers and the Egyptians then residing in the Sudan, At first, 
the Sudanese generally held aloof or followed their respective 
religious Shaykhs, the Sayyids *Ali al - Mrghani, ’Abd al - Rahman 
al - Mahdi and Sharif Yusuf al - Hindi, all of whomc supported 
the Government, The intensification of Egyptian propoganda during 
and after 1921^^), however, alarmed the Sudan officials, A number 
of secret societies had been formed in the Sudan by the young 
educated Sudanese Nationalists who were now making their presence 
felt. They worked in the country amongst the people and were 
responsible for spreading anti-British and pro-Egyptian propaganda. 
Stack, who was then the Governor-General of the Sudan, realised 
how dangerous the infiltration of the Egyptian propaganda could 
be for security in the Sudan. But he could not effectively deal 
with the subversive movements until an agreement had been reached 
between Britain and Egypt as regards the future status of the Sudan, 
The growth of Sudanese Nationalism coincided with the 
resurgence of Mahdiism in the Sudan under the foreceful personality 
of ’Abd al - Rahman al - Mahdi. It has already been noticed that 
the tribes of the Gezira and of southern and western Kordofan 
were staunch Mahdists and had accepted *Abd al — Rahman as their 
leader. In spite of Governmental measures to suppress Mahdiism,
(1) Infra, Ch. VIII
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they looked to him for guidance in their religious and secular 
life. The Sudan Government’s decision to accept ’Abd al - Rahman’s 
help in its fight against Turco - German propoganda and then 
later to counteract the effects of the Egyptian Nationalists had 
greatly hafd increased his authority amongst his followers.
’Abd al - Rahman was cautious and careful in his dealings 
with his followers and used his newly won Governmental patronage 
carefully. But the rise of neo-Mahdiism was no less dangerous 
to security in the Sudan than the Mahdist activity during the 
first decade after the re-conquest. The sporadic Mahdist risings 
of the first decade were local in character and most often pre­
maturely carried out. But the neo-ffeihdists were better educated, 
better organised and better led. ’Abd al - Rahman knew just how 
far he could indulge in political activity without provoking the 
Government into using repressive measures which might break up 
his movement.
By extending official recognition to #Abd al - Rahman, 
the Sudan Government revived a movement which wqs potentially 
dangerous to security. Under ’Abd al - RaWan’s leadership 
the open and unco-ordinated Mahdist resistance of the former days 
died away, but neo - Mahdiism became a security risk which baffled 
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The Khalifa 'ÎA'bdallahi’s successful escape after his defeat on 
the field of Karari on the 2nd of September 1898 meant the contin^iation 
of active military operations in the Sudan, Even though the main Mahdist 
force was defeated and an organised resistance by the main Mahdist army 
had come to an end, the ^alifa could, if unchecked, establish contacts 
with the other Mahdist forces who had not been able to participate in 
the battle of Karari and were still fresh and ready to fight. The main 
problems for Kitchener, who had led the Anglo-Egyptian forces, were, 
therefore, on the one hand to destroy the scattered Mahdist forces and 
on the other to isolate the Khalifa and destroy him before he found time 
to establish bases in Kordofan into which country he had fled.
The principal Mahdist forces still at large were led by the 
following;-
(1) Ahmad Padil.^^^
(2) Ahmad al-Sunni,^^ ^
(3) 'Abd al-Rahim Bey ^lim abu Daqal,^^^
(4) Salih Hammad.^^^
The above amirs were in the Gezirap Al-Khaiim wad Musa, a Ta'a'ishi 
of the Hazrai branch, commanded the Mahdist forces at al-Obeid and Umm 
Bada al-Rida, another Ta'a'ishi, was at al-Pasher in Bar Pur,
(1) AWad Padil was of the tribe of the jubarat br^ch of the Ta'a*isha 
Baqqara and a relative of the Khalifa 'Abd Allahi, R, Hill;
A Biographical Dictionary of the Sudan; P,31, (19&7),
(2) Ahmad al-Sunni was a tribal notable of the Madaniyln family of Wad 
Madani; R, Hill, op cit, P,39.
(3) A tribal leader of the Gharaisiya branch of the Hamar Arabs;
R, Hill; op cit, P,15.
(4) He was a Mahdist Amilr from the Ta'a'isha tribe, R, Hill, op cit,
P. 328,
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Of the above amirs, AWad al-Sunni was the Khalifa*s 'Amil^ "*^  for 
the whole of the Gezera, a post in which he was assisted by a force of 
soldiers comprising 796 jihidfya^^\ 70 Rifles and 29 Camels, As his 
sources of revenue began to dry up on the collapse of the Mahdist rule, 
al-Sunni responded to a letter of amnesty and submitted to Major Talbot 
on 15'”' September 1898, On his submission he was made *Umda of Wad Madani 
town,
*Abd al-Rahim Bey Salim abu Daqal was with a part of Ahmad Padil*s 
retreating army when he received a letter of amnesty from the newly 
established Sudan Government which he promptly accepted and submitted to 
al-Tahir Muhammad Badr al-*Ubaid^^\ Abu Daqal and his men, armed with 
rifles supplied to them by the Sudan Government pursued a Mahdist column 
of Ta'a'islm under Salêh Hammad and defeated them at Pashash%ya , 
capturing Saléh and with him the Khalifa Muhammad Sharif and the Mahdi * s 
sons al-Padil and al-Bushra.
The Khalifa Sharif and the sons of the Mahdi were exiled to Wadi 
Haifa but after some time they were sent back to Omdurman and finally 
allowed to settle at Shukaba, a village near Wad Madani,
Ahmad Padil, with a strong Mahdist force under his command, however,f *
continued to pose a serious threat to security in the East, After the 
disastrous battle of the Atbara in 1898, in which a strong Ifehdist force
(1) »Imil (Arabic) Term used by the Mahdists of an amir charged with the 
governing of a territory or with a mission to collect taxes; R, Hill; 
op cit, P, IX,
(2) Jihadlya, a term used in the Sudan to denote soldiers of negroid origin,
(3) A Mahdist amir and judge, a Masallami by origin. He made peace with the 
Anglo-Egyptian troops after the battle of Pirket#e accompanied the 
Sirdar as the commander of the Masallamiya irregular troops, R, Hill; 
op cit, PP, 332 and 353.
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under Amir Mahmud was destroyed by Kitchener, the Khalifa had sent Ahmad 
Padil to Gadaref and Gallabat to bring men for the defence of Omdurman, 
which was then threatened by the Anglo-Egyptian army. Too late to fulfil
his task, Aknad Padil marched back to Gadaref, Only to find that his
5
(2)
deputy, amir Sa’d Allah^^^ had been, in the meantime, defeated by the
Egyptian troops under Col, Parsons who had taken possession of the town. 
Earlier, on 7th September, Kitchener had issued orders for the 
despatch of a flotilla under Gen, Hunter up the Blue Nile as far as 
Rosaires to plant the British and Egyptian flags, and to watch at the same 
time the movements of Ahmad Padil who with a force of four to five thousand 
men was threatening Parsons,Since there was only one gunboat available, 
Hunter sent it up the Blue Nile under Maj, M»G. Talbot, R,E,, on 11th 
September with instructions to stay at Wad Madani until Hunter himself 
could join it. On the 19th Hunter started up the Blue Nile leaving Gen, 
Rundle(^) in command at Khartoum, He had under him 20 men of Royal Irish 
Fusiliers under Capt, B, Churcher and 600 men of the X Sudanese, After
(1) Sa’d Allah was a Ta’a’ishi amir,
(2) When it became known that Ahmad Pa^l was absent from Gadaref, Col,
Charles Parsons, the commandant at Kaatsalgi, was directed to occupy it.
With a force comprising 8 British officers, 29 Egyptian officers and 
about 1400 NCOS and men. Parsons crossed the river Atbara on 7th 
September 1898 and reached Gadaref on the 22nd, Here he fought the 
Mahdists, about I5OO rifles and I7OO spearmen, a few miles north of 
the town. Beating off the Mahdists under Sa’d Allah in two desperate 
attacks. Parsons advanced and occupied the town, Nur %iqara , a 
Mahdist amir of Dunqulawi origin, ^ who had been left behind by Sa’d Allah, 
surrendered with 150 of his jihadéya and two brass guns. See Gleichan; 
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, P.267, London (1905),
(5) This was in accordance with the decision of the Foreign Office/ who had 
authorised the Sirdar to send two flotillas, one up the \Ihite Nile and 
the other up the Blue Nile, The officer in command of the Blue Nile 
flotilla was instructed to go as far as the foot of the cataract at Rosaires, 
He was, however, warned not to land forces with a view to marching beyond 
the point on the river navigable for steamers. He was also instructed to 
avoid any collision with the^hiqpian forces under Menelik.
P078/4955; Salisbuiy to Cromer; No, 109; Secret; 2 August 1898,
(4) Rundle Pasha; Sir Henry Macleod Leslie; Chief of Staff,
- J
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establishing militaiy posts at Sinnar, Karkoj and Rosaires, Eimter 
returned to Omdurman by 2nd October 1898.
Meanwhile, on 28th September, AWad Pa^l had,attempted to dislodge 
Parsons from Gedaref but had failed. Nevertheless he continued to move 
about in the vicinity of the town causing considerable anxiety to Parsons 
who now asked for reinforcements. Kitchener, who had by now returned from 
Pashoda, decided to send Bundle from Omdurman with an infantry force and 
four companies of Camel Corps to support Parsons,
On 10th October, Parsons reported that Ahmad Padil was at Asser, 10 
miles south of Gedaref, The road between Gedaref and Kassala was fortunately 
open and Parsons hoped to get his ammunition column throu^ from Kassala,
He was confident that he could break up Ahmad Padil’s force once the 
reinforcements under Bundle reached him.
Bundle,on the other hand, despatched Collinson, with only I3OO men, 
to Parsons while he himself remained in the Bahad Valley to reinforce him 
if the troops already sent were found insufficient. The main obstacle to 
moving the whole force to Gedaref was the scarcity of transport camels, 
Collinson arrived at Gedaref on 21st October with reinforcements consisting 
of
Camel Corps; 2 British officers - 1 NCO
2 Egyptian Officers - 245 Sudanese
2 Maxims with I5OOO rounds per gun.
(1) PO 141/399; PO 78/4960; Sirdar to Bodd; 2nd October 1898; & Rodd to 
Salisbury, Tel, No, 256; October 1898,
(2) Ibid. PO 141/339, PO 78/4960, ut Supra,
PO
(3)7141/396; Bodd to Poreign Office;
No. 277; 15th October 1898,
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Artillery; 1 British Warrant Officer
2 Egyptian Officers
4 Maxims on tripods with 15OOO rounds per maxim.
Infantry : ♦ 3 British Officers
18 Egyptian Officers
574 NCOS and men of the XII Sudanese,
After the arrival of the reinforcements^ , Parsons realised that he 
was still not strong enough,to deal successfully with^Altoad Padil whose 
strength was reported to have increased to 4OOO rifles besides spearmen. 
Parsons again requested Bundle to send 700 more men,
Ahmad Padil, however, decided not to waste any more time around 
Gedaref, After a final unsuccessful attempt to retake the town, he moved 
towards Rosaires apparently intending to cross the Nile and join the Khalifa 
who was at the time reported to be near Sherkeila,* Parsons therefore 
asked Bundle to countermand the despatch of the additional reinforcements
(2 ')he had recently asked for, '
On learning about AWad Padil'g movements, Kitchener ordered Bundle 
to prevent him from crossing the river. Bundle now moved up to Abu Haraz 
and made a^neangements to intercept Ahmad P a d i l , A  steamer was sent up 
the Blue N-ile in case Ahmad Padil evaded Bundle,Ahmad Padil was reported 
to be in the thick bush on the Binder River, Since the Egyptian troops 
could not operate away from the river base, friendly Arabs under a certain
(1) PO 78/4960; Cromer to Salisbury; Tel, No, 285;
24th October 1898; also 
PO 141/336; Cromer to Salisbuiy; Tel, No, 290;
27th October 1898,
(2) P0A78/4960; Cromer to Salisbury; Tel, Ng, 290; 27th October 1898,
(3) Ibid,
(4 ) PO 141/336; Cromer to Salisbury; Tel, No, 297; 50th October 1898,
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Abu Bakr Mstafa were set upon Bundle now informed Cromer that
he would himself proceed to Karkoj or Bosaires as soon as the steamer 
which was patrolling south r e t u r n e d , B u t  before Bundle could move south, 
Ahmad Padil, avoiding the Nile, had reached Karkoj, Col, Lewis^^^ hearing 
from Bosaires that Alimad Padil was about to make the crossing now closed 
in with a column of X Sudanese and the Priendlies under Abu Bakr Mustafa,
On 24th December the gunboat 'Malik' and steamer 'Dal' also arrived with 
Maj, Purgu-sson and Capt, Henry Hill and one officer and 30 men of the IX 
Sudanese, Collecting all available forces. Col, Lewis attacked the Mahdists 
on 26th December as they were crossing the river near Dakhila and cut up 
most of Ahmad Padil's forces in a severe action. By leaving his cover of 
thick bush, AWad Fadîl had exposed himself to the attack and certain 
defeat by the Anglo-Egyptian troops, Ahmad Padil himself managed to escape 
but 2000 of his followers finding escape across the Nile impossible 
submitted to Lt, Strickland on 8th January 1899.
With the defeat of Ahmad Padil the reconquest of all the country 
lying to the east of the White Nile was complete. The condition of affairs 
in the region west of the White Nile was, however, less satisfactory.
The K^lifa himself, after the battle of Karari, had escaped into the 
province of Kordofan with the remnants of his army. Kitchener had sent 
Slatin Pasha(^) with the Egyptian Cavalry and Camel Corps and two gunboats
(1) B, Hill does not include Abuo Bakr T^ustafa in his Biographical
Dictionary of the Sudan, while Gleichan just refers him as Amir
Abu Bakr Mustafa who had recently submitted; Gleichen; op cit,, P,267.
(2) PO 141/339; Bundle to Cromer; 14th November 1898,
(3) David Prancis Lewis, 1855 - 1927, In the campaigns of 1897-1898 he 
led the 3^d Egyptian brigade. See B, Hill; op cit,, P,213.
(4) Slatin Pasha, Sir Rudolf Karl Von (1857-1932). He was Assistant
Director of Intelligence at the time; for details see B, Hill: Op cit
PP. 339 and 340.
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in hot pursuit. But the Khalifa, who had an early start, shook off the 
pursuers. The cavalry had followed the Khalifa's track for nearly thirty 
miles and the gunboats, unable to effect landing had sailed for another 
sixty miles before the pursuit was called off, Kordofan was an unwieldy 
province with primitive communications and the home of large Baqqara tribes 
who were ardent Mahdists, It was in this country that Muhammad^!toad, the 
Mahdi, had scored his early successes and had annihilated Hicks at Shaikan 
in 1883# It was a military urgency that the Khalifa should be destroyed 
before he could establish a base, which he was obviously trying to do. He 
was still at the head of a force which, thou^ insignificant by comparison 
with that which he commanded prior to the battle of Omdurman, was still 
not altogether despicable in point of numbers and was dangerous by reason 
of the relative inaccessibility of the region which it occupied.
Kitchener, on the other hand, could not mounj: a military expedition 
against the Khalifa as the troops were already engaged in action against 
Almad Padil, The British troops under Maj, Gen, Gataqre, who had parti­
cipated in the battle of Omdurman, had already been withdrawn soon after 
the battle, leaving the pacification of the country to the Egyptian army. 
Kitchener could^muster only 8000 men at Omdurman, This force was of a 
vastly different composition to that which had.fought at Karori, Miany of 
the senior British officers had left the army, others had been weakened 
by fever while the best of the Egyptian soldiers had passed to the reserve. 
The Sudanese battalions were of course utilized for garrisoning the newly 
acquired territories. Kitchener's only solution was to use the Priendlies 
to contain the Khalifa until he could spare regular troops from the east. 
Prom, the moment of the Klmlifa' s defeat at Karari, most of the desert 
and Kordofan tribes except the Baqqara had joined the Sudan Government,
The 'Ababda of the Nubian desert too had declared their loyalty for the 
new government. Kitchener therefore had a number of friendly Arabs at his
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disposal. He now despatched ^ bd al-^ Azim Bey Hussain Khalifa, an 'Abbadi 
notable and guerilla leader^^^, against the Khalifa 'Abd Allahi, On 5th 
September 1898 »Abd al-'Azim took the desert route and on the morning of 
the 7th reached Shegeig where he came across Arabs who had been attacked 
by the Mahdists, He was informed that the Khalifa had left the place two 
days earlier and had a small following of jihadiya not exceeding 500 men 
and a considerable following of Arabs, Most of these Arabs were believed 
to have been following the Khalifa because he was travelling towards 
their country and were not expected to remain long under his orders.
On the 51st October two companies of 5^d Egyptian battalion were 
sent under Maj, Blewitt to occupy Ducim and Kawa, It was felt that the 
presence of these troops would give the western tribes enough confidence 
to attack the Khalifa, But in November Gen, Maxwell reported from Omdurman 
that these tribes would do nothing unless the Government organised a 
flying column to deal with the Khalifa; then they would cooperate with
(2 )the Government more actively^ ',
Meanwhile intelligence reports indicated that the Khalifa was strong 
enough even to mount a punitive expedition against the jawama'a and that 
the jawama’a had lost heavily though a number of Mahdists had been killed. 
The gialifa had also raided tribes close to Duêim in December, In view of 
the Khalifa’s proximity to the Nile, it was decided to strengthen the 
post at Kawa, On 4'fch December the 2nd Egyptian battalion under Lt, Col#
Pink was ordered to proceed to Duéim and the 5^d Egyptian was sent from 
there to Kawa,
The activities of the K^lifa convinced the Sirdar that the stationing
(1) R, Hill; op cit,, PP, 7 and 8,
(2) PO 141/539; Maxwell to Cromer; 14th November 1898,
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of a British force in Khartoum was not only desirable but was a military
necessity. Both Gen, Grenfell, the GOO in Egypt, and Cromer agreed with
Kitchener that at least two British companies should be sent to the Sudan,
According to Cromer the presence of such a force would not only inspire
confidence amongst the loyal Sudanese but would also keep the black
soldiers under check,Sometime later, towards the end of 1898, while
on a tour of the Sudan, Cromer wrote to Salisbury to arrange for an early
despatch of the British troops,
The delay in the despatch of the British troops was due to the
reluctance of the War Office which was' concerned about the lack of barracks
accommodation, the scarcity of good drinking water and the inadequate
hospital facilities in the Sudan, On Salisbury's insistence the War Office,
however, agreed to despatch two companies of Royal Irish Fusiliers to
Khartoum on condition that they would be withdrawn during the summer 
(’5 ')
months,^ /
On 4th January 1899, Kitchener despatched a flying column under his
-  (4')
brother Col, W, Kitchener against the Kl^lifa^ . Col. Kitchener had with 
him Maj, B.R. Mitford as Staff Officer, 2nd Egyptian battalion, XIV 
Sudanese battalion, two -squadrons of cavalry, two guns, 2 Maxims and 
100 Camel Corps, Besides the regular troops there were 1000 Sha’iqiya
(1) PO 78/4967; Cromer's letter in PO to Treasury, 9th December 1898,
(2) PO 78/5026; R, Rodd to Salisbury; T. NO, 5; 4th January 1899,
(3) PO 78/5025; Salisbury to R, Rodd; Tel, No,5; 6th January 1899;
also PO 141/345; Salisbury to Cromer Tel, No: I, 3rd January 1899.
(4) PO 78/5022; Cromer to Salisbury, Tel, NO, 44; 4th March 1899 
enclosing Kitchener to Cromer, 15th February 1899.
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Arabs, raised and armed at Omdurman under Bashir Bey Kanbal^ **^  and 
650 Hamar Arabs under Ibrahim Bey al Milih^^^ With this impressive 
force Col, W, Kitchener moved against the Khalifa, All possible efforts 
were made to locate the exact position of the Khalifa and the strength 
of the force under his command. But accurate information was not obtainable. 
It was reported that the KMlifa was at Aigeila, But from the beginning 
Col, Kitchener was beset with difficulties. On 10th January Col, Kitchener 
marched out from Bueim but soon afterwards the failure of water supply at 
Zereiga necessitated the abandonment of the advance and the troops were 
back at Bueim on the 14th, The base was now changed to a spot 58 miles south 
of Bueim, On the 17th the Camel Corps started from this place and by the 
25th the whole force was on the move against the Khalifa who was now 
reported to be at Sherkeila, By the 29th Col, Kitchener had reached a 
spot six miles from the KMlifa’s position which was reconnoitered on 
the next day by cavalry and the irregulars. It was reported that the 
Mahdists were drawn up in a strong position covering the approach to 
the water. According to the reports the Khalifa seemed to have not less
(5)than 6000 men with rifles,Col, Kitchener hesitated and then consider­
ing that anything short of a complete success might result in utter 
disaster, decided to retire in the direction of the river.
The Sirdar defended the action of his brother and explained to 
Cromer that in view of the superior strength of the enemy there was no 
other alternative. In the same despatch the Sirdar recommended the
(1) A member of the leading families of the Sha 'iqiya Arabs.
(2) al - Maîih was of the Asakir branch of the Hamar tribe,
(3) PO 78/5022; Kitchener to Cromer; Tel, NO, 14; 5th February 1899 
in Cromer to Salisbury, NO, 52; 10th February 1899,
(4) Ibidi
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acceptance of an offer made by Bashir Bey Kanbal to occupy el-Obeid in
return for an additional grant of £E2000, He felt that the occupation of
el-Obeid would produce a good effect on the Kordofan tribes, Cromer,
however, rejected the offer. By now it was clear to him that military
operations conducted by Priendlies independently of Government troops
would not achieve any considerable success against the Mahdists,^
According to Cromer the army should be given time to recover and a
campaign in sufficient force should be conducted towards the end of the
year. He was, however, willing to reconsider the offer of the Priendlies 
. (2')
if the Sirdar wanted to continue the fight,^ ' Kitchener thereupon agreed 
to postpone the attack on the Khalifa,
The Khalifa now moved from Sherkeila to Gedid, defeating again on the 
way the jawama’a at Saleh wells, 35 miles southwest by west of Pashishuya 
on 15th February 1899.^^^ The Mahdist advance gave rise to many rumours.
It was said at first that the Khalifa was going to retake Omdurman and 
that he commanded a much larger force than had been supposed,
( '5 )
Fearing a Mahdist offensive Kitchener asked for further reinforcements, ' 
On further enquiry from Cromer, regarding the strength of the reinforcements 
he required. Kitchener asked for two battalions of British troops in 
addition to the two companies which were already in the Sudan and six 
maxims manned by Artillery,
(1) PO 78/5022; Cromer to Kitchener, Tel, NO, 3 6; 6th February 1899.
(2) Ibid,
(3) PO 78/5022; Kitchener to Cromer; Tel, NO, 17; 6th February 1899,
(4) PO 141/348; Kitchener to Cromer; 20th February 1899; and
PO 78/5026; Cromer to PO; Tel. NO, 59; 21st February 1899.
(5) PO 78/5026; Kitchener to Cromer in Cromer to P.O.; Tel, NO. 6l;
21st February 1899.
(6) PO 78/5026; Sirdar to Cromer in Cromer to PO; Tel, NO,6 3; 22 February 1899; 
also PO 141/348; Sirdar to Cromer, 22nd February 1899.
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For a long time Kitchener had been trying to induce the Arabs of
Kordofan to combine against the Khalifa but tribal differences always
made it impossible to form any such combination. Kitchener therefore
desired to have the above reinforcements. If the Khalifa were to advance
on Omdurman and again risk a battle in the open it would be an advantage
to have additional British troops,
Gen, R, Talbot, the G.O.C, in Egypt also shared Kitchener’s opinion.
He wrote to the War Office that in view of the situation in the Sudan,
the Sirdar mi^t be reinforced by British troops, as then, "the defeat
of the Dervishes would be greater and more complete," He feared that the
Khalifa might consolidate his power in Kordofan and Der Fur by winning
over the various tribes, either by force or by other means and then
raid the banks of the White Nile or possibly Dongola,^  ^Talbot was
willing to send a company of Royal Irish Fusiliers, then at Cyprus, to
Alexandria, Cromer on the other hand wanted the Foreign Office to request
the War Office to hold a battalion in readiness either at Malta or
Gibraltar in case further reinforcements were required. But no actual
movement of the troops were to be carried out except the company from
( 2)Cyprus which was to be moved,^ '
Rumours of the Khalifa’s advance were soon succeeded by reports 
that the Khalifa with the bulk of his force was only raiding for food 
and was expected to move toelhaÿ al-Ahmada, south of Pashishuya and then 
return to Sherkeila, Since this news was reliable, Kitchener informed 
Cromer that there was no immediate need to move the troops for which 
he Imÿasked,^^^ Meanwhile the Bialifa was watched, A cordon of Arab
(1) PO 78/5037; G.O.C., Egypt to W,0,; 24th February 1899 in War Office
to Poreign Office, 10th March 1899.
(2) PO 78/5026; Cromer to Salisbury, NO 63; 22nd February 1899,
(3) PO 141/348; Sirdar to Cromer; 25th February 1899.
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posts was formed from Dueim to Bara to prevent any communications between
the Khalifa and Northern Sudan and the Hawazma Arabs to the west. The
Kordofan tribes and the inhabitants of the Nuba Mountains in southern
Kordofan were also encouraged to oppose the Khalifa’s foraging parties
and to prevent him from getting fresh supplies. Rumours that the Khalifa
might try to cross the river and move towards Abyssinia kept the gunboats
busy on the V/hite and Blue Niles,^ **^
In June 1899 Maxwell^^^ reported from Khatroum that the Khalifa was
at Umm Talha, ten hours from Bar al-AWada and three days from the river.
His force was estimated by the Baqqara deserters at about 3OOO men, some
of whom had rifles. Maxwell, who was in charge of the Sudan in the absence
of Kitchener, wrote to Cromer that if given necessary authority he would
deal with the Khalifa once for all. There was plenty of water on the
roads and the country" was practicable for the troops. To carry out his
plan, Maxwell needed only 800 men, 4 maxims and two squadrons of cavalry.
He wanted to start from a spot 25 miles south of Jebel Bin and use the
-  (5)
people of Taqali and the followers of abu-Daqal to surround the ^alifa, ^
Cromer forwarded Itawell’s proposal to the Poreign Office recommending 
it on financial grounds. As far as the militarj^  aspect of the proposal 
was concerned he asked the Foreign Office to consult Kitchener who was 
then in England, He, however, felt that the proposed force was inadequate 
for the task,(^)
(1) PO 78/5026; Cromer to Salisbury, Tel, NO 107; 17th May, 1899.
(2) Sir John I4axwell (1859-1929), He was the first Governor of Khartoum,
(3) PO 141/348; l^ laxwell to Cromer; Tel, NO 263; 7th June 1899.
(4) PO 141/345; Cromer to Salisbury; Tel, NO 121; 8th June 1899.
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Kitchener was not in favour of starting any military operation at
the time of the year. Even if the operations were successful, he said,
these might entail more extensive measures than were contemplated hy
Maxwell’s report. Kitchener said that the country in which the operations
would take place was still unexplored and the proposed force was too small.
In his view there was no need for any military operations unless the
Khalifa came down the river,
The Khalifa in the meantime made his way south meeting with
opposition at the hands of Mek al-jaili wad Adam, the Mek of Taqali,
Jaili informed llaxwell that he had captured a gun and many rifles from
the Khalifa, Reporting Jaili’s successes against the lOmlifa, I4axwell
added that according to the IWidist deserters, the Ta’a’ishi and Hahhania
Arabs who had hitherto been loyal followers of the Khalifa were- new
deserting him in large numbers. Under the changed circumstances, Cromer
again wrote to the Foreign Office recommending that Maxwell be given
— (2 )
discretionary powers to take the offensive against the Khalifa,' '
Kitchener, who was still in England, would not agree to any decision 
to attack the l^alifa while he himself was away. He had personally led 
the campaigns against the Khalifa thou^ early in the year he had 
allowed his brother, Col, F,Wo Kitchener, to lead an expedition which 
had ended in a fiasco. He told the Foreign Office that if action against
the Khalifa was imminent, he would himself return to the Sudan, He had
convinced the Foreign Office that the troops were not ready, that transport 
was not available and that the gmlifa’s movements were uncertain. I;a any 
case he disapproved the idea of any expedition unless it could be done
(1) PO 78/5025; Salisbury to Cromer; Tel, NO 74; 11th June 1899.
(2) PO 141/345; Cromer to PO; Tel, NO 127; l6th June 1899.
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properly. Under Kitchener’s pressure the Poreign Office informed Cromer
- f 1 ')
that the Khalifa should be left to himself to fall to pieces,^
Early in July the Khalifa was reported to have moved to Jebel
(2 )Gedir and to have camped at the old camp of the Mahdi,^ •' He was 
harassed by tribes surrounding him but as there was little combination 
among them, he .did not suffer much at their h a n d s , O n e  ’Abd al-Samad, 
a tribal leader of the Awlad Safiya of the Bedairiya Arabs of Kordofan, even 
marched out against the Khalifa with 600 rifles, a few cavalry and spear­
men, On reaching the camp of the Khalifa, ^ bd al-Samad realised that he 
was not strong enough to attack the Khalifa without further support and 
as the neighbouring tribesmen would not join him , he requested support 
from Kitchener,
A new urgency was given to the problem by the unrest amongst the 
Sinnar section of the Kinana Arabs who were reported to be in close 
communication with the Khalifa, The centre of this Mahdi st activity was 
the Khalifa Muhammad Sharif who had been living on parole in the Village 
of al-^uidiaba. It was reported that he and the Kinana Arabs wore
(5)holding meetings with a view to rising, ^  ^It was also rumoured that
^arif was secretly collecting a force which was to march to Goz Abu:-
—  ( 6)
Guma, cross the Nile there and join the Khalifa ’Abd Allahi,^ '
(1) PO 78/5025; Sir T.A^anderson to Cromer; Tel, NO 7 6; 17th June 1899, and 
PO 141/545; Salisbury to Cromer, 17th June 1899.
(2) PO 141/548; Itawell to Cromer; 8th J%ly 1899.
(5) PO 141/548; Maxwell to R, Rodd; 25th July 1899,
(4) PO 78/5026; R.Rodd to Salisbury; Tel, NO I6O; 21st August 1899; also
PO 141/545; Cromer to Salisbury; 21st August 1899,
(5) PO 78/5026; R.Rodd to Salisbury; Tel, NO: I68; 51st August 1899.
(6) S.I.R.; No, 64; l6th July to 51st August 1899,
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One will never know what prompted Sharif to revive the Mahdi81 move­
ment in support of the Khalifa *Ahd Allahi, He had suffered much under 
the Khalifa who had all along treated him with scant respect and had 
controlled his movements. He was in fact dragged along hy the Khalifa in 
his retreat before he surrendered to the Anglo-Egyptian forces. There is 
no reason to believe that he was genuinely interested in the Khalifa’ a 
cause. It is probable that he contemplated strengthening his own position; 
and with the two sons of the Mahdi by his side and the support of the 
Kinana, he was hardly less dangerous than the !^alifa ’Abd Allahi to the 
security in the Sudan, Capt, Smyth, Acting Mudlr of Sinnar, was therefore 
-despatched to arrest SMrif, He reached al-Shukkaba early in the morning 
of 27th August and arrested Sharif along with Bushra and Padil, the Mahdi’s 
sons. The Arabs of the town, some of whom were armed with rifles, attempted 
to rescue the prisoners by opening fire on Government t r o o p s , B u t  the 
attempt failed. The village was thereupon burnt dovm and some 55 prisoners 
were taken into custody.
The Khalifa Sharif and the Mahdi’s sons were tried by court-martial 
and executed by shooting. Kitchener wanted to carry out the death sentences 
on all the prisoners and wired to Rodd, who was acting for Cromer in 
Egypt, to give him the necessary authority, Rodd, however, pointed out to
him the effects of such a whole-sale execution on public opinion in England
(2 )
and suggested that he could pass death sentences on all combatants^ ' and 
lighter sentences on non combatants, I^ is not clear from the records how 
many prisoners were finally sentenced to death, but the situation in the
(1) PO 78/5026; R. Rodd to Salisbury; Tel, NO: I6 4; 29th August 1899,
(2) PO 78/5026; R. Rodd to Salisbury; Tel, NO: 165; 27th August 1899.
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Sinnar province soon quietened down,^ "*^  As a precautionary measure half
  ( 2 )
the XIV Sudanese battalion was moved to Goz Abu Guma, ^
This outburst of Mahdiism impressed upon Kitchener the need to
dislodge the Khalifa at the earliest opportunity. By the end of August the
Khalifa appears to have been at Gedir, Mitford and Mahon who had been
reconnoitering the country between Kaka and the IVhite Nile reported much
less difficulty from road and fly,^^^
On receipt of these reports preparations were at once commenced to
launch the expedition. Kitchener proposed to have 7OOO men under his 
f 4-)command, ^ ' They consisted of two infantry brigades, five companies of 
Camel Corps and 8 Maxims, Kitchener wanted to send the main body on 
the 8th or 9th October and himself leave for Goz Abu Guma on the 10th, 
Cromer approved the plan and the second expedition against the Khalifa 
was launched,
On the 13th Kitchener reported from Goz Abu Guma that he would land 
at Kaka about the l6th. He expected that the march from Kaka to the
(1 ) -position held by the Khalifa would take eight days,'  ^ The Khalifa 
appeared to have moved to Jebel Garada, five or six miles from Gedir,
On his arrival at Kaka, Kitchener found that the water on the roads
(1) S.I.R,, No: 65; 1st September - 20th November 1899,
(2) PO 141/348; Sirdar to Cromer; 20th September 1899,
(3) PO 141/348; Sirdar to Cromer, 20th September 1899; and also
PO 141/345; Cromer to PO; No: 175; 20th September 1899.
(4) PO 141/348; Sirdar to Cromer; 5th October 1899.
(5) PO 78/5026; Cromer to Salisbury; 4th October 1899.
(6) PO 141/345; Cromer to Salisbury; Tel. No: 185; 9th October 1899.
(7) PO 141/348; Cromer to Salisbury; Tel. No: 16*7; 1,3th October 1899,
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had dried up. He therefore changed his route and marched by Pungor to
Gadir, Pungor was reconnoitered by cavalry and was found fifty miles
distant from the river and without water. Kitchener then arranged water
stations on the road and sent a battalion on the 21st, He hoped to
concentrate the whole force at Pungor by the 25th from where he expected
to take three days to reach the Khalifa’s position,
On their arrival at Pungor, the advance portion of the Government
force found that the Khalifa had already moved his camp. As the Khalifa
had an early start. Kitchener considered it impossible to overtake him.
He therefore ordered the whole force to return to Omdurman, though the
Cavalry and Camel Corps were instructed to go from Pungor to Gedir as
(2 )a patrol before returning, '  ^Kitchener explained away the failure of the 
expedition to Cromer by pointing out that this result of the expedition 
was always probable.
Kitchener himself returned to Omdurman on 27th October 1899 and
requested Cromer to despatch a detachment of British troops to Khartoum
'evil
(4)
as had been done during the pre ous year,^^^ This request was complied
with without great difficulty.
On the 21st November the Khalifa was reported to be at Gedid and 
A^ad Padil at Nafisa, a pool about 25 miles from the river on the road 
to Gedid,Thereupon Wingate and Lewis with a force of one squadron
(1) PO 141/548; Sirdar to Cromer; T. No: 52; Goz Abu Guma,
21st/22nd October 1899; 
also PO 78/5026; Cromer to Salisbury; Tel, No.195; 22nd October 1899.
(2) PO 141/548; Sirdar to Cromer; T.No, 33; Goz Abu Guma, 25th October 1899, 
also PO 78/5026; Cromer to Salisbury; Tel, No.195 Cairo, 25th October 1899,
(3) PO 78/5026; Cromer to Salisbury; Tel. No, 200; Cairo, 12th November 1899.
(4) PO 78/5025; T.A, Sanderson to Cromer; Tel,No,113; 18th November 1899.
(5) PO 141/348; Kitchener to Cromer; Tel. No,43; 21st November 1899; also
PO 78/5026; Cromer to Salisbury; Tel, No:204; 22nd November 1899.
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of cavalry, six mountain guns, six maxims, 500 camel corps, two black
battalions, I70O rifles and 1100 jihadiya were ordered to leave Pashishuya
to surprise Ahmad Padil/
Wingate left Pashishuya on the 22nd November. But when he arrived at
Nefisa, he found the place had already been evacuated by Ahmad Padil. He
therefore pushed on to Abu Adel where he found Ahmad Padil with his force.
The Mahdists were immediately engaged by mounted troops under Mahon who had
with him 4 maxims, 2 guns and the Jilmdeya under Gorrings, The Mahdists
charged to within 80 yards of the guns, but Wingate arrived just in time
with the infantry to support Mahon and the Mahdists were defeated. Reporting
Cromer
the success against the Mahdists, Kitchener informed/that Wingate’s further
( 2Imovements would depend on his finding water,' ^
A reconnoitering party of the Arabs in the meantime located the 
Khalifa’s position at Umm Uiwaykàæattc The column then marched in the night 
and arrived within the sight of the Khalifa’s camp at dawn on the 24th,
At 5,15 a.m, the Mahdists under the Klmlifa advanced to attack. The guns 
then opened fire and soon the engagement became general. Half an hour later 
the whole line advanced and swept throu^ the Mahdi st camp which was 
occupied. The gialifa and most of the Mahdi st amirs were found deaâ after the 
action,
(1) PO 141/348; Sirdar to Cromer; Tel, No,43» 21st November 1899»
also PO 78/5026; Cromer to Salisbury; Tel, No:204; 22nd November 1899.
(2) PO 141/348; Sirdar to Cromer; Tel, No: 4 6; 23rd November 1899; also
PO 78/5026; Cromer to PO; Tel, No: 205; - November 1899.
(3) PO 141/348; Sirdar to Cromer; No, 4 6; 25th November 1899;
PO 141/345» Cromer to Salisbury; No, 208; 25th November 1899;
PO 78/5024; Cromer to Salisbury; Tel, No: 204; 2nd December 1899.
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The death of the Khalifa brought to a successful conclusion active 
military operations in the Sudan, The reconquest took nearly three and a 
half years to complete. It had been originally planned in two phases, 
the first phase being the occupation of Dongola, The second phase, which 
took the Anglo-Egyptian troops to Omdurman, was usually regarded as a 
fairly remote prospect until the success at Atbara, However, the escape of 
the Khalifa soon after the battle of Karari complicated the situation and 
the period of military operations was lengthened by a further period of 
fourteen months. During the last phase of the operations, the fight against 
the Khalifa was carried on mainly by the Egyptian army though detachments 
of the British troops were kept in garrison at Khartoum,
The unquestioned command of the Nile and its tributaries enabled the 
Sirdar to occupy the greater paryof the Sudan, All towns and stations on 
the rivers were at the mercy of the gunboats. But beyond the rivers, in 
the thick bush, the Egyptian army, with its elaborate administrative tail, 
and trained to face the enemy in open country, was at a severe disadvantage 
when the I^ lahdists were driven from their strongholds, and resorted to 
highly mobile guerilla tactics. Both AWad Padil in the Blue Nile and 
the Khalifa in Kordofan caused considerable anxiety to Kitchener, Ahmad 
Padil was forced to expose himself before his power was broken. But the 
Khalifa in Kordofan could not easily be brought down, Kordofan was his 
homeland. Here he had greater space to move about and he could operate 
far away from the Nile, He moved from one place to another during his last 
days, often replenishing his supplies by attacking the tribes. The tribes 
were themselves disunited and individually they could do him little harm. 
The Anglo-Egyptian troops too could not be effectively used against the 
Khalifa before the country was reconnoitered or communications improved. 
The climate either too wet which made the movement of the army
difficult or'too dry in which cast insuffient quantities of water was
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available for men and animals. Kitchener would not risk a battle before 
completing arrangements in every detail. If it had been possible, he 
would have asked for large British reinforcements before invading Kordofan, 
But he knew that the South African war was in progress and that the War 
Office could not easily be persuaded to sanction extra British troops.
He had to fall back on the Egyptian armj^  and the Priendlies to put down 
the Khalifa. The question of the reliability of the Egyptian army is 
discussed in more detail in the following chapter. Suffice it to say that 
the Egyptian army particularly the black troops, combined with the friendly 
Arab tribes of the Sudan successfully penned down the Khalifa and forced 
him to give battle which resulted in his death and the destruction of 
the last large Mahdi st force on the field of Umm Uwayk&rB/bt,
CHAPTER II
AI





In the absence of an adequate force of British troops in the Sudan,
the Egyptian army was used in the final phase of military action against
the Khalifa, Of the 18000 men of the Egyptian army about 5000 were the
Sudanese troops comprising six battalions, viz,, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII and
the XIVth. These were the black battalions of the Egyptian army and were
stationed in the Sudan, The remainder were of course the Egyptian fallah
battalions, a major portion of which was also stationed in the Sudan, while
the British troops were reduced to two companies in garrison at Khartoum,
Under the circumstances the Sudan Government depended mainly on the 
the
Egyptian army in/Sudan for its security.
For some time before the end of 1898 discontent had been noticed in 
the Egyptian army. It appears that service in the Sudan was unpopular 
with the Egyptian troops, especially amqngst the junior officers to whom
f 1it meant a sentence of perpetual banishment. '  ^Another reason for the
discontent was that the conditions of service were not favourable enough
to reconcile these officers to their forced exile. To this was added the
stem rule of Kitchener which was irksome to most of the Egyptian officers.
In March 1899 Cromer privately wrote to Salisbury that if the Sudan was
to be held by an army composed partly of the Sudanese and partly of
Egyptians, considerable modifications would have to be made in the
(2 )
existing conditions of service in the Sudan.' ' He opposed the policy of 
stationing the whole Egyptian army in the Sudan. According to him a system 
of relief could be adopted by stationing a number of battalions in Egypt. 
This would mitigate to some extent the prevailing discontent in the 
Egyptian array. Secondly he recommended liberal periods of annual leave 
for the Egyptian officers in order to reconcile them to the service in
(1) An officer served for his life time, whereas the soldier was enlisted 
for only six years.
(2) PO 141/342; Cromer to Salisbury; Private; 26th March 1899,
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the Sudan# Thirdly, he wanted Kitchener to resume the former practice of
(1)paying extra allowance to the troops in the Sudan.
Kitchener held different views on improving service conditions in
the Egyptian army. "V/hat the Egyptian officers want", he wrote to Cromer,
—  ^
"is increased pay and pension; they know that during Ismail Pasha’s
time pay in the Sudan was either i or i extra and a year’g service was
counted as a year and a half for pension, and they want to know what we
(2)
are going to do for them."'  ^Kitchener suggested that instead of dealing 
with the field allowance regulations it would he better to increase the 
pay in the Sudan, If the field allowances were re-introduced, he added, 
it would appear that he had acted unjustly and that he was being forced 
to re-introduce them.by popular outcry. Besides, this would not meet the 
case of what the officers considered they should have# However, he agreed 
that the pay of the junior officers was too low.
Kitchener further promised to keep a garrison of two infantry 
battalions, two squadrons of cavalry and two battalions of artillery in 
Cairo and made a beginning by placing the 3rd Egyptian battalion under 
orders to move to Egypt, He also sanctioned leave of absence for nearly 
15 officers and men#^^^ He also agreed that all NCOs and men would be 
given leave of one month in their village every second year and with a 
Depot Battalion in Cairo he hoped to arrange that soldiers would serve 
one year in Egypt out of their six in thâi.Sialiin.
(1) Kitchener had stopped the field allowance granted to the Egyptian 
army,
(2) FO 141/348; Sirdar to Cromer; Tel, No: IO6 ; 31st March I9OO,
(3) FO 141/348; Sirdar to Cromer; Tel, No: 111; 1st April 1899,
(4) FO 141/348; Sirdar to Cromer; Tel, No; 112; 2nd April 1899,
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The reforms initiated in the Egyptian army by Kitchener failed to
satisfy the junior officers who continued to show their discontent in
private discussions. But the fear that Kitchener inspired was such that
as long as he was connected with the Egyptian army, there was no immediate
danger of open trouble. But when the fear he inspired had been withdrawn
('1')
some such trouble was expected,' '
The departure of Kitchener and with him a number of British officers
in December 1899 brought matters to a head. He left behind an army seething
with discontent and a number of new inexperienced British officers and
NCOs who had recently arrived. These new British officers by their ignorance
of Arabic and the traditions of the British officers in the Egyptian army
and by their injudicious treatment of native troops, added further confusion
to the already deteriorating situation in the Sudan, The Khedive^bbas Hilmi
himself appears to have taken no pains to hide his personal dislike of 
c __
Kitchener, Abbas was ever ready to listen to any complaint that was brought 
to his notice and had given it to be understood that he was unable to 
remedy any kind of military grievance. With the Egyptian army, constituted 
as it was, this was quite sufficient to foster a mutinous spirit which 
only required an occasion to burst into flame.
While the situation in the Egyptian army was deteriorating, the war 
in South Africa took a serious turn, Ld, Roberts, the Commander-in-Chief
(2)
in South Africa, wanted more and more troops,'  ^ Cromer, on his part, 
promised to send ten maxims complete with carriages and harness with
(5)200,000 rounds,'^/ The impression created especially upon the Egyptian 
officers by the British reverses in South Africa was profound. This news,
(1) PO 141/354, Cromer to Salisbury, Private, Tel,, 26th January I9OO,
(2) PO 141/354; PO to Cromer; T.No,3; 13th January I9OO; and also
PO 141/354; Cromer to Salisbury; T, No: 4;14th January I9OO,
(3) PO 141/354; Cromer to Salisbury; 14th January 1900,
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followed by rumours that a revolt had taken place at Cairo and that the 
Sudanese troops were about to be sent to South Africa, made the situation 
in the Egyptian army explosive. It only needed a spark to fire the charge, 
and this was furnished by the order given by Maxwell to the Sudanese 
troops to hand in their ammunition,^ There was no difficulty at first 
in collecting the ammunition from the men and the collected ammunition 
was placed under the respective battalion guards ready to be transported 
to the store,' ' But the men particularly of the XIV Sudanese battalion 
were so excited and disturbed by the rumour that they were going to be
sent to South Africa after being disarmed that they decided to take back
their ammunition and resist the o r d e r , I n  this they were encouraged by 
the junior Egyptian officers. On the ni^t of 22nd/23rd Januarj^  1900 a 
considerable quantity of ammunition was carried off by the men of the XJV 
Sudanese to their barrack rooms, the guards having been easily forced. On 
the next day the XI Sudanese also showed signs of disaffection, A deputation 
of five belonging to this battalion asked to be brou^t before the officer 
commanding and requested him to keep the ammunition under quarter guard 
instead of returning it to the store. When they were told that they would
be supplied with new ammunition, they wanted to retain the old till the
arrival of the new, They were, however, told that orders must be obeyed 
and carried out. When the regimental mules arrived to carry away the
(1) Wingate presumed that the unrest in the Egyptian awmy must have been the 
cause for such an order, W.P, Durham, Box 270/1/I Note on the Mitiny by 
Wingate,
(2) PO 78/5086; Bough Notes by Col, Jackson, Incl, 3 in Cromer to PO; 
Private; 17th Pebruary I9OO,
(3) W.P. Durham; Box 27O/I/I; Note on the Mutiny in Ogdurman by E, Wingate; 
also: PO 78/5086; Incl, I in No,3; Wingate to Cromer; 5th Pebruaiy I9OO
in Cromer to Salisbury; No:27; Confidential, 10th Pebruaiy 1900,
(4) PO 78/5O86; Rough Notes by Col, Jackson; Incl, 3 in Cromer to FO;
Private; 17th Pebruary 19OO,
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ammunition, the men of the XI Sudanese rushed the mules and carried away 
whatever ammunition they could get. Mathews, who commanded the XI Sudanese 
was unable to stop them. However, he posted sentries with fixed bayonets 
over each exit from the barracks in order to search for the ammunition, ^
A serious situation was now avoided only with great difficulty as the 
soldiers' wives, hearing of the disturbance arrived to help their husbands 
armed with sticks and knives,
In order to temporize with the Sudanese troops. Maxwell, the 
Governor of Khartoum, now permitted 500 rounds per battalion to be kept 
for guard purposes. As the commanders also kept their ammunitions under 
their respective quarter guards, a quieting effect was produced.
By 26th January 1900 the worst incident appeared to be over though 
a large amount of ammunition was still unaccounted for,^^^ Cromer wrote 
to Salisbury that a success in South Africa would greatly relieve the 
tension in the Suda n , W i t h  the approval of Cromer, Wingate, the Sirdar 
designate of the Egyptian army, sent Col. Jackson, the Civil Secretary of
(5)the Sudan Government, to the Sudan to take charge of the situation there, ' 
Soon after reaching Omdurman, Jackson interviewed many old soldiers of 
the various Sudanese battalions. He came to know that one Capt, Ma^ud 
Effendi Mukhtar of the XIV Sudanese had instructed certain of his NCOs
(1) Ibid.
(2) PO 78/5086; Wingate to Cromer; 5th Pebruary 1900; Incl. I in No.3; 
Cromer to Salisbury; No.27; Confidential; 10th Pebruary 1900,




to persuade their men to rush the guards on the lïîght^of 22ad/23rd 
( 1 )
January 1900, 'f MuJ^tar was arrested hut Maxwell was not sure whether 
he was the real head of the mutiny * ^ ^ ^
On 31st January Jackson reported to Wingate that the disaffection 
amongst the Egyptian officers, especially amongst the junior officers and 
of a few Sudanese officers from the Military School, was serious. But all 
the Sudanese officers who had been promoted from the ranks were loyal and 
so were all the old soldiers,He also informed Wingate that the Bairam 
parade ordered by Maxwell was cancelled, as a report had been circulated 
that it was being held with a view to disarming the men, Maxvjell’s 
suggestion that the XIth and the $17 Sudanese should be charged the price 
of the balance of ammunition not yet returned was opposed by Jackson, who 
feared that this would give a fresh pretext to the officers to get at the 
Sudanese who were still suspicious,
Jackson carried on investigations till the 7th of February thou^ 
information continued to be collected even after that date. On the 1st 
February he had interviewed three men of each company of the XI Sudanese 
and after much discussion had convinced them that the Government did not 
distrust them; on the other hand their action was hasty and wrong,
Assured by Jackson that he would help in the release of prisoners, the XI 
Sudanese returned almost all the ammunition unaccounted for,' ' On the 
2nd and 3rd of February Jackson interviewed a similar party of the XIV
(1) FO 78/5086; Hough Notes by Jackson in Cromer to PO; Private,
17th Pebruary I9OO,
(2) PO 78/5090; Cromer to Salisbury; No. 25; 30th January 1900,
(3) PO 78/5O86; Rough Notes by Col. Jackson in Cromer to PO; Private; 
17th February 1900,
(4) PO 78/5O86; Rough Notes by Col. Jackson in Cromer to PO; Private; 
17th Pebruary 1900,
(5) PO 78/5O86; Wingate to Cromer; No,13; 5th Pebruary 190O in Cromer to 
Salisbury, No,27; Confidential; 10th Pebruary I9OO,
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Sudanese* These men were at first sulky but when he explained to them 
that the ammunition had been withdrawn in error and that the Government 
had never suspected the Sudanese, they agreed to return the ammunition, 
Jackson on his part promised that he would recommend the release of the 
NCOS and men on the arrival of the Sirdar, He also promised that he would 
place before the Sirdar for consideration their request for the renewal 
of the old order by which every man retained 20 rounds wrapped up for
('1')guard purposes, while the remainder was placed in the battalion stores,^ '
But the ammunition had not been returned when he met the party again on
the He also talked to the company which had been on duty on the
night of 22nd/23rd January, but with no result. From his interviews with
the representatives of the XIV battalion it appeared that this battalion
had been unfortunate in having three commanding officers in succession,
particularly the last one, Sloman, who were unduly severe and "down on
the men". This had thrown the battalion completely into the hands of the
Egyptian officers, Jackson, however, established contacts with some of the
senior Sudanese men, who under the pledge of secrecy agreed to supply the
(2)information necessary to end the crisis,^ ^
In the meantime, on the 29th January, Wingate left Cairo for Khartoum
armed with a letter from Khedive deprecating the insubordination in the
Egyptian army and authorising him to losq6o time in restoring order and
(x\
punishing the guilty,^  ^It was, however, known in the army circles that
(1) FO 78/5O86; Rough Notes by Col, Jackson in Cromer to F.O.j Private;
17th February 1900,
(2) FO 78/5086; Rough Notes by Col. Jackson, in Cromer to FO; Private,
17th February 1900; also Wingate to Cromer, No,13; 5th February 1900 
in Cromer to Salisbury, No,27; Confidential, 10th February 19OO,
(3) WoP. Durham, Box 270/I/I; Note by Wingate on the Mutiny in Omdurman, 
I9OO; See also: FO 141/354; Cromer to Salisbury, Secret^30th January
1900,
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the Biedive was sympathetic to the Egyptian officers.Wingate, therefore, 
before he left Cairo wanted to have in his hands a document from the 
Khedive definitely disassociating himself from the movement in Omdurman, 
Soon after his arrival at Khartoum, Wingate examined all the 
information collected by Jackson and decided to hold a reception at 
Omdurman, his first as Sirdar and Governor-General of the Sudan. As a 
precautionary measure the garrison of Seaforth Highlanders was sent across 
Khartoum and stationed in a large yard not far distant from the Omdurman 
Headquarters where the reception was to be held.(^)
At the reception Wingate announced that he would receive any officer 
who wished to speak to him after the levee. There were about 500 officers 
who attended the levee, a large number of whom assembled in the yard to 
discuss the situation in the Sudan. Some of the senior men who acted as 
spokesmen for others said that they were disturbed by the financial reforms 
instituted by Kitchener and that the XIV Sudanese had shown their concern
by breaking into their guard rooms, seizing the ammunition stored there
(4)
and expelling the British officers,Some of the junior officers hinted
that a fresh start could be made if the arrested officers were released, 
Wingate told these officers that he would not even look into their 
complaints until the XIV Sudanese had complied with their orders.
(1) PO 78/5086; Mr, F.J. Nason to Col, Jackson; 5th February 1900 in 
Cromer to FO; Private, 17th February 1900.
(2) Cromer had planned to send the Seaforth Highlanders which was in 
garrison at Khartoum and the Camaroons from Egypt to South Africa; 
FO 141/554; Cromer to Salisbuiy, 14th January 1900;
But in view of the mutiny in the Sudan he decided to retain 
the Seaforth; FO I41/354; Cromer to Salisbury, 25th January 1900,
(3) W.P. Durham; Box 27O/I/I; Note by Wingate on the Mutiny in Omdurman,
1900.
(4) FO 78/5O86; Wingate to Cromer; No,13; 5th February 1900; in Cromer 
to Salisbury; No. 27; 10th February 1900,
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In his report to Cromer on the general situation in the Sudan, 
Wingate confirmed Jackson's findings that there had been much mismanage­
ment of the Egyptian officers for some time and that many of them had 
real reasons for complaint,^^  ^ Wingate proposed to scrutinize the 
complaints of the officers if the ammunition was returned. If, on the 
other hand, the XIV Sudanese continued their defiance, he would then 
adopt a firm attitude and try Capt, Mal^ud Mukhtar on a serious charge
and refuse to deal with the complaints till the insubordination was 
(2)
crushed, ^ In a subsequent telegram to Cromer, Wingate proposed to 
appoint a commission, after the XIV Sudanese had submitted, to collect 
evidence from the officers with awiawto putting their complaints before 
the Government,
Cromer agreed that there could be no question of making concessions 
until the ammunition had been handed over. He suggested two methods to 
deal with the situation, the first was to appoint a Commission as Wingate 
had suggested - but this would take time. The alternative was to come 
to some immediate decisions as to what concessions were possible and to 
announce them either after the ring leaders had been punished or 
simultaneously. He offered to send additional British troops to the Sudan 
and even suggested the disbandment of the XIV Sudanese,
Wingate refused the offer of additional British troops and did not 
consider it necessary to disband the XIV Sudanese, He informed Cromer
(1) PO 78/5086; Wingate to Cromer; No, 13; 5th February I9OO in
Cromer to Salisbury; No, 27; Confidential; 10th February 1900.
(2) Ibid,
(3) FO 78/5086; Wingate to Cromer; No.15; 5th February 1900;
in Cromer to Salisbury; No. 27; Confidential, 10th February 1900,
(4) FO 78/5O86; Cromer to Wingate ; No, 5A; 6 th February 1900 in Cromer
to Salisbury; No, 27; Confidential, 10th February 1900,
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that the stolen ammunition was slowly being returned and that there was 
a change for the better in the general situation in the Sudan, If the 
XIV Sudanese were to be disbanded at this stage, Wingate added, it would 
set the clock back. He said that in the event of the Court of Inquiry 
being held, he would ask the court to collect officially evidence against 
officers and to advise as to the degree to which the officers were 
implicated,
By the 8th of February, nearly 5OOO rounds had already been returned 
and more were forthcoming, Wingate was hopeful that the situation would 
improve. He informed Cromer that in the event of the whole of the 
ammunition being returned, he would constitute the Court of Inquiry and 
wanted to read in the open court, in addition to the Khedive’s letter of 
the 29th Januaiy, a communication whose purport should be that Wingate 
considered the complaints to have some foundation and that he would ask
( 2)the Government to consider them,^ '
Cromer promised to send a message signed by the Minister of War, He 
also agreed to support concessions to remedy real grievances but only 
after the junior officers were made to feel the displeasure of the
( 5')Government,^ /
As the situation in the Sudan continued to show signs of improvement, 
Wingate assembled the Court of Inquiry on the 12th February with Col,
(1) FO 78/5086; Wingate to Cromer; No, 19» 6th February 1900; in Cromer
to Salisbury, No, 27; Confidential; 10th February I9OO,
(2) FO 78/5O8 6; Wingate to Cromer; No, 25; 8th February I9OO in Cromer
to Salisbury; No, 27; Confidential, 10th February 1900,
(5) FO 78/5O86; Cromer to Wingate; No, 15» 8th February I9OO; in Cromer
to Salisbury, Nq. 27; Confidential; 10th February I9OO,
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Jackson as the President,The questions of grievances and of in­
subordination were so intimately connected that the same court was asked 
to deal with both the questions but it was instructed not to discuss 
the former until the latter was settled,
The court, however, made slow progress in collecting the evidence. 
Seven or eight instigators were marked down and it was expected to take 
weeks to try each one of them by Court-Martial, Wingate wanted to know 
whether Cromer had any objection if the ring leaders were sent to Cairo 
without previous warning and if on their arrival there a decision were 
published cashiering the worst and putting the others on half pay or 
p e n s i o n , H e  also informed Cromer that the officers of the Cavalry 
had sent in petitions demanding extra working pay and rations when employed 
on military works and hi^er appointments for the Egyptian officers in 
general,
The XIV Sudanese had not yet accounted for nearly 4OOO rounds and the 
arrest of an officer of the XI Sudanese was bitterly resented by the men 
of his battalion. This only proved that the discipline of the army was 
completely s h a k e n , U n d e r  these circumstances Cromer was not prepared 
to grant any concession to the Egyptian officers. He informed Wingate 
that there were two ways of dealing with the question. If the troops were 
completely out of hand and no reliance could be placed upon them,
(1) PO 403/297; Cromer to Salisbury, No,40; 25th February 1900,
It is curious to note that Maxwell, who had originally issued the 
order which sparked off the mutiny was not present at the Inquiry,
(2) FO 78/5086; Wingate to Cromer, No, 33; 9th February 1900; in Cromer 
to Salisbury; Nq . 27; Confidential, 10th February 1900,
(3) FO 78/5987; Wingate to Cromer; Nq. 71 ; 19th February 1900; in Cromer 
to Salisbury, No, 38; Confidential; 25th February 1900,
(4 ) FO 141/354’f Cromer to Salisbury; 21st February 1900,
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decisive measures would be impossible without incurring excessive risks
to the British officers and the British garrison. It would be better to
temporize until the insubordination could be crushed by increasing the
British garrison. In the second place, he suggested that Wingate after
issuing an order cashiering certain officers and putting others on half
pay and pension should put them on board a boat. If anybody showed the
least hesitation in obeying his orders, he should shoot him down with the
help of the British detachment and the loyal portion of the Egyptian 
(0army,' ' In support of his suggestion to Wingate, Cromer asked Salisbury
to reinforce the British garrison in Egypt, He said that he could not
(2 )
send troops to the Sudan without additional British troôps in Egypt,'
the 
id/1Cromer’s request was acceded to an War Office wanted to know the 
number of troops he needed,
Fortunately the Court of Inquiry completed the first and the most 
important part of its proceedings by the 22nd of February, With regard 
to the insubordination in the XIV Sudanese, Capt, MaWud Effendi Mukhtar 
was held responsible. But owing to the difficulty in obtaining evidence 
against him and, as a conviction on a minor charge of neglect of duty 
would not serve the interest of discipline, the Court recommended that he 
be cashiered. The court also recommended the dismissal of It, Mustafa 
Lutfi of the XIV Sudanese and 2nd Lieutenant Ahmad Shakdr of the same
(1) FO 78/5087; Cromer to Wingate; No, 47; 20th February 1900, in 
Cromer to Salisbury; No. 58; 25th February 1900.
(2) FO 141/354; Cromer to Salisbury, Private, 21st February 1900,
(3) FO 141/354; Salisbury to Cromer; Private, 22nd February 19OO,
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battalion but the latter was placed on half pay in consideration of his 
youth and inexperience,^*'^
In the case of the XI Sudanese, the Court held Capt. Hasan Labib, 
whose company was still insubordinate, as the chief offender. He' was 
dismissed from the service. Corporal Bilal al-Nur was reduced to the ranks 
before being discharged and Lt, Salfeh of the 8th Egyptian Battalion was 
dismissed and 2nd Lt, Mustafa Shami was placed at the bottom of the roll 
of officers,
Wingate informed Cromer that he would record briefly the judgement 
in a general order and read it before the officers. The condemned officers 
would be present and their swords would be taken away before they were 
placed on board a steamer which would take them north, Wingate wanted to 
inform the prisoners that the Khedive had confirmed the recommendations 
of the C o u r t , B u t  the Khedive was away on the Libyan frontier and was 
not expected to return to Cairo for a number of days, Cromer therefore 
sent a confirmatory telegram from Mustafa Pasha Eahmi, the President of 
the Council of Ministers,
On 24th February, Wingate read out the Court’s decision before the 
British and 100 Egyptian and Sudanese officers and received the guilty 
officers’ swords. The whole proceedings passed off smoothly and the 
officers were sent to Cairo,
As the crisis in Omdurman was over, Cromer informed Salisbury that
(1) FO 78/5087; Wingate to Cromer; No. 84; 22nd February 1900 in Cromer 
to Salisbury; No, 38; 25th February 1900,
(2) Ibid,
(3) Ibid,
(4) FO 78/5087; Cromer to Wingate; No, 57; 22nd February 19OO in which 
Cromer to Salisbury, Nq. 38; 25th February 1900.
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the additional British reinforcements he had asked for were not required/**^
In a subsequent despatch, Cromer told Salisbury that though the Khedive’s
conduct in the past and the sympathy with which he had listened to complaints
had contributed to create a very serious spirit Of insubordination, the
(2)
Khedive had no intention of instigating anything approaching a mutiny.
But Cromer and Wingate were desirous that the Khedive should see the 
officers who were dismissed. Their objection to written orders sent in 
the Khedive’s name was that the native population did not consider these 
as representing his real opinion. It was thought that there would be less
scope for misrepresentation if the Khedive personally addressed the
Lgre
(4)
officers,On his return the Khedive ag ed to see the officers and
according to Cromer the effect was good.
The mutiny of 1900 considerably complicated the problem of security
in the Sudan, It was now clear that no reliance could be placed on the
loyalty of the Egyptian army. According to Cromer the Egyptian army was
the greatest danger in the Sudan and in this condemnation he included
(5)both the Sudanese and the fallah troops,' ' On the other hand Kitchener 
did not doubt the loyalty of the Sudanese battalions though he noted 
that the amount of reliance that could be placed on the Egyptian army in 
case of an emergency depended on the strength of the Imperial forces 
stationed in the Sudan and E g y p t , B u t  the British troops could not
(1) FO 141/554? Cromer to Salisbury; No, 47? 26th February 1900,
(2) FO 403/297; Cromer to Salisbury; Tel, No,55? Secret; l6th I4arch 1900,
(3) Ibid,
(4) Ibid,
(5) W.O. 106/41 ; War Office to Foreign Office; No, I, Secretary; 24th 
October 1902,
(6) W.O, 106/41 ; War Office to Foreign Office, Incl, 2 in No, I(a);
24th October 1902,
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always be usefully employed in some regions, particularly those of the
southern and western Sudan due to adverse climatic conditions. Yet some
of these parts were the very centres of Mahdiism, which was still a potent
danger to security in the country. Consequently the Sudan Government had
to look to the Sudanese battalions again,who alone could be usefully
employed in these centres of unrest. Hitherto these battalions were
officered by Egyptians in the junior commissioned ranks. Since the mutiny
had revealed the Egyptians as the source of mischief, Wingate set about
reorganising the Sudanese battalions by eliminating Eg;^ p^tian officers
and posting British officers in their places. Steps were also taken to
distribute the Egyptian army in the provinces. Meanwhile on Cromer’s
insistance considerable reductions were also carried out in the Sudanese
^ d  Egyptian battalions,Senior Sudan officials including Jackson,
(2 )
Fergusson and Slatin objected strongly to these reductions,'  ^ Jackson 
wired to Wingate urging him to reduce the Egyptian battalions if 
reduction was absolutely necessary, for these could not be employed in 
the southern provinces of the Sudan, but if the Sudanese battalions were 
disbanded it would be difficult to re-form them in future, Wingate 
shared his officers’ views, but he was asked by Cromer to carry out the 
reductions. It is rather an odd paradox that the armed forces (or a part 
of them) had to be reduced in order to increase security in the Sudan,
(1) FO 78/5154, Cromer to Lansdowne, No, 19? 1st March 1901,
(2) FO 141/571, Wingate to Cromer, 3rd November, 19OI and 30th December 1901,
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CHAPTER III
Islamic Resistance Movements (Mahdists and 
Millenarian) as a threat to Security, 1900 - 1908
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Mahdiism as a faith was a great danger to security in the Sudan,
The death of the Khalifa and the collapse of the Mahdist State in the 
Sudan did not bring about the extinction of Mahdiism, In the Nile Valley 
north of Omdurman there had never been much support for Mahdiism; 
but in the Gezira and Kordofan where the Mahdi had preached his tenets 
without encountering serious opposition, Mahdiism remained strong. There 
were many in these parts of the Sudan to whom Mahdiism was a way of life; 
Some were ardent Mahdists from sincere conviction of the Mahdi’s mission, 
while others wished to see, for one reason or the other, the restoration 
of the Mahdist rule. The Khalifa’s defeat and death at Wingate’s hands 
had stunned Mahdiism, but it required only time and a dynamic leader to 
declare that he was the man of the hour and there would always be people, 
at least in the Gezira and Kordofan, to follow him. It was such a revival 
of Mahdiism and of mystical politico - religious movements analogous to 
Mahdiism that Wingate most feared. From the number of despatches he 
addressed to the Consuls-General in Cairo it appears that he was fully 
convinced that the Sudanese Muslims were still Mahdist at heart. He was 
therefore always on the alert. Prominent Mahdists were watched and their 
movements noted. But small groups of religious enthusiasts were by no 
means easy to detect, even though their beliefs were potentially politically 
subversive. To keep himself informed, Wingate depended on the Intelligence 
Department of the Egyptian army and his provincial staff. In addition to 
these he appointed Slatin Pasha as the Inspector-General of the Sudan,
Slatin with his intimate knowledge of the country and its leading men 
could easily watch the pulse of the religious life in the country and 
for the next fourteen years he was the personal liaison officer of Wingate, 
Yet no year passed after the reconquest without some religious uprising.
In most cases, however, the Sudan Government was able to remove the 
seditious elements before they could carry their teachingsinto effect.
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An attempt is made in the following pages to discuss some of the subversive 
movements which threatened the security in the Sudan from 1900-1908,
1, The Milllniumist Movement - February 1900
The first movement that came to the notice of the Sudan Government
was led by a certain *Ali 'Abd al - Karim, a Dongolawl, during the second
half of February 1900. The members of this movement believed that the ‘
Mahdi had really come and died and that the late Khalifa had prophesied
that after his death when the Turks had once more conquered the land,
(l)then would be time for the coming of the Nebi ’Isa'.' ' The second coming
of the Nebi^Isa was of course a prelude to the last judgement and the
1 —
\ end of the world. Hence this sect was termed millfeniumist. *Abd al-Karim
and his followers were arrested and at a meeting of the principal religious
’Ulama’ they were denounced as heterodox. The members of the sect, however,
affirmed that they had no intention of causing a rising against the
Government as it was God’s will whether they were ruled by ’Turks’ or
Mahdists, Another group under Mu^mmad al-Zaki, a Zeidab- jaali, however,
made it known that if inspired to rise against the Government they would
do so, as this would be a divine inspiration,
Slatin interrogated ’Ali ’Abd al-Karim and the millSniumists and
A
arrived at the conclusion that the sect was not dangerous at the moment,
but could cause difficulties at some later date if allowed to pass
unnoticed. Acting on Slatin’s recommendations, Wingate had some twentyfive
(2 )members of the sect deported to Wadi Haifa,' ^
(1) FO 78/5087; A Report on the new sect by F, Newall; 24th February 1900; 
in Cromer to Salisbury; No, 50; 9th March 1900, See also FO 78/5096; 




The treatment meted out to the Milliniumists showed that Wingate was
A
not taking any chances with any religious movements in the Sudan, He was 
following the religious policy laid down by Kitchener in his "Confidential 
Memorandum to Mudirs",^**^ He had stated: "Be careful to see that religious 
feelings are not in any way interfered with and that the Mohammedan religion 
is respected. At the same time, Fikis teaching different Tarik(a) and 
dealing in amulets etc,, should not be allowed to resume their former 
trade , , . . , Mosques in principal towns will be rebuilt but private 
mosques, takias, Zawiyas, Sheikhs' tombs, etc,, can not be allowed to be 
re-established, as they generally formed centres of unorthodox fanaticism...," 
This policy enunciated by Kitchener influenced Wingate in his dealings with 
the innumerable fa cqûha^  and religious Shaykhs during the long tenure of
— - (2)
his office. Any faqi who was not approved by the Board of 'Ulama' '  ^was 
denounced as unorthodox and either deported or hanged. So, it was no 
surprise that the millfiSumists thou^ found innocent of any subversive, 
anti-government activity were considered dangerous in the long run if 
left unnoticed and .therefore deported,
2, Religious Movement at Tabat - 1901^^^
It was reported to the Sudan Government in July I9OI that intensive 
religious activity was seen at Tabat in the Gezira under the leadership 
of Shaykh 'Abd al - Mahmud Mulmmraad Nur al - Da'im, a son of the Mahdi's 
first teacher. According to the reports, the Shaykh's followers were
(1) W.P. Durham, Box 479/2; Kitchener*s'Confidential Memorandum to 
Mudirs',
(2) Constituted in June 1901,
(3) R. Hill; Slatin Pasha; op cit. Pp. 85 and 8 6,
See also SIR - 84, July I9OI; Gleichen to Wingate, 25th July 19OI; 
SAD/271/7 ; Slatin to Wingate; 13th August 1901, SAD/27I/8 ; quoted 
by G, Warburg in The Sudan under Wingate, P.lOO, (1971)*
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gathering in the caves in the hills of S^adi and Jabal Moya and in the 
districts of Masailamiya and Ibud in the Mahdist fashion, Jackson, who 
was acting as Governor-General, could not ignore these reports. The Shaykh 
and several other religious leaders were arrested, but later it was dis­
covered that the conspiracy was exaggerated. The whole affair was traced 
back to jealousy amongst the Mahdist Shaykhs in the area, Slatin advised 
Jackson that in future before arresting well known religious leaders it 
would be better to consult trusted Shaykhs of the Sudan,
3, Muÿimmad al-Amin - 1903
The religious movement initiated by Muhammad al-Amin in Taqali 
in the Nuba Mountains caused considerable stir in 1903* Al-Amin hailed 
from Bomu and appears to have been well versed in Islamic theology 
and like most Faqis he claimed descent from the Prophet, He was treated 
with considerable respect by the Sudanese when he passed throu^ Khartoum 
on his way to Mecca towards the end of 1900, He had letters of recommenda­
tion from the rulers of the various African countries through which he 
had passed including one from the Sultan 'Ali Dinar of Darfur,^^^ While 
in Mecca al-Amin obtained a document from the religious authorities
recommending by name a large number of Sudanese tribes to recognize his
( 2)
religious qualifications and to give him necessary assistance,' '
Al-Amin re-entered the Sudan travelling through the country via 
Kassala and the Gezira; he crossed the White Nile at Goz AbiTGuma, He
(1) FO 78/5502; Wingate to Cromer, Alexandria, 11th October 1903,
in Cromer to Lansdowne; No,110; Confidential, 17th October 1903,
(2) Ibid; Wingate believed that such documents could be procured by a head 
of a Tariqa on application to the high authorities in the Hijaz, Wings.te 
had not seen the document; from the circumstances of the case he did 
not consider that al-Amin's mission was a politically inspired one.
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appears to have visited various places in Kordofan before he accepted the 
invitation of al-Jailiwad Adam, the Mek of Taqali, over whom he appears 
to have gained considerable influence. His presence in the mountains would 
have passed unnoticed but for the confrontation he had with the local Qadi 
whom he caused to be confined due to certain religious differences, Al-Jaili* 
however, intervened and released the Qadi who now reported to the Government 
authorities at el-Obeid that a new Sharif had arrived at Taqali who declared
(a)himself to be a Mahdi,' '
When the news of al-Amin's activities reached el-Obeid, the Governor 
of Kordofan, Col, B.T, Mahon, was on his way to Khartoum on leave, and 
the acting Governor, J.H. Butler, at once informed Nason, the acting
— — ( 2)
Governor-General, of the appearance of the Mahdi at Taqali,' ' He asked 
for one and a half companies of the XII Sudanese to arrest the man, Nason, 
however, deferred all action till he was able to contact Mahon which he did 
on 4th September, Mahon wanted one squadron of cavalry and one maxim to 
be placed under him in addition to the forces which Butler had requested, 
After receiving Wingate's telegraphic approval, Mahon left Khartoum on 
8th September and arrived at al-Amin's camp on the 11th, On seeing him 
arrive, the men at first rushed with their spears to defend themselves 
but finding that they were completely surrounded, al-Amin and his men 
surrendered and were immediately placed under guard,
(1) al-Amin is referred to as a Mahdi in all the official correspondence, 
Al-Amin himself never claimed to be a Mahdi,
(2) FO 78/5302; Mr, Findlay (1st Secretary, British Agency, Cairo) to 
Lansdowne, Alexandria, 7th September 1903#
(3) FO 78/5302; Report by Col, Nason on the Kordofan Mahdi in Findlay to 
Lansdowne, No, IO5, 4th October I903,
(4) FO 141/374; Col, Mahon's Report on the Military Operation against al-Amin, 
24th September 1903 in Findlay to Lansdowne, No, 105; 4th October I903.
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Col, Mahon then proceeded to Taqali to examine al-jaili/fho had been 
the first to receive al-Amin^ ^ \ After some hesitation Jaili arrived, but he 
was, according to Mahon, so nervous that he owned up that he had received 
al-Amin, had believed in him at first but later, finding him to be a liar, 
had turned him out,^^^ After warning Jaüï^ Mahon returned to Khartoum, 
Al-Amin and his followers were sent to el-Obeid under O'Connell,
Mahon recommended that they should be sent to Khartoum or to Rosetta in 
Egypt to join other political prisoners, but, on no account to be freed,
, After al-Amin's arrest his correspondence was discovered in the 
village which revealed the widespread nature of the movement. Within the 
short time that he was in the Sudan, al-Amin had gained considerable 
influence over the tribes. Every one in the district believed in him and 
had it not been for the surprise attack, he would have escaped and then 
his arrest would have been a difficult matter. Even after his arrest the 
Shaykhs, who knew him well, refused to give any information against him.
He had received promises of support from the Hawazma, the Misseriya and 
the Jim'a tribes. According to Nason the force that these tribes could 
put in the field was at least 10,000 men including 2000 mounted, Nur 
Hussain, acting Nazir of the Jim'a tribe appears to have volunteered to
lead a cavalry attack on el-Obeid in the hope of surprising the XII 
(d) —Sudanese there,' ' After al-Amin's arrest Nur HuSsain escaped to Taq; 
where he was found by Mahon, He wa,s arrested and sent to el-Obeid,
(1) Al-Jaili had been a pro-Govemment Mek and had cooperated with the 
Anglo-Egyptian forces in 1899 against the IQialifa^bd Allahi,
(2) FO 141/374; Col, Mahon's Report on Military Operations against al-Amin. 
24th September 1903 in Findlay to Lansdowne, No, 105, 4th October I903,
(3) FO 78/5302; Findlay to Lansdowne, No, 105, Secret, 4th October 1903.
(4) FO 141/374» Col. Mahon's Report, 24th October 1903, in Findlay to 
Lansdowne, No, IO5, 4th October 1903.
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Another Shaykh Sahiha of the Hawizma tribe who had undertaken to raise 
the Nubas in support of al-Amin was arrested by Capt, Massey who led a
patrol against him but a fellow conspirator Faqi Malik Nur effected his
- ( 1 ) escape to the Missiriya tribe,' ^
During al-Amin's detention at el-Obeid it was found that agents from
the neighbouring tribes had come into the town to watch developments. So
many important people were implicated that O'Connell feared that al-Amin's
escape might be arranged by the offering of a bribe sufficient to overcome
the loyalty of the guards, O'Connell therefore strongly recommended his 
(2)execution,'  ^ The extreme penalty of the law was approved by Nason on 
27th September I903 which was carried out on the same day even without a 
formal trial. In justifying this measure, Nason informed Findlay that,
I
"this action may appear somewhat unnecessarily severe, but the reports 
which now arrive daily, in my opinion fully justify the action taken and 
I feel convinced that the effect on the country will be most wholesome,"'^/ 
It must be noted, that during this period, sentences imposed by the 
Government on the politically subversive elements were determined not so 
much by abstract justice as by the degree of political danger represented 
by the accused.
On his return from England, Wingate approved al-Amin's summary 
execution and hoped that it would act as a powerful deterrent to further 
disturbances. Supporting Nason's action, Wingate pointed out how important
(1) FO 141/574; Findlay to Lansdowne, No: 105, 4th October I903,
(2) FO 141/374; Findlay to Lansdowne, No: IO6, 4th October 1903,
(3) FO 141/374; Report by Col, Nason, 4th October 1903, in Findlay to
Lansdowne, No: IO5, 4th October 1903,
67
it was to act without delay "in a matter which would have only become 
more difficult had the question of execution been postponed. As long as 
his (al-Amin's) fate remained undecided the state of tension which is 
reported to have existed throu^out Kordofan would have become aggravated, 
and there would have always been the danger of escape. His summary 
execution . , , , resulted in calming the agitation, and has, moreover 
afforded a powerful example to those who may have been encouraged to throw 
in their lot with this adventurer.^ ^ ^
Subversive activities in the province of Kordofan were far more 
dangerous than elsewhere in the Sudan, In the Gezira or any other part 
it was possible to contain a movement without giving it a chance to spread 
across into the neighbouring provinces by sealing off the frontiers. In 
Kordofan the situation was, however, different. It was too large a 
province, with an unadministered hinterland. Military operations could 
not easily be mounted and the garrison of the XII Sudanese, on which 
security in the province depended, was too small for the task. Well 
educated and popular persons such as al-Amin could easily talk over the 
people and get them to their side. One important factor which helped the
(1) FO 78/5302; Wingate to Cromer, Alexandria, 11th October 1903 in Cromer 
to Lansdowne, No: 110,(c) Cairo, 17th October 1903.
The execution of al-Amin was not without its repercussions on English 
public opinion, Lansdowne informed Cromer that the Arbitration and 
Peace Association had enquired whether it was true that the Kordofan 
Mahdi had surrendered to Mahon and subsequently hanged and if 
under what laws the execution was carried out; FO 78/5303, Lansdowne 
to Cromer, Tel. No: 39, 15th December 1903.
•
In reply Cromer stated that it would be an error to suppose that the 
man had surrendered, he having been surrounded and captured by troops.
He wanted the Peace and Arbitration Association to be informed that 
al-Amin's execution was justified by the military necessities of the 
situation and was carried out by military law and that there was no doubt 
that he was guilty of offences dealt with under the Section 93 of the 
Penal Code, FO 78/5303* Cromer to Lansdowne, T.No: 4 6; l6th December
1903.
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Government representatives in el-Obeid was that the tribes of Kordofan were
(1)not united, Ih their mutual rivalry the Government found its strength,
Mahon recommended that a company of Camel Corps, 150 strong, mounted on
mules or horses or both should be formed at once as it was not possible
(2)
to use the Camels in the south during the rainy season,' ' But Wingate 
found it difficult to meet his recommendationsThe Egyptian army 
had been pared down to its irreducable minimum on economic grounds^^^ and 
that there was not much he could do except to watch the situation with 
increased vigilance and instantly suppress any subversive movement.
4. 'Abd al-Qadir Muhammad Imam Wad Habuba, April 1908,
Between the execution of Muhammad al-Amin in 1905 and the rising
r __
of Wad Habuba in 1908 a number of'Nebi Isas', called Mahdis in the 
Intelligence Reports, appeared on the scene. Prompt action on the part 
of the local authorities suppressed their activities. In August 1904, for 
example. Col, Gorringe, Governor of Sennar, reported that a certain Adam, 
a Bungulawi', had declared himself a Mahdi and with eleven of his followers 
cut the telegraph 15 miles West Northwest of Singa, Gorringe immediately 
despatched the Mamur, Zaki Effendi Wassef, to arrest the pretender, 
but in a fight that ensued the sub-Govemor and Adam with 9 of his 
followers were killed,Adam's two surviving followers who were arrested
(1) PO 141/574, Mahon's Report, 24th September 1905 in Findlay to Lansdowne, 
No. 105, 4th October I905,
(2) Ibid,
(5) FO 78/5302; Wingate to Cromer; Alexandria, 11th October 1903 in Cromer 
to Lansdowne, No;110; Confidential, 17th October I903,
(4) Egypt No, I, Annual Report by Cromer on the Sudan, C d 44I. XCi,
1057, See Ch, II,
(5) FO 78/5367; Findlay to Lansdowne, T,No; 95, Confidential, 8th August
1904.
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were later executed, seemingly-; against the express wishes of Mr. Findlay
hut with Wingate ' s approval. ^ ^
The year 1905 was comparatively a quiet one. Of the two cases that
were recorded, the first one was that of a certain Hasan Wad Ifesouna who
was arrested in Dameira in Northern Kordofan and sent to Khartoum for
engaging himself in settling religious questions. He was found innocent
and later released. The second case was that of a religious maniac, the
name is not given, who was arrested in Omdurman for gathering followers
(2)around him and who was deported from the Sudan.'  ^ A serious incident 
which occurred in 1906 in Talodi is discussed at some length in the 
following chapter. It was at first thought to have been instigated by 
religious motives but was later traced to the Government's measures 
against slave raiding.
The most serious religious uprising in the Sudan occurred in April 
I9O8, The scene of the rising was Katfia in the Blue Nile Province and 
was led by 'Abd al-Qadir Muhammad Imam Wad Habuba of the Malawiyin tribe,' ' 
The first news of the unrest in the Gezira reached Wad Madani, the 
Headquarters of the Blue Nile Province, on 29th April I9O8 , Mr, C.C, Scott 
Moncrieff, the deputy Inspector at Rufaa informed Maj, Dickinson, the 
Governor of the province, that 'Abd al-Qadir'had collected about forty 
followers at Wad Sheniena and that he had refused to explain his conduct
(1) G. Warburg; op cit., P,101. ,
FO
(2)/57l/65; Annual Report on the Sudan for 1905; Cromer to Grey, Nq . 27, 
8th March I906,
(5) For details see FO 371/451» Report on the Blue N^le Province Rebellion 
by Wingate, 26th May 1908 in Gorst to Grey, No. 55, 3rd June 1908;
FO 141/443, Bonham-Carter to Wingate, 9th June I9O8.
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to Capt, Mahmud Sharif, the M^iur, who had gone to the spot to keep watch 
on *Ahd al-Qadir*s activities. Scott Moncrieff added that he himself was 
proceeding to inquire into the matter.
Dickinson’s first impression was that the unrest was due to a dispute 
over land between Wad Habuba and his relations and that it would soon
subside. A few hours later, however, he was informed by the Msàfiur that
Neh
(2)
*Abd al-Qadir was calling himself bi Isa and that he had expressed his
intention to fight the Government.
Dickinson now despatched all the police he could spare from Wad
Madani and instructed Capt, Muhammad Fahmi Yakut, the Mamur of the Kamlin
district, to report himself with all the police he could take to Scott
Moncrieff at Katfia. At the same time he ordered the company of the XIII
Sudanese to hold themselves in readiness. Capt. Mac Ewen, the senior
Inspector of the province, was sent to obtain reliable information
regarding the rising.
In the meantime, Scott Moncrieff had joined the Mamur at Wad Sheneina
where the latter was awaiting a reply to his letter to ’Abd al Qadir,
Rather than continue to wait, they decided to go to Tuqr, where ’Abd al-
Qadir had established himself. They had twelve camel policemen with them
but they took only two of these. V^hen they had gone half way, th^left
the two policemen and rode off unescorted and unarmed,' It appears
that ’Abd al-Qadir had sent a message saying that if the Inspector and 
} —
the Mamur could come and interview him unarmed and unattended, he would 
lay his grievances before them. He also included in his invitation, his 
uncle "Abdallah Musa’id and his brothers agains-^hom he had grievances.
(1) PO 371/451, Report on the Blue*Nile Province Rebellion by Wingate, 
26th 1908 in Gorst to Grey, No. 53, 3rd June I9O8.
(2) FO 141/413; Bonham - Carter to Wingate, 9th June I9O8 .
(3) Ibid.
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The latter, however, declined to/and tried to dissuade both the officials 
f 1 )
from going,' '
When Scott Moncrieff and the Mænur reached Tuqr, ’Abd al-Qadir
received them and after some time had elapsed, on a given signal, both
the officers were struck with knives and murdered. On the same evening
Capt, Fahmi Yakut reached Katfia with the police reinforcements. But there
was little he could do except to send a message to Wad Madani, However,
he stayed in the area observing.the movement of thé rebels.
The military force that Dickinson had at his disposal at Wad Madani
(2)
comprised two companies of the XIII Sudanese and one maxim gun,' ^
Leaving one company at Wad MadanT, Dickinson now marched to Katfia with the 
other company, the maxim gun and few camel police, Capt, H.S. Logan, 
accompanied him as second in command. He was also joined by Mr, E, Bonham- 
Cartei^  the Legal Secretary and Mtq Peacock of theasame department who 
were on a tour of the district, Dickinson reached Katfia on 1st May I9O8 
and camped that night I50 yards away from the village, intending to attack 
the rebels’ position at dawn next day.
However, during the night the rebels, led by a villager who was in 
sympathy with them rushed the c a m p , b u t  they were driven back. The 
police lost heavily in the first rush but the XIII Sudanese stood their 
ground and gradually pushed the rebels back,
Wingate received the news of the outbreak at Bor in the Whüte Nile 
Province from where he made arrangements for the despatch to Kamlin of
(1) PO 371/451 ; R. Wingate to Gorst, Incl, 2 in No,I; 26th May I9O8 in
Gorst to Grey, No, 55» June 19O8,
(2) The remaining four companies of the XIII Sudanese were ten days away
engaged in relieving the southern post in the Sinnar district,
(3) FO 141/413; Gorst to Grey, No,32, 3rd May, I9O8,
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two companies of the X Sudanese under Lt, C,P.Haywood with two maxim 
guns under Capt, P.M.C, T r e n c h , I n  the meantime Capt, C.J, Ryan who 
had already left Khartoum on 30th April had reached Katfia with 45 Arab 
mounted Infantry, One company despatched by boat was ordered to hold Geteina 
and - half a company at each place, Butler Bey, the Governor of the
White Nile Province, also patrolled the river and had camel police moving 
along both the banks. These measures were necessary to confine the activities 
of the rebels between the Blue and the White Niles and to prevent the 
rebellion spreading across the provinces on the east and the west. To the 
east of the Blue N^le was the densely wooded country in the basins of the 
rivers the Rahad and the Binder which had been, for more than a year, a 
sanctuary to AWad Fadil in 1899, On the west of the Nile lay the province 
of Kordofan, the home of the Baqqara and of Ma^^ist enthusiasm. It was 
essential that the rebels should not be allowed to cross the rivers.
On 2nd May a reconnoitering party under Capt, Ryan and Capt, Mac Ewen 
found Tüqr deserted. By the '^rd. it was clear that there were no more large 
bodies of the insurgents in the field, Dickinson now issued a proclamation 
declaring ’Abd al-Qadir an outlaw, A list of persons who were present at 
Tuqr on the 29th April and those who were in alliance with 'Abd al-Qadir 
was made and circulated through out the villages,
Abd al-Qadir appeared to have fled in a south westerly direction 
after the night attack but had then turned North as he found it impossible 
to cross the river. He then fell into the hands of the villagers of Bebeiba 
al - Dubassin who brou^t him to Katfia, He was tried on the 8th of May 
by a civil court and was executed by hanging at Hillet Mustafa, the
(l) FO 141/416; Wingate to Gorsti Tel. No;66, 30th April I9O8 ;




market centre of the Hatawiyin tribe,'
Thou^ the rebellion had been broken up there was still a number
of rebels at large in the Gezira, Three complies of Infantry, the X and
the XIII Sudanese, and all mounted troops who had left Khartoum on the
4th May with Maj, C.H, Leveson, were therefore placed at the disposal of
Dickinson while Leveson himself was asked to return.
The Civil Court, presided over by ¥a0y Sterry, the Chief Justice,
sat at Kamlin from 19th to 23rd May and tried 23 persons implicated in
the rising and charged them under section 95 of the Penal Code for waging >
war against the Government, The Court acquitted three and the remaining 20
were found guilty. Of these the Court condemned 12 to death and fore-
feiture of property and the remaining eight were sentenced to varying
( 2 ')terms of imprisonment,' * Wingate informed Gorst that he was confirming 
the sentences, Gorst, however, intervened and impressed upon Wingate the 
need to maintain the British reputation for mercy. But the British 
officials of the Sudan Government were unanimous that greater leniency 
would be mistaken for weakness by the Sudanese, Slatin who had arrived 
at Katfia supported Sterry*s verdict and felt that the prisoners fully 
deserved their punishment,
Gorst agreed with Wingate that greater leniency might be misunderstood 
but he was concerned with the effect that the execution of such a consider­
able number of men would have on public opinion in E n g l a n d , T h e  need
(1) PO 371/451; Gorst to Grey, Nos: 33 (4th May 1908); 34 (5th May 1908); 
37 (12th May 1908);and 38 (l7th May 1908),
(2) PO 141/416; Sirdar to Gorst, 27th May 1908,
(3) PO 371/451 ; Gorst to Grey, No; 40, 28th May I9O8 ,
(4) PO 141/416; Gorst to Sirdar, 28th May I9O8 ,
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for greater security in the Sudan was therefore in conflict with the
broader needs of the British policy, especially with a liberal Government
in office* For some time the British public had been worried about the
affairs in the Sudan and Egypt, particularly after the execution of al-Amin
in the Sudan in 1903, the Dinshawi incident in Egypt in 1906 and about
the health and welfare of the IWidist prisoners in E g y p t * S i r  E, Grey,
the Foreign Secretary, was anxious to avoid any situation which would unchain
"all the fanatics and sentimentalists" in Parliament and the country and
also provoke a certain effervescence among nationalists in Egypt and their
(2)
supporters in Europe.' ' He informed Gorst that the British Government 
would not agree to the hanging of the twelve prisoners condemned to death. 
Since 'Abd al-Qadir had already been executed there could be no question 
of hanging any who were his dupes except those who actually took part in 
the murder of Scott Moncrieff and the M a m u r , I n  a private communication 
Grey authorised Gorst to let Wingate know that Gorst was acting under 
direct instructions from the Foreign Secretary,
In the meantime Wingate had sent Slatin to Cairo to give Gorst a 
verbal account of the rising. But before meeting Slatin Gorst had given 
Wingate the definite instructions of the Foreign Office to commute the 
sentences, Gorst urged that Wingate should publish the commuted sentences 
before they were known at home. Otherwise, he feared, it would appear 
that the sentences were reduced under pressure,
(1) Parliamentary Debates, IV Series, Vols, 183, P. 1073 and Vol, 188, 
PP, 421 and 422,
(2) FO 371/451, FO Minutes on Gorst to Grey, No, 40, 28th May I9O8 in 
FO to Director of Military Operations,
(3) FO 371/451, Grey to Gorst, No, 12, 29th May 1908,
(4) FO 141/416, Gorst to Wingate, No,8, 30th May 1908,
75
Wingate referred the question to Bonham-Carter, who pointed out
that nearly all the prisoners convicted were present during the murders
at Tuqr hut there was no proof that they had actually struck Scott
Moncrieff or the Maniur* Under the definite orders of the Foreign Office
Wingate had little choice; the sentences were commuted to imprisonment
for life and confiscation of property and Gorst was informed that the
remission of sentences would he soon published.^
The remission of sentences was condemned hy the British officials in
the Sudan* Currie wrote, ", . . , Once again England falls hack on the
hlood stained policy of attempting to conciliate its enemies hy giving away
(2 )its friends. . . * Slatin himself wanted to resign alleging that it
would not he possible for him to carry out his duties as Inspector-General
of the Sudan under the new circumstances. He felt that commutation would
encourage other risings which might endanger the lives of British and
(tÇ)
Egyptian officers serving in the remote districts.'  ^Bonham-Carter was 
convinced that the British Government could not possibly he in possession 
of the facts necessary to form a correct judgement unless they had seen 
the proceedings. He insisted that the publication of the commuted sentences 
should he postponed until the proceedings had been sent to England, He 
-also felt that the loss of their officers had created hitter feelings in 
the Egyptian army and that the commutation of sentences at this juncture 
would result in a discord between them and the Government,^^  ^ As a 
protest he too wished to resign. On hearing of this Slatin, who was still
(1) FO 141/416, Wingate to Gorst, No, 114» 3'lst May"1908; also 
FO 371/451, Gorst to Grey, No, 42, 31st May I9O8,
Op cit.
(2) Currie to Slatin, 4th July I9O8, SAB/431/50, quoted hy G, Warburg,/P, 102,
(3) R. Hill ; Slatin Pasha. P.91.
(4) FO 141/416, Wingate to Gorst, No, 123, 2nd June 1908,
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in Cairo, wired to Bonham-Carter not to resign as Legal Secretary but
(1 )merely as a member of the Governor-General * s Council. Under the
pressure, Wingate made one more attempt to satisfy his officials. He
wrote to Gorst that he would postpone the publication of the sentences
until the British Government had examined the entire proceedings of the
case. But he was told that the Foreign Office already had in their
possession all the facts and that there was no chance of changing their 
(2)
decision,' *
The rising of 'Abd al-Qadir was taken far more seriously than previous 
risings of a similar nature by the Sudan authorities. There were sufficient 
reasons for this. Belonging to a rich land owning Halawiyin tribe of the 
Gezira, whose father had held the post of a Nazir under the old Egyptian 
Government, 'Abd al-Qadir enjoyed a status in the society. Under the 
Mahdi he had closely associated himself with the movement and after the 
collapse of the Mahdist State, had devoted much time and energy for the 
Mahdist cause. The Kinâna Arabs in whose neighbourhood he lived, and for 
whom he had admiration, were equally ardent Mahdists, In a statement to 
the tribunal which interrogated him, he clearly stated that they were as 
true believers and lovers of Mahdiism as he himself was and he expected 
that they would be the first to join him,' ' As he himself stated that 
if he had succeeded in the night attack, he would have had over 40,000 
men around him with whose help he could have established the Mahdist 
State in the S u d a n , B u t  his rising was premature and because of this 
it failed.
(1) R, Hill : Slatin Pasha, P. 91,
(2) FO 141/416, Gorst to Wingate, No,9, undated,
(3) FO 141/413, Bonham-Carter to Wingate, 9th June I9O8,
(4) Ibid,
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The rising of 'Abd al-Qadir was viewed with grave concern by 
Wingate. The fact that the rebellion was broken not by a military action 
but by the lack of support afforded to the rebels by the local in­
habitants did not blind him to the dangers of Mahdiism in the Sudan,
In a letter to Maxwell, he wrote, . . . All those who are sitting 
on the fence are most loyal to the Government and denounce 'Abd al-Qadir 
and his crew as madmen. Had he been successful, he would have now been 
a prophet endowed with all sorts of miraculous gifts and he should 
have had most of the Gezira at his heels. There is no doubt that there 
is plenty o:^^Mahdiism and until the generation bom and brought up in 
that faith has died out we shall be subject to these outbreaks. It 
only wants some cause of discontent or grievance to bring it out,"^ **^  
Wingate considered various means of increasing security in the 
Sudan, These recommendations were duly referred to the Foreign Office 
for considerations which would be discussed in a later chapter.
(1) R, Wingate: Wingate of the Sudan, P.149*
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CHAPTER IV
The Pacification of the Nuba Mountains 
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The Nuba Mountains, stiuated in southern Kordofan, cover roughly an 
area of 30,000 square miles. The whole area is not mountainous, but the 
hills rise from the plains in isolated massifs. The hills, generally 
referred as mountains, consist of huge granite boulders piled by nature 
one on top of the other, and the interstices created by this formation 
are described as caves. Many of these caves not only penetrate the entire 
hill but also have a number of branches leading from the top to the base 
and even to the adjacent strongholds and plains around. The Nuba stored 
in these caves both food and water and sometimes even their cattle.
Whenever they apprehended danger they either hid themselves in these caves 
or escaped throu^ them to the neighbouring hills.
The Nuba are in fact not one people but several. They are all negroid 
in appearance and where they have not been touched by Arab or Islamic 
influence, follow a broadly similar mode of living. But language, religion 
and political structure are very diverse; and a single hill may be occupied 
by two or three tribes speaking totally different languages and differing 
no less profoundly in religious and political institutions. They thus 
presented a difficult administrative problem; but the military problem was 
no less acute, for the Nuba had accumulated many fire arms and well under­
stood how to use these in defence of their rugged hills. The Nuba marksmen 
lying in their mountain fastnesses were hard to locate and silence. The 
Nuba fire was reported to be effective upto two to three hundred yards and 
this made them doubly dangerous to deal with,^ **^
(l) It was reported that there were nearly 20,000 rifles of various kinds in 
the Nuba ji-iountains, Most of these were captured from the fleeing Arabs 
after the battle of Omdurman and some traded by the Baqqara for slaves. 
Rifles were also smuggled in from places as distant as Ethiopia (PO 371/ 
1636, SIR, No. 227, June 1913).
Ammunition was locally manufactured. Lead sulpher and non-safety matches, 
the heads of which were used as caps to ignite the powder charge, were 
smuggled into the hills. Charcoal and salt petre were produced locally.
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Administratively the least difficult problem was preseftte%by;„^^se
groups with an authoritarian political structure under a Me& or Chief, who
could act as an intermediary between the Government and his people. This
was the situation at Taqali, Tagai, Rashad and Da'ir. More difficult was
the situation where the Mek and the Kujur (the chief priest, who mi^t
be a Shaman or a rain-maker) exercised coordinate authority,Although
the Government might use the Mek as an intermediary, his influence was apt
to be undermined by the Kujur, who always took care to remain in the
background. The same difficulty presented itself even in those hills where
the Kujur* s influence was paramount. The Kujurs saw their own decline in
the increasg6f the Government's influence and kept themselves in the
background. Certain other hills were close to the level of stateless
society. Such were the Heiban, the More and the Nyima group of hills. In
Heiban, for example, there were no local heads, no clan heads, no Council
of elders to guide collective life or even to symbolize collective
existence over and above the segments which composed the society. The
political action of the groups was the actions of its several segments.
The collective identity of the group emerged only from a diffused co-
(2)ordination of these actions of individuals or small group sections,' '
In Moro there was a 'big man' who owed his position of authority neither 
to spiritual powers nor to the membership of a specific clan. He was known 
as 'Elan', He was above all a war leader. He would plan raids and advise 
his people where to strike and what tactics to pursue. His power rested 
mainly oh his wealth and the large following he could command. His position 
was, however, not hereditary,
(1) J.¥. Sagar, Notes on the Nuba, S N R  5-6, 1922-1923, P,143.
(2) S.E.Nadel, The Nuba. P,146, London (1947).
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By the time of the Egyptian conquest of the Sudan, early in the 19th 
centur^ r, the Arabs had for long occupied southern Kordofan, Almost the 
whole of the Nuba country had fallen to the Hawa^ma, a few hills being taken 
by the Humr, Sub-division then took place, each sub-tribe taking its own 
pone of hills and watering places. According to Sagar the usual procedure 
in the division of the country was that each sub-tribe of the Arabs protected 
as far as possible the hills in its own zone in return for supplies of grain 
and slaves and in principle raided only@^ the hills belonging to other sub- 
tribes,^ "*^  It should, however, be noted that the Arabs lived on the plain 
and that often, perhaps usually, these Arabs had no control over the internal 
affairs of the hills they protected.
During the Egyptian occupation of southern Kordofan, a few of the hills 
such as Billing, Kaderu and Ghulfan, for some time, paid_L.t?^ ibute to\the - 
Egyptian Government in recruits for the army, while the remainder were left to 
the Arabs, who in turn, paid a heavy tribute and provided recruits taken
( 2)by force from the Nubas,' ^
During the Mahdiyya most of the hills were attacked for recruits. The 
Mahdist General, Abu^Anja, made extensive raids from Talodi for this purpose. 
These raids drove the Arab tribes, the Messeriyya, the Ifewazma and the Humr, 
to sink their differences and oppose the Mahdists in support of the Nubas 
who were under their respective spheres of influence. One of the Mahdist 
raiding parties was in fact annihilated by the Arabs between Jebel Gedir 
and Talodi, Abu înja, however, crushed the opposition and continued his 
r a i d s , A b u  Anja's attempts to raid Jebel Da'ir were, however, frustrated 
by the Mek Kumbo of Kitra, a Nuba Village on the northern side of the massif.
(1) PO 371/890; Notes on the Nubas by J.W, Sagar, SIR No, 186, January 1910, 
Appendix A,
(2) Ibid,
(3) F.R. Wingate: Mahdiism and the Egyptian Sudan, London (I89I), PP, 290,
291.
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who was joined by the Dubab Arabs who lived at the foot of Jebel Da'ir,
— (T
Abu Anja's force was ambushed in a deep ravine, called Khor Tulbas, on 
the west side of the Jebel,Mahdist attacks on Jebel Nyima were also 
repulsed. Smaller hills such af J, Ghulfan and Jebel Miri were, however, 
conquered by forces;. In the latter case, the elders were induced to enter 
the Mahdist Camp to treat for terms and then they were either killed or 
captured. Whilst thus disorganised, Jebel Miri was attacked and occupied.
In the case of J, Ghulfan, Debri and parts of Kaderu, the whole population
(2)was driven to Omdurman,' ^
During the period between the battle of Omdurman and the death of the 
Khalifa», the friendship of the southern Kordofan tribes, both the Arabs 
and the Nuba, was courted by Kitchener, who wanted to neutralize their 
power by detaching them from the Khalifa, The Mek Ja'iMTAdam of Taqali was 
foremost in extending his support to the British authorities. He had been 
successful against small Mahdist parties and had even captured a gun,^^^ 
Another Arab Shaykh, 'Abd al-Samad of the Bedairiyya, who had some influence 
over Jebel Kaderu, was even entrusted with 600 rifles by Kitchener to attack 
the Khalifa, There were some negotiations between him and the Mek Ja'iUi 
Adam but the two chiefs could not agree on a combined a t t a ck ,T he  
Shaykhs of the Messeriyya, the Hawazma, the Ghudiy'at and the Bedairiyya
/ c \
and the hills of Koalib, Da'ir and Sobai were granted Aman (clemency),'
(1) w.. , A,R.C, Bolton; The Dubab and Nuba of Jebel Da'ir, 
SNR, 19, 1936, P,94.
(2) PO 371/890, SIR No: 186, January 1910, Appendix A,
Mr. J,W. Sagar: Notes on the Nuba,
(3) PO 78/5040, Kitchener to War Office, SIR No: 64, l6ihJuly to 31st 




As long as the Khalifa was alive, the Sudan Government could not 
establish a military post in Kordofan, But soon after the Khalifa* s death. 
Col, Mahon was despatched with a detachment of the Camel Corps to occupy 
el-Obeid which he did on 17th December 1899#^ **^  Kordofan was found in a 
state of anarchy. The Government's first task was therefore tbisuppress 
the Arab tribes, who since the battle of Omdurman had no master. Most of 
them were armed with guns and the inaccessibility of the country they 
lived in made them doubly dangerous. The Nuba, on the other hand, posed 
no immediate threat to security. They were disunited and the inter-tribal 
fights between the various hills and the constant raids between the Nuba 
and their Arab nei^bours which had been going on for generations deprived 
them of a common interest to combine against the Government, The Government
was satisfied at this juncture to receive deputations from the Arabs and
li
(3)
(2) —the Nuba of southern Kordofan who were willing to submit,' * Mek Ja'iü
Adam of Taqali was one such who visited Omdurman in April or May 1900,
But Taqali could not be considered a typical Nuba hill. Since the time of 
the Fung and the Pur, the Taqali Kingdom had been exposed to foreign and 
Muslim influences and was completely Arabized and Islamized, During the 
Mahdiyya Taqali was over run so many times that only a small portion of 
the population remained in the domain of Mek Ja'iM.^^^ It was therefore 
not difficult for the Sudan Government to bring the hills in the Taqali 
region under its immediate control though some times this was resented by 
the M@ks, Zaiba of Rashad was another Mek who surrendered to the Government
(1) PO 141/348, Sirdar to Cromer, Tel. No. 53» 28th November 1899; and
PO 78/5026, Cromer to Salisbury, 24th December 1899.
(2) PO 78/5086, Annual Report on the Administration of the Sudan for 1899,
in Cromer to Salisbury, No: 35, 20th February 1900,
(3) PO 78/5096, SIR, No:69, 10th April to 9th May 1900, 15th July 1900,
(4) J.W. Kenrick, 'The Kingdom of Taqali',-MLR., Vol. XXIX, 1948, P, 143,
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thou^ the other hills in the same region such as Tagoi and Tukum kept 
their reserve, Wingate was content to establish Government posts at Billing 
in the west and another at Talodi in the south, Wingate did not wish to 
be prematurely drawn into the Nuba Mountains, Only those hills which were 
easily accessible and whose reduction did not involve considerable expendi­
ture were brought under the authority of the Government, ^
By the end of 1902 the Government had brought under its control a 
number of Nuba hills such as j. Billing, j, Anyma, j, Ghulfan, j. Umm Eeitan, 
j, Ghawai, j, Kownma, j, Tira Mandi and j, Rashad,According to 
O'Connell who visited the Nuba Mountains in 1902 the Mek^sa of j. Billing 
wasVtaxed 300 dollars, O'Connell considered that this was too high and 
that it should be reduced. He added that j, Anyma which was a very large 
hill paid only 100 dollars. He further reported that inter-hill fighting 
and raiding was still going on the Nuba Mountains, The Hawazma were found 
raiding j, Umm Heitan, j, Ghawai, j, Kownma and j. Tira Mandi, 'The Talodi 
Arabs* to whom a reference will be made shortly, also joined the Hawazma in 
raiding the last two hills. There was fighting between Mek Gadeil of Tagoi 
and the Meks Zaiba and Ja'i3i of Rashad and Taqali, O'Connell recommended 
that the Government should take some steps to prevent the Hawazma and the 
Talodi Arabs from raiding the hills. If the Government could not establish 
more posts, he thought that at least the horses should be taken from the 
Arabs, 'as on foot the Nuba was as good as any Arab','^'
(1) L, Sanderson; 'Educational Development and Administrative Control in the 
Nuba Mountains', Journal of African History, iv, 2 (1963) P,233,
(2) FO 78/5301, Sudan Annual Report for 1902; Report by O'Connell on a tour 
undertaken in November 1902, Incl, 3 in Cromer to Lansdowne, No.27;
26th February 1903.
(3) FO 78/5301 ; Report by O'Connell on his tour of the Nuba Mountains,
Incl, 3 in Cromer to Lansdowne, Sudan Annual Report for 1902; No, 27, 
26th February I903.
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In order to protect the Nuba from Arab raids, the Slavery Department 
in the Sudan was reorganised. An additional Inspector was posted at el-Obeid and 
and it was decided to create a small mounted Corps of local Arabs to put a 
stop to the local raiding, ^ ^ ^ The Camel Corps of the Egyptian army was 
also to be reorganised and with the cooperation of the Camel Corps of the 
Slavery Department the Government hoped to establish posts and introduce a 
system of patrols to check slave raids,^ ' Two Arab companies were there­
fore raised and were added to the Camel Corps,
The first to feel the pressure of the Government’s new policy was a 
certain Shaykh Hum Num of Kitra, Emboldened by its successes in the Mahdiyya, 
this hill defied the Sudan Go v ernment,It  was reported at el-Obeid 
that SMykh Num Num had ousted the Shaykh appointed by the Government,
Capt, Hawker m s  thereupon despatched in October I904 with 83 Camel Corps 
to arrest Num Num and re-establish Government’s authority, Num Num, however, 
refused to surrender and when the Patrol advanced on the hill, it was 
fired upon. The fire was returned and the Nuba were pushed back up the 
hill. But Hawker could not take advantage of this initial success due to 
scarcity of water and shortage of ammunition. Encouraged by the apparent 
failure of the Government troops, Shaykh Abu Zaida of Sidra and Shaykh 
Isma’il of Gondukur^^^ joined Num. Num and harassed the troops. The retire­
ment thou^ difficult was carried out with a loss of two men killed and
(1) Egypt No. I (1904); CXI, Sudan Annual Report for 1903.
(2) PO 78/5301, Memorandum: by Wingate, Bor, 18 January I903. Incl, I in
Cromer to Lansdowne, No, 27; 26th January 1903.
(3) PO 78/5430, Sudan Annual Report for 1904» Cromer to Lansdowne, No;26,
15th March 1905.
(4) A.R.C. Bolton : The Dubab and Nuba of Jebel Dair, S.F.R., 19» 1936, P.94.
(5) Two neighbouring villages on j, Da’ir,
IJ
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three wounded. The patrol, however, withdrew to Rahad and the failure was
reported to el Oheid/**^
Further action now became necessary to restore the Government's
prestige, Maj, O'Connell left el-Obeid on 10th October 1904 with a strong
force comprising 5 British and 18 Egyptian officers and 354 rank and file.
He was supported by two ,75 mm Maxim Nordenfelt machine guns and one ,450
maxim machine gun. At Rahad, which he reached on the 11th, O'Connell was
joined by some 600 Arab friendlies of the region. From here he offered
amnesty to Abu Zaida, Two days later when no reply was received from Abu
Zaida, O'Connell marched on Kitra, Num Num's Village, which was found
deserted. Then he attacked Sidra and Gondukur,The Shaykhs of these two
places then surrendered'; .By the 20th Num Num himself submitted. It appears
that O'Connell had realized that the Government's authority could not be
established by planting Government M^ eks on the people. The three Smykhs
were therefore reinstated in their villages on condition that they would
obey the Government in future. The main purpose of the patrols was to show
the Nuba that the Government had to be obeyed and that in case of need it
(2)was able to impose its authority,' '
Armed expeditions now became a permanent feature of the administration 
in the Nuba Mountains, In future force was used when persuasion failed.
The primary aim of these patrols was to extend Government authority into 
the Nuba Mountains and to protect the weaker communities who had accepted 
the Government protection.
The next hill against which military action was taken was Shatt Safia, 
south of Kadu^li and Talodi, A certain Abu Enan, Mek of S^t Safia, had 
raided another tribe and refused to pay compensation,Maj, Leveson
(1) SIR, No, 124, November 1904.
(2) FO 78/5430; Sudan Annual Report, 1904, Slatin's impressions in Cromer
to Lansdowne, No, 26, 15th March 1905.
(3) FO/5430, Sudan Annual Report for 1904, Cromer to Lansdowne, No. 26,
15th March 1905, SIR, NO: 127, February 1905.
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then attacked the Mek with 55 men of the XII Sudanese, 29 Camel Corps and 
also Friendlies sent by Mek Rahal Andal of Kadughli and Hammad Abu Sikkin 
and a number of Hawazma Baqqara, The Mek and his son were captured after 
a fight early in I905, The fact that Hawazma Baqqaras cooperated with the 
Government suggests that they were the victims of Abu Enan's raid. If 
this is correct then, the Government's policy of breaking the power of the 
Arabs was already bearing fruit. It was time now to protect the Arabs from 
the attacks of their neighbours,  ^ the Nuba, Perhaps the disarmament of 
the Arabs in itself made the Nuba more aggressive and difficult to deal 
with.
For some years the Arabs had been brooding over the Government's 
policy of disarming them by confiscating their arms or controlling them by 
licence, while the Nuba were allowed to retain their arms. This was 
especially resented by the Talodi Arabs whose main occupation was slave 
raiding. The Talodi Arabs were either slaves or offspring of slave women 
of the Humr Baqqara, A large number of these had settled down at Talodi, 
Illiri and other places at the bottom of the Nuba Mountains, Owing to their 
Nuba origin they were much more formidable when attacking the hills than
(2)the Arab proper and were correspondingly feared,' ' A Government post 
had been established at Talodi at the request of the Nuba which was 
resented by the Talodi Arabs,
The Talodi Arabs, however, continued to raid the Nuba hills in and 
around Talodi, In May 1905, three of their leading Shaykhs,’Alawi, Khatir, 
and 'Abdallah Shameham : were arrested for their share in raiding. The
(1) FO 78/5430, Sudan Annual Report for 1904 in Cromer to Lansdowne, No,26, 
15th March 1905.
(2) FO 141/402, R.S. Wilson (Junior Inspector, Kordofan) to Governor, 
Kordofan, 29th June I906,
(3) FO 141/167, }ïr. Findlay to Grey, No, 105, Confidential, 24th June I9O6,
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arrest of their Shaykhs caused considerable unrest amongst the Talodi 
Arabs and when, early in 1906, the Inspector ordered the release of some 
120 slaves whom the Arabs had kidnapped from the Nuba, an open revolt 
bro^e out.(^) At a native dance, on 25th May 1906, the-Arabs attacked 
and killed the M&ûr, Capt. Ibrahim Muhammad, one officer and 40 men of 
the XII Sudanese and then invested the Talodi post*^^^ Fortunately some 
1200 Nuba friendlies under their Meks Rahal of Kadughli, Hamad Abu Sikkin 
of Miri, and Bosh of Gedir marched down to Talodi and relieved the garrison.
In the meantime, O’Connell had despatched a relief column in two 
detachments on 2nd and 3rd June respectively from el-Obeid, By the 12th 
the relief reached Talodi, According to 0’Conneli^ho had joined the relief 
column, the post would have been annihilated but for the timely help of 
the Friendlies, This also saved the Government the expense of a large 
expedition which would have been necessary if the rebels had got hold 
of the rifles of the garrison and occupied the Talodi Mountains as was 
their intention,
The relief force now attacked the Village of Teira near Jebel Illiri 
where the rebels were reported to be in full force. The village was cleared 
on the 15th and on the next day while the force rested, amnesty was announced 
to those who would surrender. This was accepted by most of the inhabitants 
of Teira, but the Talodi Arabs refused. Fighting was therefore resumed 
on the next day and the Arabs dispersed after losing 4OO men, O’Connell
(1) Egypt No, 1 (1907) Annual Report on the Sudan for 1906, Cromer to Grey, 
3rd March 1907*
(2) FO 141/402, Sirdar to Capt, Parker (Sudan Agent), No,633, 2nd June I906; 
also Report on the Military Operations of the Talodi Field Force by 
O'Connell,
(3) FO 141/402, Report on the Operations of the Talodi Field Force, by 
O'Connell,
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now returned to el-Obeid after leaving two and a half companies of the 
XII Sudanese at Talodi under Capt, Hutchinson, All those who were 
implicated in the revolt were arrested including Shaykh Raimia, 'Abdallah
('1')
Shamsham and Fiqi 'Awri, the leaders of the Talodi Arabs,^ '
The Talodi affair was much more serious than the inter-hill fights.
As Fiqi 'Awri himself stated, if prompt action had not been taken against 
Illiri, the Talodi and Illiri Arabs would have joined to raid the friendly 
hills and tribes and would have planned to attack the garrison during
(2)the next rainy season' *' when the movement of troops would be difficult.
The arrival of the Government troops at the time of the year, during 
rainy season, had a great effect on the rebels. All the Shaykhs of I^ Lliri 
when asked why they had given refuge to the Talodi Arabs said that they 
never expected the Government troops to arrive during the rains,
Capt, Hutchinson now ordered the trial of two of the arrested Shaykhs, 
'Abdallah Shamsham and Fiqi 'Awri by a Field General Court-Martial, The 
Court sat at Talodi on 28th and 29th June with Mr. Sagar of the Sudan 
Civil Service as judge advocate and both the prisoners were found guilty 
and sentenced to be hanged, Hutchinson confirmed the sentences without 
referring to superior authority and on the 1st of August the sentences 
were carried out,^^^
Wingate approved Hutchinson's action in confirming the sentences on 
his own authority,Bonham-Carter, on the other hand, without condemning the
(1) FO 571/59, S.I.E. No, 144, July 1906,
(2) Ibid, Appendix 'A',
(3) FO 141/402, Report on the Operations of the Talodi Field Force by 
Maj, O'Connell,
(4) FO 371/65, Abstracts of the proceedings of a Court-Martial held at 
Talodi on July 28th and 29th, 1906 for the trial of 'Abdallah Shamsham 
and Fiqi Awri, Incl, 2 in No:I, Cromer to Grey, No, 188, 25th October I9O6,
(5) FO 371/65, Wingate to Cromer, 25th October 1906, Inc, I in No,I, Cromer 
to Grey, No, 188, 25th October 1906,
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action expressed the view that Hutchinson could have delayed the execution 
till the sentences were confirmed by a superior authority, ^
Hutchinson, however, justified his action by explaining that the Arabs 
had spread a report that the Sudan Government was no more able to hold the 
Mountains than the Mahdists had been, and therefore would soon move out 
of the Nuba Mountains, The Nuba were therefore uneasy fearing that they 
would be left at the mercy of the Talodi Arabs, Another reason was that 
the Talodi people would not come in as long as their Shaykhs were alive. 
Moreover,' the attitude of the neighbouring people demanded that the punish­
ment should be severe. Hutchinson was convinced that had the Talodi post 
failed on 25th May, the Government would then have had to deal with at 
least 5000 men with many horsemen and rifles in an exceedingly difficult 
country. He added that men from every village in Illiri had taken part in 
the attack on Talodi, He further added that the rains had made the roads 
impassable and that there was the difficulty of guarding the prisoners.
The Sudanese troops were excited at the massacre of their comrades and 
their excitement was kept alive by the women and families of the murdered
(2)
men. The soldiers could not be trusted to guard the prisoners,' ' If 
Hutchinson had not executed the two Shaykhs, Cromer wrote to Grey, the 
soldiers would probably have killed all the prisoners,
By disarming the Arabs the Government had upset the delicate balance 
of power in the Nuba Mountains. Finding the Arabs held back, the Nuba
(1) Ibid, Bonham -Carter to Wingate, 20th October 1906, Incl, 4 in No,I, 
Cromer to Grey, No,188, 25th October 1906,
(2) FO 371/65, Letter of explanation by Capt. Hutchinson, 1st September 1906, 
Incl, 3 in No.I Cromer to Grey, No,188, 25th October 1906,
(3) FO 371/65, Cromer to Grey, No,188, 25th October I906,
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now began to move about in greater numbers attacking one another and
(2)
(l)the Arabs, Though they were visited periodically by the Sudan
officials, the Nuba showed utter disregard for Governmental authority<
This state of affairs in the Nuba Mountains emphasised the need for a 
systematic pacification of the region.
Reviewing the situation in the Nuba Mountains in 1906, Cromer 
referred to Slatin's suggestion advocating a change in the administration 
of the hills. After the Talodi disturbances Slatin appears to have 
recommended separating the southern part of Kordofan, including the Nuba 
Mountains, from the rest of the province and keeping a force concentrated 
at Kadughli, He also wanted more British Inspectors and Egyptian Mamurs 
to be posted to this area, Cromer strongly recommended Slatin’s proposals 
to the Foreign Office,' ' In the meantime, the garrison of Kordofan 
had been increased by an Egyptian battalion which was ordered to el-Obeid, 
and the XII Sudanese battalion there was moved to a spot near Kadughli,
The strength of the Kordofan force of the Slavery Department had also 
been increased by one British Inspector and about 40 mounted men,^^^
Capt, McMurdo, the Director of this Department was sceptical of much being 
effected until the Government had a firmer hold on these semi-independent 
and often hostile tribes. According to him durable peace in the country
(1) PO 371/890, SIR No: 186, Appendix ’A’, J.¥, Sagar: Notes on the Nuba,
(2) PO 371/891, A Report on Jebel Nyima Patrol, Gorst to Grey, No,2,
4th January 1909.
(3)P0 371/247, Cromer to Grey, No.33, 3rd March I907.
(4) PO 371/450, Gorst to Grey, 7th March I9O8, Annual Report on the Sudan
1907.
(5) Egypt No.I (1906), Sudan Annual Report for 1905, 8th March I906,
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could not be established until a local militia of at least 2000 rifles
had been raised and placed in occupation of the various big tribal mountain
strongholds,
Wingate who inspected Kordofan in December I906 wrote to Cromer that 
the small garrisohs at el-Obeid, Bara and Talodi were inadequate to deal 
with any serious eventuality in Kordofan and that the Government ought
('1')to be in a position to deal with them,'  ^ He agreed with Slatin that 
the province should be subdivided into two, making the 12th parallel 
roughly the dividing line,^^^
During 1906 to 1908 further information was collected on the Nuba 
Mountains, Soon after suppressing the Talodi Arabs a Government post was 
established at Illiri, Leveson, the senior Inspector of Kordofan, during 
his tour of Inspection in December 1906, visited the spot where work was 
still in progress. He reported that the Illiri ’Markaz’ would not work 
satisfactorily as it would be impossible to administer the country lying 
more than 40 miles west of Illiri in addition to the huge extent of country 
lying to the north, east, and south of it. He proposed that Illiri ’Markaz’ 
should deal with J, Moro, J, Talodi, J, Durham, Mesakin, Degig, Krongo 
and Golo while Kadughli should take J, Teis, J, Ela/heima and all the 
hills west of them, all the Baqqara and if desirable the Humr country,
On December 28th, 1906, Leveson met Slatin at Talodi with whom he 
visited J, Illiri, J, Tunguru, Lakola, J, Morong and J, Gedir, On the 7th 
of January 1907 the party dispersed, Slatin going to J, Pungor en route 
to Kodok while Leveson returned to el Obeid on the 30th after visiting
(1) W,P, Box 279/6, Wingate to Cromer, 12th December 1906,
(2) Ibid,
(3) PO 371/246, SIR, No:151, Januaiy 1907, Appendix ’O’,
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Tendik, Taqali and Sidra on J. Da'ir,
During 1908, Bimb^y Vickery, the Inspector at Taqali 'Markaz* 
visited Tukam, Tagoi and the Koalib hills. In his opinion Mek Ali Adam 
of J, Tukam should be removed to el-Obeid for some time. He found that 
the chiefs of Koalib hills were hostile to the Government, Shaykh Girru, ■ 
the principal chief of the Koalib hills ^ having refused to come in. 
According to reports which Vickery received the Koalib doubted whether 
the soldiers of the Government would ever be brought against them. They 
had so often been threatened and nothing had happened. The only chief
— f 1 'Iwho ha,d paid the tribute was Shaykh Paraqallah of J, Delami,^  ^ Mek
Gedeil of Tagoi appears to have been evasive and refused to come in
when summoned. There was a dispute between him and the Meks Jaili/Adam
of Taqali and Zaiba of Rashad,
Following the proposals submitted by Slatin and Wingate it was
decided in 1908 to reorganise the Nuba Mountains as a Sub-Province under
a Sub-Governor whose office should be moved to Talodi from Kadu^li,
The Sub-Province was divided into four Marakiz, Kadu^li, Billing, Tendik
and Tungaru, It was proposed to move the last to Talodi, There were to
be three Inspectors who would reside at Billing, Taqali and Tun<^ru,
The Sub-Governor dealt with all matters of administration and justice.
At each ' Markaz ' there was to be a Mamur, who was assisted by one or
more sub-Mamurs, The administration was assisted by some police in each
'Markaz', All the police were armed with Martini-Enfield ,503 carbine
or rifle. They had 100 rounds per man in the 'Markaz' and no man was
(2)
allowed to go out on patrol or guard with less than 20 rounds.
(1) FO 371/449, S.I.R, No:l66, May 1908, Appendix 'M*, Report on J, Tukam, 
Koalib and Taqoi by Vickeiy, March 1908.
(2) FO 371/659, S.I.R., No,171, October 1908,
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The creation of the Nuba Mountain, sub-province opened a new period of 
Nuba-administration, During this period the Government relied more and more 
on military patrols to enforce its authority when persuasion failed to 
bring about the desired effect. Notable among the Nuba who had so far 
maintained their independence were those inhabiting the Nyima group of 
hills and the Eoalibs, J. Nyima had neither acknowledged the Egyptian 
Government nor the >üahdiyya and during the period under review they had 
been a constant source of trouble to the Sudan Government. The relations 
of the Nyima with their neighbours were mostly hostile, leading to constant 
wars and raids. The Eoalibs inhabitating the high massifs of J. Nyukar,
J, Umbre and Delami Meyl had refused to meet Vickery when he had visited 
them earlier in 1908,^”*^
Slatin recommended strong measures against the Nuba of J, Nyima.
Their behaviour was an open danger and incitement to the other groups to 
follow their example. He proposed that punitive measures should begin at 
the end of the rainy season, i.e. the end of October or the beginning of 
November when water would be sufficient and the ground dry enou^ to permit
( 2)the movement of troops.' '
However, before military action was taken against the Nyima, R.S, 
Wilson, the sub-Govemor, tried to induce them to submit. The Nuba chiefs 
were invited to meet the sub-Govemor at Billing on 5th October 19O8 , Some 
eight chiefs attended the meeting either in person or sent in their 
representatives. The hills represented were (1) J. Fassu, (2) J, Sultan,
(1) FO 571/449, Report on Tukam, Tagoi, Koalib and Taqali by Vickery, 
March 1908, in S.I.R,, No:l66, May 1908; S.I.R, No:l67, June 1908, 
Appendix *E*,
(2) FO 571/891, Reference to Slatin's Memorandum in a Report on J. Nyima 
Patrol in Gorst to Grey, No,2, 4th January 1909.
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(3) Kakara, (4) Kalara, (5) Salara, (6) Nith, (7) Tandia and (8) Kurmitti. 
After the meeting, the chiefs met again and settled amongst themselves the 
inter-hill demands and complaints,
On 9th October Wilson visited J, Nyima and interviewed Dargul, the 
Kujur of J, Passu and Agabna, the Mek of J, Sultan, Dargul, who had 
unlimited influence over his people, was represented by his deputy, a certain 
Barud, at the meeting at Billing on the 5th, He now formally professed his 
loyalty to the Government and agreed to surrender all prisoners and booty
(2)taken from other hills,' ' Agabna was asked to surrender 15 rifles.
The effect of Wilson's policy of establishing direct relations with 
the Nuba was soon felt all around. Representatives from J, Katla and Wali 
came in on the 10th October followed by Shaykh Wad Karro of J, Mandai who 
arrived on the next day. By the 17th Kujur 'Uthman Wad Agrab of Kurmetti, 
Kujur Tia Wad Tebeiri of Mandai Ullal and the representatives of Wali 
Baboi, Wali Kurun, Katla Kidu,.^  Katla Keteik, Zulman and others had arrived 
at Billing and settled their inter-Hill complaints. Though the policy of 
bringing the Nuba under direct control appears to have had an encouraging 
start, it was by no means easy to disarm the more powerful of the Nuba 
chiefs, Dargul, the Chief of J. Passu, for instance had received Wilson 
and promised his loyalty to the Government but refused to surrender a 
certain number of rifles which Wilson had demanded as a fine for his 
recalcitrance. The same was true of the Chiefs of Katla Kidu and Kiteik 
who had sent in their representatives .but refused to give up either 
prisoners or booty,Persuasion having failed, Wilson now recommended
(1) PO 371/659, Report by R,S, Wilson on the progress of the negotiations 
with the hills, 6th October I9O8, Appendix P, SIR No:171, October I9O8 ,
(2) FO 371/659, S.I.R,, No,171, October 1908, Appendix F, Report by R.S, 
Wilson on the progress of the negotiations with the hills,
(3) FO 371/659, S.I.R. No,172, November 1908, Appendix 'B*, A Report by 
R.S. Wilson on the attitude of some Nuba hills towards the Government.
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that these hills should be punished. Even if only one rebellious jebel was
properly punished, he wrote, others in the neighbourhood would submit,
It was now decided to send a patrol comprising half a-squadron of
cavalry, two mounted guns, two maxims, four companies Camel Corps and two
companies of XV Sudanese under the command of Maj, Lempriere, Capt, Lloyd
(2)
the Governor of Kordofan had political control over the operations.
By the 51st October the whole force was concentrated at Billing, J,Fassu 
was stormed on the 5^d November and Bargul^s Village was captured. The 
Village was found entirely deserted, all the inhabitants having taken refuge 
in the caves on the hillside. However, the village was burnt down, the crop 
destroyed and the cattle rounded up before the troops returned to the base. 
Four days later, after attempts at negotiations had failed, the attack was 
resumed but the village was again found deserted, Capt, Lloyd thought that 
after the two attacks the hi Ilmen might be desirous of treating but were 
being restrained through fear. The troops were therefore withdrawn after 
leaving Mr, Sagar at the place to open negotiations with the hi Ilmen, As 
expected, Darrgul’s son came into Mr, Sagar after the troops had gone, and 
offered to restore all slaves and pay the fine imposed by the Government 
and promised not to raid in future if his father’s liber-by was guaranteed, 
Capt, Lloyd who was informed acquiesced in these conditions and granted 
amnesty to J, Fassu,
In the meantime the troops had marched to J. Funda which was attacked 
on the 12th, and the chiefs were forced to pay the fine. From J. Funda the 
troops turned towards Katla, a series of hills of considerable extent, 
some 17 miles from Funda« Representatives from various hills appeared before 
Lloyd, but the outstanding hill, known as Katla Karun, refused to hand
(1) I~bid, No, 2, dated 25rd October 1908,
(2) FO 571/891, Report on J, Nyima Patrol, Gorst to Grey, No,2, 4th January
1909.
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over some raided property and a number of slaves. This hill was therefore 
attacked and captured on the 18th,
This concluded the operations. After the restitution of all slaves 
and stolen property, the chiefs were granted pardon and the troops were 
withdrawn.
The immediate result of the Nyima operations was that a number of 
hills who had never previously sent in representatives to Billing now 
submitted. Prominent amongst these were J, Temein, J, Tulushi, and Tima, 
the most important of the Koalib h i l l s , J .  Temein surrendered all 
its captives and promised to abstain from raids, J, Tima returned all the 
Gulud captives held by them and J, Tulushi paid up their tribute for the 
first time and asked the Government to arrange peace between them and 
their enemies. These hills were at a very considerable distance from the 
scene of recent operations and the fact that they had voluntarily surrendered 
proved the success of the new policy. In order to prevent future feuds,
Sagar recommended that troubles should be immediately investigated and 
settled soon after their outbreak, for "if the Nuba was left without 
obtaining compensation for his losses, he would compensate himself sooner
(2)or later,"'  ^ Sagar wanted the Inspectors to spend as much of each year 
as possible in their districts in order to settle quarrels as they arose, 
Sagar recommended that shortage of Inspectors should be avoided in the 
Jebel sub-province in order to avoid further fighting and that the patrols 
should pass through the province more frequently to impress upon the 
Nuba the power of the Government, In other words, mere over-arule must give
(1) PO 371/659, Report on the results of the Nyima Patrol, by J,¥, Sagar, 
4th January 1909, in the Annual Report on the Sudan for 19O8, Gorst to 
Grey, No,29, 27th March 1909.
(2) Ibid,
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way to closer administration of the province.
During 1909-1910 more detailed information was collected about the 
Nuba hills, their strength, the number of guns each hill possessed and 
the lay out of the land in general. In May 1909 Bimb.Black, one of the 
Inspectors, inspected Billing and Kadughli and collected valuable in­
formation from the military point of view. His visit took him to J, Tulushi, 
J, Tima, Wali Baboi and ¥ali Umm Kurun, the Katla group and the Bago,^ "*^
His conclusions were that the Baqo, Tima and the ¥ali could be visited 
with a few police. But Tulushi should never be visited without a strong 
patrol and the Katla group without a strong escort. While Black was 
returning from Tima to Billing in March 1909 after the completion of the 
tour, he was fired upon at a spot not far from Katla Kidu and sli^tly 
wounded. The surrender of the men responsible for firing having been 
refused by the Nuba of Katla Kidu, a patrol under Heath was despatched on 
25th I%rch and the hill was attacked and occupied on the 28th, But the 
hill was found as usual deserted. After burning the village and destroying 
the grain, the troops returned to the camp at the Palaka, a stream in the 
centre of the hill. Here the sub-Govemor joined the patrol and advised 
proceeding against Tima where it was reported that the inhabitants of 
Katla Kidu had hidden their cattle. The troops therefore attacked J. Tima 
and occupied it after slight resistance, Wilson now considered that the 
hills had been sufficiently punished. The troops were then withdrawn and
(2)
the operations closed.
During the same year Vickery visited the Taqali Markaz which was 
established at Keraia in the neighbourhood of the village of Mek Ja’iUj-#
(1) PO 371/659, S.I.R,, No,179, June 1909, Appendix 'C, Report on a tour 
of Inspection in Billing and Kadughli,
(2) PO 371/659, SIR, N0:177, April 1909, Appendix 'E*, Report by Ronald 
Heath,
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He noted that Mek Ja'ihL seemed to be unhappy to have the liarkez so close 
to his village which had reduced his own stature in the eyes of his own 
followers. He was reported to have been preventing his people from taking 
complaints to the Inspector.^ '/Ee- was of the opinion that Taqali should 
not be abandoned at a time when the Government was making headway against 
Ja • iH' 8 influence,
Vickery also saw Gedeil Muhammad, the Mek of .Tagoi, and discussed 
various complaints lodged against him by the Meks of Taqali and Rashad.
He was convinced that most of the complaints against Gedeil were made up 
with the object of discrediting him in the eyes of the Government, He 
therefore wanted the three Meks to meet on neutral ground and settle their
disputes. The enmity amongst these could not be allowed to go on as they
(2)occupied a position astride the main roads in the Taqali Markaz,^  '
’Ali Adam, the Mek of J, Tukam in the same Markaz, could not be
persuaded to come down, J, Tukam was found to be a high rocky hill with
numerous ravines and spurs, and the two villages, Tukare and Tishan, 
were both situated high up on the mountain and could be reached only after 
an arduous climb of over an hour. According to Vickery the best way to 
attack the mountain was to enter simultaneously from J, Gawad and 
Charachaka, a water hole, five miles away. The Mek had 200 rifles which 
could be augmented in the event of disturbances,No attack on J, Tukam 
was, however, launched, and 'Ali Adam appears to have been left to himself 
for the time being.
(1) FO 571/659» SIR, No: 179, Jiine 1909, Appendix 'D', Report on Markaz 
- Taqali,
(2) Ibid,
(3) FO 371/449, SIR Noi-170, September I9O8, Appendix 'D', Military Report 
on J, Tukam; See FO 371/659, SIR NoP 179, Jime 1909, Appendix D, Report 
on the Markaz Taqali by Vickery,
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The year I910 saw further extension of Government's authority with
the occupation of Tirulumam in the Moro hills, the headquarters of the Mek 
( 1 )Cheppina' • J, Daqiq was also occupied. Some 850 Friendlies under Meks 
Rahal of KadugH, Fiqi 'Ali of Miri and Shaykfa Hamad of Liki joined Haddow 
in the pacification of the latter p l a c e . A t  Tagoi, however, a much stiffer 
resistance was offered to the Government troops, Savile, the Governor of 
Kordofan, whilst on an Inspection tour in April I910 ordered the Meks of 
Taqali, Tagoi and Rashad to meet him at Tendik to resolve their differences, 
Gedeil of Tagoi sent hack an insolent reply refusing to attend the 
Conference, Savile now felt it incumbent upon him to vindicate the 
Government's authority. Summoning a company of the X Sudanese which was 
passing by and 30 police who had accompanied him, Savile despatched them 
against J, Tagoi, But an unexpectedly strong resistance was encountered 
in the face of which the small force could not proceed. For his opposition 
to the Government Gedeil was ordered to pay a fine of 50 rifles and £E 5 
by a fixed date,
Gedeil not only refused to pay the fine but openly announced protection 
to all the fugitives from the Government, It seems rather futile to have 
expected him to pay the fine when he was still actually resisting, Wingate
(1) FO 371/890, SIR No, 187, February 1910; and SIR No: 188, Mareh 1910,
(2) Ibid,' and SIR Nos/89 and 190 for April and May 1910,
(3) FO 371/890, SIR, No:189, April I9IO,
(4) FO 371/895, Patrol in Southern Kordofan, in Gorst to Grey, No,152,
29th November 1910,
Yet Gadeil had met Vickery in a friendly manner during 1909. This sudden 
change in his attitude to the Government is a typical example of how 
even friendly Nuba chiefs could behave in an unpredictable manner.
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now decided to punish Gedeil. A strong force consisting of two guns, one 
squadron Cavalry, four companies of Camel Corps and infantry was concentrated 
at Rashad under Asser on 10th November 1910, A portion of the force then 
attacked Tagoi and after a severe battle occupied the hill, Gedeil, 
however, escaped to the neighbouring hills, A certain^dris Wad Karbus, 
who had some claim to the Tagoi Mekship was then appointed Mek and the 
patrol returned to Rashad leaving behind a company of the Sudanese Infantry,^ 
On the 29th a brother of Gedeil surrendered to Vickery with 30 rifles 
and informed him that Gadeil was on his way to el-Obeid to surrender. But 
Gadeil had in fact taken refuge at J, Kimla, a hill to the south of J, Da'ir, 
from where he returned to J. Tagoi in February I9II, shot dead the new Mek, 
and beat back an attack by *Abd al-Rahman, the Mek of Turjok who had come 
to the rescue of Mek Idris, On receiving this information the Mamur at the 
Taqali Markaz proceeded to J, Tagoi but found that Gadeil had again escaped
(2 ')to his former sanctuary at Kimla, ' In the meantime the senior Inspector 
at el Obeid had already proceeded to Sidra on J, Da’ir with a view to 
opening negotiations with the Nuba of J, Kimla; and in this he was successful. 
By 30th March the representatives from Kimla arrived with 53 out of 60 rifles 
which were demanded of them as a fine. The need for further operations 
having thus been avoided, efforts were directed towards capturing Gedeil 
who had escapéd from Kimla, He was reported to be somewhere in J. Da'ir, The 
Camel Corps now picketed the water at Hawazma Pirik and Kimla, the only 
watering places in the area. Finding access to water cut off and all roads 
of escape closed, Gedeil surrendered on 5th April 1911. He was tried for 
the murder of ^ dris and sentenced to be hanged. The sentence was carried 
out on the llth,^^^
(1) FO 371/1112, SIR, No: 196, November I9IO, Asser to Wingate, 15th 
January 1911 in Gorst to Grey, No, 152, 29th November 1910,
(2) Ibid,
(3) FO 371/1111, SIR, No: 201, April 1911.
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Meanwhile it became necessary to despatch troops to the Katla group 
of hills. Evidently encouraged by the example of Gedeil, the Nuba of this 
group of hills had refused to pay either the tribute or the fines which 
were imposed for its non payment, A portion of the force which had been 
concentrated at Rashad was now sent under Conry Bey, Katla Kurun, the main 
hill, was successfully stormed on 2nd December 1910 and on the 12th Tima 
was occupied. The operations in this sector were completed by the 19th 
and the force returned to el-Obeid leaving a section of the Camel Corps 
at Dilling,(^)
The punitive expeditions were regrettable but this was the only way 
of demonstrating the Government's authority and collecting taxes. During 
1913-1914 a considerable number of the Nuba belonging to J, Tira el Akhdar, 
Sabai and Mandai fought the Government troops before they surrendered. The 
outbreak of the First World War brought a lull in these operations. The 
only exception was the revolt of Fiqi "Ali of Miri which was suppressed
( 2)only by a major operation,^  ^ The situation in the Nuba Mountains, however, 
continued to be bad. In the Nyima hills the Nuba of J, Sultan under Agabna 
refused to pay taxes or to give up refugees from justice. Stack, now the 
Acting Governor-General and Sirdar, approved the despatch of a company of 
mounted Infantry to assist the Inspector of the district, Capt, R,W, Hutton, 
in reducing Agabna, Unfortunately Hutton was killed while attempting to 
arrest Agabna and the set-back caused to the Governmental authority 
necessitated a despatch of a larger force, 3OOO strong under Lt, Col, L.K, 
Smith, Agabna was finally arrested in Februaiy 1918, A large number of 
prisoners, 4OOO in number, were found in this hill alone. The reduction
(1) FO 371/1111, SIR, No: 197, December 1910,
(2) Military operations against Fiqi^Ali are discussed at some length 
in Ch, VI,
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of J, Sultan was important because it had never before been effectively 
subdued,
The situation in J, Alira,Heiban and the Koalib range was equally 
bad. The Nuba here had a good stock of rifles and they were doing their 
best to add to their supplies,These hills to all intents and purposes 
defied the Government and the Government administrative officials who 
visited them were exposed to grave risk,^^^ It was decided to send a 
punitive force to teach them a l e s s o n , O n  23rd April 1919 a patrol 
of about 440 rifles of the XI Sudanese and Nuba 'territorials' under Maj,
C, Graham visited these hills with a view to overaweing them and if they 
still remained hostile, to punish them and exact a fine,^^^ The patrols 
were to be followed up with a closer administration by establishing a new 
civil post on these hills which would have under its charge certain portions 
of the three districts of Talodi, Kadu^li and Rashad,According to 
Stack it had not been possible so far to increase administrative officials 
in the Nuba Mountains which had been reduced during the War,
On 24th April, 1919 initial attempts to get into touch with the Heiban 
Chief Kabus (Kabis) having failed, the chief's village at the north-:eâst.'end of 
Heiban was burnt down and posts were established. The Nuba chief of Heiban
realising that resistance was futile submitted with his people on 30th April,
/
(1) FO 371/3713» Stack to Wingate, Report on the operations in the Sudan 
in Stack to Wingate, 19th January 1919,
(2) FO 371/3724, SIR, No, 292, November 1918,
(3) FO 371/3724, SIR, No, 293, December 1918,
(4) FO 371/3724, SIR, No, 298, May 1919.




The object of the patrol having thus been achieved, the troops returned to
the plain and the political officer took over the situation, A small force
of 50 NCOS and men was again despatched in June 1919 to destroy the new
huts built by the followers of Kabus (Kabis) of Heiban, The object was to
prevent these men from settling down before the fine of 50 rifles had been
surrendered. This object was achieved without much difficulty,^
In the meantime the patrol under Graham had subdued the Chief Lummi
of Alira and moved to the Koalib hills close to the village of the principal
Kujur, Girru, who was the paramount chief. He had considerable influence,
but fortunately he sent in envoys. Summons was then sent to Girru to come
in person and after much delay he came in on 8th May and paid the fine.
Another chief, Loingi, also surrendered and military action was found to 
(2)be unnecessary,^ ^
The moral effect of a comparatively large force was obvious. Once the 
Nuba realised that the Government intended to enforce its orders they 
readily submitted. Stack confidently wrote to Allenby that " . . . . with 
time the closer administration now possible owing to the formation of the 
new district will have a good effect, and I trust no further military 
patrol will be necessary to ensure public security,
The Nuba of Tira at Akhdar, however, continued to cause trouble, A 
small police post was therefore placed at J. Tira al Akhdar to check the 
Nuba cattle th i e v e s , T h i s post was evidently too small to keep them 
from mischief. In October 1922 when the Nuba of Tira el Akhdar refused to
(1) FO 371/5724, SIR, No, 299, June 1919.
(2) FO 371/5724, SIR, No, 298, May 1919.
(3) FO 371/3713, Stack to Special High Commissioner for Egypt, No,41,
26th June 1919.
(4) FO 371/3724, SIR, No, 302, September 1919.
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hand over certain prisoners who had escaped from custody at Billing, 
opportunity was taken to teach them a lesson. Two hundred rifles from Talodi 
and 60 from Kadu^li were despatched under Capt, B,H, Withers to Tira el- 
Akhdar, Mr.J.A. Gillan, the Deputy Governor accompanied Withers as political 
officer,^
The troops arrived at the hill on 14th October but failed to take the
Nuba by surprise. Most of the diehards managed to escape into the caves of 
r,
Guban and Omura and were joined there by recalcitrants from other parts of
the hill. Organised resistance was, however, broken by the 19th and to
ensure that the Nuba of Tira el Akhdar would not give trouble in future,
50
they were removed from their villages to the plains below, A fine of/4ifles 
was imposed on the hill and a number of men and boys were taken for enlist-
(2 )ment in the army,^ '
The Nuba of Tira el Akhdar had had a severe lesson. In December it was 
reported that they were rebuilding their villages on sites in the foot hills 
of Tira el Akhdar which had been allotted to them,^^^ But a few of them had 
not settled down even by July 1 9 2 3 . They said that they were unable to 
find suitable sites outside the prohibited area. They were therefore split 
up and placed with other Tira Shaykhs whom they liked.
During 1923 troops were again employed on moretthan one occasion to
(5)punish the Nuba, ^ According to the Governor of the Nuba Mountain province,
(1) FO 371/8976,SIR, No,339, October 1922,
(2) Ibid,
(3) FO 371/8976, MIR, No,341, December 1922,
(4) FO 371/8977, MIR, No, 348, July 1923.
(5) FO 371/10070, Annual Report on the Sudan for 1923, Allenby to MacDonald,
No,475, 21st July I924. The Nuba visited by the troops during this year
were of Katla Kurung, Miacoma and Umbri Koalib,
107
the number of instances of assault and disobedience gave an impression of
unrest which did not really exist. This was mainly due to the effect of
closer administration of the province and the adoption of a policy of quick
retaliation for offences,
From the foregoing it is evident that the Nuba did not pose a threat
to security in the Sudan, But the Sudan Government could not tolerate the
existence of an unsubdued territory for long, especially in a 'sensitive*
province such as Kordofan where Mahdiism was, as yet, far from extinct.
The Nuba Mountains afforded a tempting sanctuary for turbulent and subversive
characters, and could be used as 'incubators,' for resistance movements which
(2)
Wingate was bent upon to crush 'in the egg',  ^ *
The pacification of the Nuba Mountains was necessarily slow and spread 
well over tmdecades. The strategy of pacification was in the first instance, 
to establish friendly relations with the peripheral chiefs such as the Meks 
of Taqali, Rashad, Kadu'^li and the like. At about the same time a cordon 
of military posts were established at strategic points, encircling the 
Nuba Mountains, Once the plains and the peripheral hills were secured, 
the administration of more tractable areas was taken in hand. The creation 
of the Nuba Mountain sub-province in 1908 and an increase in the strength 
of troops enabled the Government to inflict severe punishment on disobedient 
hills; and thus it induced the submission of most of the others. After the 
war, overwhelming force was used against lhard-core' resisters, such as the 
Nuba of Tira al-Akhdar, Heiban and Alira, some of whom were compelled to
(1) PO 571/8977, MIE, NO:546, Hay 1925.
(2) As early as 1905 Muhatnmad al-Amin, had established himself in Taqali 
whose religious movement was discovered by the Government just in time. 
Supra Ch, III, P.
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vacate their hills and settle elsewhere. By 1923-24 a close administration 
was more or less established in the Nuba Mountains, If there were further 
punitive measures, these were to ensure public security and to maintain 
law and order rather than to coerce the submission of entire communities.
The opening of new roads for wheeled traffic connecting the Nuba Mountains 
with the outside world and the establishment of a Mission Station by the 
Church Missionary Society, created a sense of confidence amongst the Nuba, 
who started coming dovm their hills in large numbers both for the purpose 
of living and for cultivation.
In conclusion it might be noted that the main "difficulty in pacifying 
the Nuba was the shifts of attitude among Nuba leaders from co-operation 
to hostility (and vice versa), They seemed to be quite unpredictable, 
and motives behind their actions were not understood; for instance, Jaili 
Adam had actively cooperated with the Anglo-Egyptian troops against the 
IGialifa in 1899. Normally it was expected that he would remain loyal to 
the Government, But in 1903 ve find him harbouring Muhammad al-Amin and 
his supporters who were suspected of subversive activities. The same could 
be said of Paqi 'Ali, Rahal Andal and many other Meks who at one time support" 
ed the Government and on other occasions lent a helping hand to the 
turbulent and subversive characters. This opaqueness of the Nuba situation - 
the virtual impossibility of predicting what any Nuba leader would do 
next - put the Sudan officials to great difficulties in deciding the course 
of action to be followed. This hi^ly contrasts with the ease with which 
Mahdists and neo Mahdist leaders were tackled. This was due to the greater 
understanding of the Mahdist and neo Mahdist behaviour and motivation 
than what is known of the Nuba motivation.
Another reason which involved the Government in inconveniently large 
scale operations could be traced to the over-enthusiasm of some of the
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Sudan officials who tried to punish the Nuba for some minor offence 
with inadequate forces. They were beaten back, which oft^n resulted in 
;hth§ Government mounting expeditions on military scale to restore its 
lost prestige. In this connection one might suggest that Kitchener's 
technique of picking good men and giving them great freedom of action 
worked well intthe Sudan, but it had its drawbacks in the Nuba Mountains 
and it might have actually delayed pacification.
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CHAPTER V
Security under Strain - 1900-1914
The Role of British Military Officers 
and the British Garrison in the Sudan.
Ill
The mutiny of 1900 in the Sudanese battalions of the Egyptian army 
convinced Wingate that no reliance could be placed on the Egyptian officers 
for the maintenance of security in the Sudan. As an alternative he wanted 
additional British officers and an increased British garrison to counter­
act the subversive influences in the country. But, in spite of the crucial 
security importance of British officers and British troops, Wingate had 
considerable difficulty in securing an adequate British force, and in 
obtaining and retaining the services of suitable British officers for both 
military and civil duties. These factors are discussed below at some 
length,
(a ) The British Military Officers with the Egyptian Army in the Sudan
The appointment of Kitchener and Wingate, both military officers, as 
Govemors-General of the Sudan laid the basis for the appointment of British 
military officers in the central and provincial government of the country. 
The higher ranks of the administration came to be dominated by military 
officers though an attempt was made by Cromer, as early as 1900, to recruit 
British civilians to serve in the S u d a n , A  large number of these 
military officers were required as Governors and Inspectors in the provinces 
and in the Central Government besides those who were serving with the 
Egyptian army.
Cromer realized the importance of employing competent officers in the 
military and civil administration of the Sudan, He wrote to Salisbury in 
May 1900, . . .It can not be too clearly understood that the working
of the whole complicated machine of Government in Egypt and the Soudan 
depends not so much on the employment of a large number of Englishmen as 
on the selection of a limited number of men possessing the special quali-
(1) Egypt No, I, (1901) Cd 441, 86, Annual Report on the Sudan, 1900,
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fications requisite to fill certain places with advantage to the public
s e r v i c e " . H e  was supporting the cases of Lt, Col, Nason (Governor of
Berber) and Lt, Col, Collinson (Governor of Kassala) whose extension of
(2)service in the Sudan had been requested by Wingate, '
The policy of employing British Military Officers, however, ran into 
difficulties at the very outset, British officers on the strength of the 
Sgyp±fei>4rmy were liable to be transferred by the War Office to any part 
of the world where their services were required. Secondly, the conditions 
of service in the Sudan did not encourage the officers themselves to 
prolong their stay in the country. The hardship of life in the Sudan, the 
climate, the arduous work coupled with the difficulty of obtaining an 
adequate amount of leave produced a growing dislike of service in the 
Sudan amongst them,^^^
British reverses in the South African War in 19OO necessitated the 
recall of a number of British officers from the Egyptian army, and many 
others whose battalions had been ordered to South Africa were equally 
anxious to join their regiments,While not objecting to the demands 
made by the War Office on the British officers lent to the Egyptian army, 
Wingate appealed to Cromer to move the Home Authorities at least to 
prevent British officers resigning from service in the Egyptian army. 
Thanks to Cromer's intervention, Wingate was authorized not to accept 
resignation from officers with intent to go oi/active s e r v i c e , O n  the
(1) PO 78/5087, Viscount Cromer to Marquess of Salisbury, No: 1 
Separate and Special, 11th May I9OO,
(2) PO 78/5087, Maj, Gen, Sir R, Wingate to Viscount Cromer, Private, Incl, 1
in No,I, 10th May 1900 in Viscount Cromer to Marquess of Salisbury,
Separate and Special, No, I, 11th May 1900,
(3) PO 141/342, Viscount Cromer to Marquess of Salisbury, Private,
26th March 1899.
(4) FO 78/5090, Cromer to Salisbury, Tel, No,3, 14th January I9OO,
(5) FO 78/5089, Salisbury to Cromer, Tel, No: 8, 22nd January I9OO,
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outbreak of the mutiny in the Egyptian Army in 1900, Cromer definitely
told Salisbury not to press the Sirdar to part with any officer whom he
wished to retain.
It was now clear that experienced British officers could not be
retained in the Sudan unless the many disadvantages under which they
laboured while serving with the Egyptian array were removed. Some of the
officers were anxious to rejoin the British service as their careers were
likely to suffer by remaining in the Egyptian army; and others who were
willing to extend their contracts had to go on half pay in their parent
Regiments and their work in the Sudan did not count as full service towards
a pension. As a military officer, Wingate was anxious to retain as many
British officers as possible. In I'fey 1900 Wingate proposed to Cromer that
he should be permitted to retain qualified British officers, once they
joined the Egyptian aniQr, for a period of ten years and not seven years
as fixed by the War Office, After the expiry of ten years the Sirdar
should be empowered to retain an officer if his services were considered
essential for the administration. Such officers, whose servicesweareextended
beyond ten years, according to Wingate, should be removed from their
regiment or corps and placed on the General List of Officers extra-
regimentally employed and, while so employed, should be eligible for
selection for promotion precisely as if they had remained on the establish-
(2)ment of their regiment or corps,^ '
The War Office, while accepting some of the proposals submitted by 
Wingate, found it difficult to waive all regulations sufficientljw to 
safeguard completely the officers' promotion and pension prospects whilst
(1) PO 141/354, Cromer to Salisbury, Private, 31st January 19OO,
(2) PO 78/5007, Wingate to Cromer, Private, 10th May I9OO, I%cl, I in No,I, 
Cromer to Salisbury, Separate and Secret, 11th May I9OO,
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in the Egyptian service. Obviously, it was impossible for the Military 
authorities in England to agree to any proposals which clashed seriously 
with the general organisation of the British army. The Sirdar was permitted 
to retain the officers for a period more than seven years, but after seven 
years the officer would be removed from his regiment or corps and would 
be placed on the half pay list. He would remain eligible for army or 
Brevet promotion but he would lose all his claim for regimental promotion, 
However, Cromer continued to press for better terms of service for the 
British officers in the Egyptian Army, In 1902 he pointed out to Lansdowne 
that apart from a handful of British troops, the Sudan was garrisoned by a 
Muslim army which had already mutinied once - a mutiny caused partly at 
least by the withdrawal of senior and experienced British officers for the 
South African War. European businessmen and (most unfortunately in Cromer's 
view) missionaries would soon arrive in the Sudan. Their presence would 
create tensions which would complicate the problem of security. According 
to him the only remedy was to place in each district one or two British 
officers who were thoroughly familiar with the country and its customs, 
Egyptian officers or inexperienced British officers necessarily working 
through Egyptian subordinates would, Cromer thought, do more harm than 
good,(§^ He referred to the cases of Lt, Col, Ravenscroft and Lt, Col,
Peake who, if the recent decision of the War Office was applied, would 
leave the Egyptian army and others would follow their example. In conclusion 
Cromer suggested that British officers, after having served for 7 years
(1) PO 141/550, R,H. Knox to T.A. Sanderson, NO; 0145/8627, 26th October 
1900, in T.A. Sanderson to Cromer, No, 206, 31st October, I9OO,
(2) FO 78/5225, Cromer to Lansdovme, No,I, Secret, Cairo, 2nd January 1902,
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in the Egyptian army should he allowed to go on half pay, and then, 
instead of being merely eligible for promotion in the British Regiment, 
as suggested by the War Office, should be promoted whilst remaining in 
the Egyptian army after completing a definite number of years of service,
In a subsequent despatch to Lansdowne Cromer reaffirmed his view that if a 
very few of the best and more experienced British officers were to go, 
the Sudan Government would face difficulties in conducting both civil and 
militarj'- affairs,
Lansdowne informed Cromer that he had discussed the question of British 
officers with Itr, Brodrick, the Secretary of State for War, and Lord 
Roberts, the Commander-in-Chief, Roberts admitted that the existing rules 
discouraged officers from prolonging their service in Egypt beyond seven 
years and suggested as remedies either that when they were placed on half 
pay they should be promised substantive promolhon with their regimental 
contemporaries upto the rank of Lt, Colonel if well reported on, or that 
they might be granted substantive promotion by length of service as in 
the Indian Staff Corps, However he made it plain that he disliked the 
idea of any arrangement which would give undue advantage to officers 
employed in Egypt as compared with those employed elsewhere,
Brodrick, on the other hand, wanted to solve the question of British 
officers by forming a Staff Corps for Egypt and Africa, But this would 
require time and a good deal of consideration,Salisbury also appears
(1) Ibid; FO 78/5239» Lansdowne to War Office, Private and Secret, 
18th January 1902,
(2) FO 800/123, Cromer to Lansdowne, 19th January 1902,
(3) FO 8OO/I23, Lansdowne to Cromer, 29th January 1902,
(4) Ibid,
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to have promised Lansdowne to take up the question of the Army Regulations 
with the War Office, In order to get over the immediate difficulty of the 
shortage of British officers Lansdowne suggested that Cromer should recruit 
retired civil servants from Indiq, Cromer rejected this idea on the ground 
that they were too old for the work and the climate. Besides, they were 
less likely to leam the language than younger men. Their Indian experience 
too would he of no use in the Sudan except in the field of irrigation,^^^ 
Cromer further elaborated his difficulties by pointing out that the 
soldiers then acting in a civil capacity in the Sudan were quite first 
rate as subordinates, but what they required was high-level civilian 
guidance by a man who could grasp general principles and avoid extreme 
centralisation, "Neither Kitchener nor Wingate", he wrote, " . , are quite 
ideal men for my purpose," But a civilian Govemor^General could not be 
appointed in the Sudan, The country was not big enough for two big men, 
one commanding the army and one dealing with the civil Government, Moreover 
the military and civil Government in the Sudan was inextricably mixed up - 
it could not be displaced without causing great dislocation, "Therefore",
(2 )Cromer told Lansdowne, "he had decided to stick to the present system", ' 
Thanks to Cromer, the question of the terms of service was referred 
to a Committee appointed by the War Office with Gen, Grenfell^ ' as its 
President,The Committee revised the rules for service of British 
officers with the Egyptian army so that the Sudan Government was now 
permitted to retain the selected officers upto 10 years. After the expiry
(1) FO 8OO/I23, Cromer to Lansdowne, Private, 9th February 1902,
(2) Ibid,
(3) Grenfell, Francis Wallace, (I84I - 1925), he was Sirdar of the Egyptian 
Army from 1885 - 1892, R, Hill, Op cit, P 143.
(4) FO 78/5309, War Office to the Foreign Office, No; 0143/9137 F,2, a, 2nd 
January 1903.
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of this period their service could be extended indefinitely. Officers 
below the substantive rank of Lt. Colonel were permitted to remain seconded 
upto 10 years, instead of seven, provided that, if the officer's turn for 
second in command arrived before the end of 10 years, he should elect to 
return to the British Regiment or forego regimental advancement. If the 
officer did not elect to return to his Regiment he would receive a half pay 
Lt, Colonelcy when the officer next above him in the British Regiment 
obtained his regimental Lt, Colonelcy,
The names of those officers who elected to remain \d_th the Egyptian
would
army after 10 years would be kept in the regimental list but they/have no 
claim to revert to regimental duty. Such officers after 10 years might be 
allowed to retire on retired pay under usual rules and were allowed to 
draw their British retired pay even if they continued in the Egyptian service. 
They were not subjected to the rules applicable to officers in the Colonial 
service which prohibited the issue of retired pay whilst the officer was 
employed.
The new rules made the Egyptian Government responsible for granting 
to the officer, on his retirement from their service, a pension equal to 
the amount of the difference between his actual retired pay from the British 
Army Fund and the retired pay he would have received had his further 
service reckoned towards army retired pay. It vas also made clear that if a 
British officer left the Egyptian army due to ill health, he would be 
examined in England by a Medical Board and would be treated both as regards 
retirement and retired pay exactly as if he were serving in the British 
Army but the retired pay so earned should be supplemented from the Egyptian 
Funds to such an extent as would compensate the officer for the premature 
closing of his career.
The War Office and the British Treasury approved these proposals
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on condition that Egypt would bear the extra cost.^^^ Cromer accepted 
these revised rules and communicated the decision of the War Office to the
(2)Egyptian Government, ' The immediate effect of the new arrangement was 
that all those officers who had gone on half pay under the 7 year rule 
were now placed on the full pay list,^^^ Wingate was now in a position 
to increase the number of British officers serving in the Sudan, The 
construction of Port Sudan, the railway and its bridges, and the constant 
military patrols and detachment duties in distant garrisons demanded an 
increasing number of British officers. Besides, the increase in the number 
of military posts and the consequent splitting of units led to difficulties 
in maintaining discipline in the garrisons,A case of insubordination 
in which two Sudanese soldiers of the X Sudanese, in garrison at Mongalla, 
threatened the life of Capt, Logan, their commandant^, gave Wingate 
another occasion to demand more British officers,
A proposal had been under consideration for some time to add twe 
more Sudanese battalions to the Egyptian army. Pending formation of these 
battalions, Wingate now asked for authority from Cromer to take ten new 
British officers for employment in the existing battalions. He requested 
Cromer to approach the Home Authorities for the loan of these additional
(1) PO 78/5300, Foreign Office to Cromer, No, 6, 9th January 1903,
(2) FO 141/374, Cromer to Lansdovme, No,53, 29th April I903,
(3) FO 141/373, E.W.D, Ward (War Office) to the Foreign Office,
Noi 0143/9137, F, 3, 31st March 1903, in T.A, Sanderson to Cromer,
No. 65, 3rd April 1903.
(4) FO 141/402, Wingate to Cromer, 12th February I906,
(5) W,P, Durham, Wingate to Cromer, 13th Februaiy 1906,
(Fortunately the insubordination wasnot widespread. It was the result 
of a personal grievance and according to Wingate Capt, Logan, who had 
been alone at his post all the summer, must have been tactless in 
dealing with his troops,)
119
o f f i c e r s . I n  a subsequent telegram he pointed out that there was a 
need to increase the number of British officers in the Sudan by at least 
one per battalion and if possible, one or two additional officers should 
be added to the Camel Corps, This meant a total of 8 British officers 
not counting those required for the new:; battalions,Thanks to Cromer, 
Wingate was able to obtain the services of eight additional British 
officers,
In January 1914 the War Office decided to limit the number of British 
officers serving with the Egyptian armj^  to 184, when Wingate approached 
them for additional officers. He was told that the additional British 
officers would not be released unless a contribution out of Egyptian Funds 
was made in respect of the expense of the initial training of such additional 
officers and their ultimate retired p a y , T h e y  referred to their 
previous letter dated 22nd June 1907 in which this decision had been 
conveyed to Wingate and to which no reply had been made. Kitchener, then 
Consul-General at Cairo, strongly criticized the attitude of the War Office, 
He pointed out that the question of British officers serving with the 
Egyptian army was the result of the occupation of Egypt and was closely 
allied to that .of the maintenance in Egypt of an Army of occupation. He 
deprecated the suggestion that Egypt should be asked to pay for the
(1) FO 141/402, Wingate to Cromer, Tel,No;13, 12th February I906,
(2) FO 141/402, Wingate to Cromer, Tel, No: 14, 13th February I906,
(3) FO 371/59, Cromer to Foreign Office, Tel, No*.36, 14th February 1906; 
Cromer to Grey, Tel, No: 48, 25th February I9O6 ; FO 141/395, E,W,D, 
Ward to Foreign Office, No: 0143/9626, M.S, 3, 28th February 1906,
(4) FO 371/1967, War Office to the Foreign Office, No: 0143/482 P,1,, 
31st January 1914.
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training and pensions of British officers serving in the Sudan, or that 
the Sudan administration should be burdened with any additional Military
Cl \
charges when all its resources were devoted to economic development,^ ^
He added in conclusion that the War Office decision had caused considerable
dislocation in the existing organisation.
In the meantime Wingate was becoming uneasy. He wrote to Clayton, the
Sudan Agent, that the War Office letter of June I907 dealt entirely with
the question of the supply of Royal Engineer officers, and that he had
Cp')
two or three expeditions on hand which he could not get out of,  ^He also 
vrrote to the Admiralty asking if they could spare the services of two 
Marine officers but his request was turned d o w n , H e  asked Clayton to 
represent his difficulties to Kitchener,
In April Clayton had an interview with Kitchener and discussed the 
question of the additional British officers. Various proposals were discussed 
but Kitchener appears to have preferred the idea proposed by Clayton of 
forming "the Sudan Political Service",recruitment for which could be 
solved by employing a certain number of officers either from those 
serving at the time with the Egyptian army or of those who had left it 
and returned to the British service. Members of this service could be 
employed in the outlying provinces which required Military Governors,
This service should be quite distinct and under different conditions to 
the existing civil service which would remain as the "Administrative"
(1) FO 371/1967, Kitchener to Grey, No:31, 1st March 1914.
(2) W,P, Durham, Box 469/6/I, Wingate to Clayton, l6th February 1914.
(3) W.P, Durham, Box 469/6/I, Wingate to Clayton, 28th March 1914.
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S e r vice,These proposals were approved neither by Wingate nor Kitchener 
and came to nothing, Wingate was not keen on solving his problems by
( 2)employing Civil servants and Kitchener shared his opinion,^  ^ In the 
meantime no civilians were asked for and demands on the War Office to 
relax their conditions continued. Grey supported Kitchener and took up 
the case with Mr, Asquith, the Prime Minister, on whose intervention the 
War Office agreed to release the British officers for service in the Sudan, 
Nevertheless the Foreign Office was asked to impress upon their represen­
tatives in Egypt and the Sudan the need to reduce the number of British 
officers to 184, The outbreak of the war in the same year wholly altered 
the situation, Wingate was short of 100 British officers during the early 
years of the war^^^, Though Kitchener, then Secretary of State for war, 
had permitted him to retain the services of British officers even if their
contracts had terminated, Wingate could find no officers to replace those
:
who had gone to Gallipoli, Sc_lonica and France, He suggested to Col, 0,
Fitz Gerald, Personal Secretary to Kitchener, the appointment to the 
British garrison in the Sudan of a few regular officers who might be in­
capacitated from returning to any of the various theatres of operation.
He added that without the experience of regular officers it would be 
difficult to bring these garrison battalions to any sort of pitch of 
efficiency,
(1) W,P, Durham, Box I90/1/I, Clayton to Wingate, 8th April 1914.
(2) Ibid,
(3) FO 371/1966, Brade (W,0.) to the Foreign Office, No: 0143/482, F,1,,
25th May 1914.
(4) W.P. Durham, Box 236/3, Wingate to Lt, Col, H.H.S, Morant, l6th 
November 1915.
(5) W.P, Durham, Box 236/3, Wingate to Col, O’Fitz Gerald, 27th October 1915.'
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(b ) The British Garrison in the Sudan
The British garrison in the Sudan served two primary objects, namely,
to lessen to an appreciable extent any open disloyalty on the part of the
Egyptian army and to enable the Sudan Government to release the Egyptian
army battalions to undertake punitive expeditions to establish Government
authority in southern and western Sudan where it was not more than nominal.
In 1898 the British garrison comprised only 250 men who were detached from
the Arniy of Occupation in Egypt and sent to Khartoum at the request of 
(l )Kitchener, This garrison was to be withdrawn during summer months.
The outbreak of the mutiny in the Egyptian army in 1900 emphasized
the fact that the British garrison in the Sudan was too small and that it
was stationed in the countiy for too short a period. According to Wingate,
who had now succeeded Kitchener, at least one battalion should be permanently
stationed in the Sudan, But the difficulties in stationing British troops
during the summer months were numerous. There was no proper accommodation
for the troops and shortage of good drinking water and lack of hospital
facilities would have to be overcome before troops could be sent in garrison
on a permanent basis. However, the possible unreliability of the Egyptian
army made Wingate anxious to retain the British garrison during the summer
months of 1900, He asked Cromer to approach the Home Authorities to
sanction the expenditure necessary for the improvement of the barracks
accommodation for the two companies, who were in garrison in the Sudan,
before the hot weather set in. The small amount of £E 600 which was the
(2 )
estimated cost for the improvement of the barracks was sanctioned,' '
(1) PO 78/4967» Cromer's letter in the Foreign Office to Treasury,
9th December 1898,
(2) FO 403/297» Cromer to Salisbury, Tel, Ho: 54» 9th March 1900; War Office 
to FO, 19th March I9OO; and Salisbury to Cromer, Tel, No: 19» 19th 
March I9OO,
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But the amount proved insufficient to meet the cost of construction and
the garrison, inspite of the risk, had to he withdrawn due to lack of
( 1 )suitable accommodation,^ However, Wingate continued to insist upon
having a whole battalion stationed permanently at Khartoum, Cromer shared 
Wingate’s anxiety and wrote to Salisbury that the condition of affairs in 
the Sudan and the composition of the Egyptian army demanded at least one 
battalion to be stationed permanently in the Sudan, He therefore suggested
( 2)that steps should be undertaken to construct suitable accommodation.
If the Wa.r Office objected to the proposal, he suggested that permanent 
barracks for two companies should be constructed, not because two companies 
were sufficient but because it would be preferable to have even a very 
small British garrison rather than none at all,^^^ The revised estimate 
for the construction of the barracks was, according to Cromer, £E IO5O 
for which, he w^ anted War Office sanction. Thanks to Cromer's insistance, 
the General Officer commanding in Egypt was instructed by the War Office 
to provide the necessary buildings for two companies of infantry?' at 
K h a r t o u m , A n  inter-regimental quarrel between the XIII and XIV 
Sudanese battalions in February 1901 brou^t home the need to increase 
the garrison in the Sudan, Cromer informed Lansdowne that the greatest 
danger in the Sudan was the Egyptian army itself and urged that either
(1) FO 403/298, Cromer to Salisbury, Tel, No, 71, 9th April 1900;
FO 78/5087, Cromer to Salisbury, No: 84, 1st May 1900,
(2) 403/298; FO 78/5087, Cromer to Salisbur^ r, No: 84, 1st May 1900,
(3) Ibid; FO 78/5095, Sanderson to War Office, 15th May 1900,
(4) FO 78/5166, Knox (wo) to the Foreign Office, No: 7700/9275, l6th May
I9OO; FO 403/299, War Office to the Foreign Office, 17th August 1900;
Salisbury to Rodd, Tel, No: I6O, 23rd August 1900,
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( 1 )a British battalion be stationed somewhere handy' or that the Egyptian
army should be reduced. The War Office appears to have been persuaded about
this time to construct barracks accommodation for six instead of only two
companies in the Sudan and the work was completed by November 1902, when
Wingate was happy to report that there were six companies of the 3I'd
(Battalion Royal Fusiliers in Khartoum,' '
Simultaneously with the construction of the barracks a general scheme 
for the defence of Khartoum was considered and the barracks were built in 
accordance with the decision then arrived at,^^^ According to ^ol, L,B, 
Friend, R.E., C.R.E, in Egypt, who was in charge of the construction of 
the barracks in the Sudan, two schemes were considered which were comple­
mentary to each other. These were:
1st: The barracks as forming part of the general defences of Khartoum, 
2nd: The barracks as forming a last defence in case of a general 
rising.
With the construction of the barracks the first scheme was fully 
carried out. The second scheme, according to Friend, was as follows:- 
The Army Service Corps Stores and the Hospital Compound were to be held 
as a citadel; the possession of the Gordon College was considered absolutely 
essential and command over the sandy hill and Egyptian Army barracks to 
the south of the British barracks was also essential,
(1) FO 8OO/I23, Cromer to Lansdowne, 20th February 1 901,
(2) FO 78/5309, SIR, No: 100, 1 - 3O November 1902,
(3) FO 141/38I, Statement 'A' by L.B. Friend, Cairo, 12th April 1904
in Maj, Gen, John R, Slade, GOC in Egypt to Sirdar Egyptian Army,
Khartoum^Cairo, 12th April I904.
(4) Ibid,
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The Civil population (women and children) were to be accommodated
in one or two of the Barrack blocks adjoining the Hospital enclosure.
The A.o.C, Stores were strongly built and were capable of prolonged
defence; the enclosure fence, where not enfiladed, was of open iron work
and from the Commanding Officer’s house and the Gordon College, a cross
fire could be brought to bear on the sandy hill and the Egyptian Army
Barracks to the south. Friend added that it had once been thou^t necessary
to hold the Egyptian Army Barracks and the Sandy hill but this no longer
cross
seemed necessary as an effective/fire could be brought to bear on this 
area. Since it was not possible to hold all the enclosures with the number 
of troops available, a supply of sand bags and entrenching tools was 
necessary to enable the Commanding Officer to form his line of defence 
in accordance with the requirements of the case. The defensive position 
was based on the river; it included the Gordon College but there were no 
detached outlying positions -
No Artillery defence was provided for in this scheme and no store 
accommodation was provided for the food supply of the civil population 
in this original scheme of defence, though the A.S.C, Stores were built 
to hold three months reserve supplies for the British troops at Khartoum, 
The scheme for the defence of the British Barracks, Khartoum, was 
again taken up in I904 by Wingate with Maj, G, John R, Slade, the General 
Officer Commanding in Egypt, Slade was anxious to undertake what was 
immediately wanted to ensure the safety of the British Community, in 
the event of a general rising, with the means at his disposal, postponing 
for the consideration of the Home Authorities the larger scheme suggested
(1) FO I41/38I, Statement 'A', Secret, by L,B. Friend, Cairo, 12th April 
1904 in Maj, Gen, John R. Slade, GOC in Egypt to Sirdar, Egyptian Army, 
Khartoum, 12th April 1904.
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by Wingate of building a fort on the sandy hill south of the British 
( 1 )Barracks,^ ' Wingate was however Convinced that until this fort was 
constructed, armed and garrisoned, the situation could not be looked
( 2)upon as safe in the event of a general rising,^ '
The detailed scheme of defence of Khartoum was divided into two 
phases, viz, (1) that which could be immediately undertaken without a 
reference to the Home Authorities and (2) that which could not be under- 
taken without a reference to the Home Authorities,^^' With regard to 
the first it was decided to undertake immediately the following works:-
(a) The construction of the Defensible Artillery Magazine and the 
Ordnance Workshop and their accessories near the gun part. Slade wanted 
it to be built sufficiently strong to withstand Field Artillery fire,^^^
(b) The construction of a Supply Store capable of holding six months 
supplies of Egyptian Army ration for the European and non-Muslim population 
who would be given refuge at the Gordon College in the event of a general 
rising,
(c) The formation of a gun park on the ground immediately to the 
west of the Gordon College enclosure, in which would be permanently parked 
all the guns not immediately in use by the Egyptian Artillery andto which 
the two 40 pr guns would be transferred temporarily from the palace
(1) F0 I41/58I, GOC British Troops in Egypt to H.E. The Gov, Gen, of the 
Sudan, Secret, 29th April I904.
(2) FO I4I/38I, Wingate to Slade, Secret, 1st May 1904.
(5) IMd.
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pending construction of the fort on the sand hill where they would be 
eventually mounted. These guns would be available for training the men 
of the British battalion under Artillery instructors.
As regards the construction of the fort on the Sand hill which 
needed the approval of the Home Authorities, Wingate requested Gen, Slade 
to approach the War Office for immediate approval of the scheme. Once 
this fort was constructed and occupied, Wingate added, it would command 
the Blue Nile Ferry, the British barracks and what was becoming the 
official residential area. The troops not employed in holding these 
would be in reserve, small parties probably holding advantageous positions 
in various parts of the Barracks, such as the Water tower and Electric 
Engine building. For the purpose of interior defence it was planned to 
provide an ample supply of sand bags, barbed wire etc.
The total cost of the proposed works was estimated at about £E I5OOO, 
Cromer wrote to Lansdowne that he would provide this amount from Egyptian 
funds, but before dealing with the question he wanted the views of the 
militai^ '' authorities in the War Office on the purely technical aspect of 
the subject,
The whole question of the defence of Khartoum was accordingly sent
to the War Office for consideration. They v^rote back to the Foreign Office
saying that the Committee of Imperial Defence was considering the question
of the Defence of Egypt, They would also consider the Reports from the
General Officer Commanding in Egypt and the Sirdar on the measures which
should be taken to ensure the security of British Troops and civilians
(2)
of Khartoum in the contingency of a mutiny of the Egyptian army,'
(1) FO 78/5367, Cromer to Lansdowne, No: 74, Secret, Cairo, 28th May 1904.
(2) FO 78/5373, War Office to the FO, No: 0143/9373/1 (1) Secret, 17th June 
1904; FO 78/5365, FO to Cromer, No,128, Secret, 24th June I904.
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In a memorandum on the problem of security in the Sudan, Gen. Neville 
Gerald Lyttleton, Chief of the General Staff, emphasized the point that 
an extremely difficult position would be created if the British authority 
in Egypt were to be overthrown by the combination of a raid of a hostile 
power with a local rising. This would not only be an embarrassment but 
it would put a great strain on the British military resources. As regards 
the problem in the Sudan he added that if the British battalion and a 
large number of civilians including women and children were invested in 
Khartoum by Egyptian mutineers, public opinion in England z^ould not 
tolerate their being left to their fate but would insist on immediate 
steps being taken at all hazards for their relief, without regard to the 
serious complication which would be caused by such a dislocation of the 
British strategic plans. So long as British troops were maintained at 
Khartoum, Lyttleton argued, arrangements should exist which would enable 
them in the event of a mutiny of the Egyptian army to hold their own for 
such a period as would insure a reasonable probability of their being 
relieved,
Lyttleton supported Slade's proposals for the defence of Khartoum,
He also agreed to increase the Khartoum Garrison by half a company Royal 
Garrison Artillery, If the Royal Navy were to accept the entire responsi­
bility for the protection of Egypt from external attack, then there would 
be no difficulty, according to Lyttleton, in posting half a company of 
RGA at Khartoum, But if the British garrison in Egypt was expected to
resist a hostile overseas raid, Lyttleton then thou^t that it might be
(2)
possible to post the Maltese Artillery at Khartoum,' However,




one officer and 50 NCOs and men of the Royal Garrison Artillery were in
f 1 )fact sent to strengthen the garrison at Khartoum,' '
About the same time Wingate asked for and obtained two 5” B.L. guns
and one 6" B.L, Howitzer which he wanted to place in the fort. He agreed
that the 6" B,L, Howitzer was unnecessarily heavy for the defence scheme,
but in the absence of any other Howitzer of a more suitable calibre being
available, he had asked for it. In addition to these he obtained six 15 pr
Pieldguns and four ,303 Maxim machine guns which he thought would be
( 2)useful for the defence of the fort or for the British Barracks, '
In 1905 the Duke of C©.nnaught inspected the British Forces stationed 
in Egypt and the Sudan, While in the Sudan,he was much impressed by Port 
Sudan which was then under construction. In his report he noted that this 
port would be of great value to Great Britain^in the Red Sea, The cost of 
reinforcing the troops in the Sudan by this route would be considerably 
less than the Nile route, Khartoum itself being within I6 hours of the 
sea,(^) He further added that Egypt and the Sudan were becoming of 
greater strategic value from the Imperial point of view and for this 
reason the question of maintaining troops in Egypt and the Sudan should be 
considered on Imperial rather than on Financial grounds. According to 
the Duke, Egypt was the halfway house to India and with the opening of 
the Sudan communications, British troops quartered in Egypt or the Sudan 
had been brought nearer India and in case of necessity would be most 
advantageously posted as a first reserve. By the Atbara - Port Sudan
(1) FO 141/386, Governor General to General Slade, 19th October I904.
(2) Ibid,
(3) WO 106/41, Box 2, 0,3,6, The Report of the Inspector-General,
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route they would avoid the Suez Canal and possible complications with an 
enemy who might be threatening the Canal,
The Duke was apparently not satisfied with the number of British 
troops stationed at Khartoum, There were only five companies of the Rifle 
Brigade and the Royal Garrison Artillery detachment at the time of his 
visit. He recommended that one complete British battalion should be found 
for Khartoum and placed under the direct orders of the Governor-General, 
This battalion should be one either proceeding to or returning from India 
and it should remain at Khartoum for one year. This battalion should not 
be considered as part of the garrison of Egypt,According to the Duke 
the command of the British troops in the Sudan should be vested in the 
Governor-General, This question which had been undecided since 1898
when it was first raised,was now taken up again by Cromer with the
set
(3)
( 2 ')Foreign Office' ' and finally tled when the War Office agreed to place
the garrison under the Sirdar,
It may be noted here that the question of the command of British 
troops in the Sudan was first taken up in December 1898 when the appoint­
ment of a successor to Gen, Grenfell as G.O.C., Egypt, was discussed.
Since the G.O.C. Egypt proposed by the War Office was junior to Kitchener, 
the Sirdar, the latter was instructed to correspond directly with the 
War Office, The question was once again raised in 1900 but Cromer had it
(1) WO 106/41, (Box 2) C,3,6,, The Report of the Inspector-General, 
the Duke of Cannaught,
(2) FO 78/5429, Cromer to Lansdowne, No, 19, 25th February 1905.
(3) FO 78/5437, E,W,D, W^ ard (W,0,) to TJl, Sanderson, No.38/Egypt/l7(AG I) 
12th April 1905.
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postponed in view of the mutiny in the Sudan, In September when the 
British Barracks were nearing completion, Wingate took up the question 
with Maj, Gen, Talbot, the G.O.C,, Egypt, Wingate wanted the garrison 
to be placed under his own command. To this Talbot objected. At one 
time the War Office agreed to place the supreme command of the British 
garrison under the Sirdar (providing he was not under the rank of 
Colonel), Talbot thereupon wanted to know whether the War Office wished 
to constitute a new command from the Army of Occupation directly under 
the War Office; if so he would issue orders constituting the new command. 
If not, Talbot wanted to know whether the Sudan detachment was to be 
treated in the light of a detached Brigade, Further correspondence was 
carried on and the detachment continued to be under the G.O.C,, Egypt 
until Cromer revived the question in February 1905*^^^
Two years later the Duke visited the Sudan again. In his Report he 
noted that he could not believe that a complete battalion was considered 
too large for the Sudan, He stil!)Afanted one complete battalion to be
(2 )maintained in the Sudan,' '
In June 1907 a sub-committee of the Imperial Defence Committee sat 
under the Presidency of Morley, the Secretary of State for India, to 
examine the military requirements of the Empire as affected by Egypt
(1) FO 78/4967, W,0, to F,0,, No: 57520. 10th December 1898; FO to WO, 
15th December 1898, ^(l9
FO 141/356, Cromer to FO, 3rd Februarj^  1900,
FO 141/389, Wingate to Cromer, 29th September 1902,
FO 141/389, Talbot to Cromer, 5th October 1902,
FO 78/5309, W.O, to T,A, Sanderson, No: 7520/2865 DAG,M@th'(myJ903, 
FO 141/389, Talbot toAG of the Forces, 10th May 1903.
See FO 141/389, AG (T,K, Kenny) to GOC, No: 57520, 4th June 1903.
2870
(2) FO 371/248, Report of the Inspector General, 30th April 1907.
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and the Sudan,^ All possible contingencies were examined and a Memo­
randum was submitted on the 3rd April 1908 by l^laj, Franks of the Gen, 
Staff(^) The contingencies were;-
(l) A Native Rising
A native rising was considered not impossible. The Arabs, the 
dominant race were proud, ambitious and fanatical Muslims, Though the sons 
of the Shaykhs were being educated, according to the memorandum, the 
effect of the education on their characters could not yet be estimated.
The memorandum took into account the fact that there was a seditious 
element amongst the Arabs and that the abolition of slavery was severely 
felt by them, but no rising would become serious unless it was based on 
religious fanaticism. The blacks would not join in such a rising nor 
probably would the jaaliyin Arabs around Berber, whilst the population 
of the Red Sea Province, according to the memorandum, was comparatively 
small. It appears that the British War Office had forgotten ’Uthman Diqna 
and the British reverses in that part of the Sudan during 1880s, The 
memorandum did not contemplate any serious difficulty to the communications 
between Khartoum.and the Red Sea and even if there was any danger the 
communications would not be threatened at first, A rough estimate of the 
fighting men who might be drawn into such a rebellion was given as follows:-
1, In Kordofan: 25000 men with 5000 rifles of whom 500 might be 
mounted,
2, In the Blue Nile'. Province and thé Gezira: About 10,000 men.
The rifles they possessed were mostly Remingtons in bad order 
and ammunition was scarce,
(1) Cab 16/4. Report,
(2) W.O., 106/42, The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Part II,
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If the Egyptian array were to be concentrated, it could cope success­
fully with a considerable rising unaided. But the Egyptian array was 
scattered and there was no prospect of relieving it of its outpost duties. 
The outbreak would not take place without some warning and the moral 
effect of the prompt despatch of British reinforcements to the Sudan at 
the first symptom of trouble would, it was thought, avert a conflagration. 
One or two battalions were considered sufficient for this purpose 
and it was suggested that some noticeable difference in their uniform 
would be advantageous to suggest to the Sudanese the arrival of extensive 
reinforcements. If two battalions were sent one might travel by the Nile 
route and the other by the Red Sea route to advertise their arrival as 
widely as possible. Steps also should be taken to secure the safety of 
the railwa%T from Port Sudan to Khartoum,
Should the rising take place inspite of the above precautions, 
according to the memorandum, reinforcements would be required of at least 
the following strength:- 
One Regiment Cavalry,
One battery Horse Artillery,
 ^One Brigade Infantry, 
with the necessary compliment of Engineer and Departmental services,
A reinforcement of the Army of Occupation in Egypt of at least two 
battalions would then be necessary as a precaution against unrest in 
Egypt itself,
(2) A Mutiny of the Egyptian Army
According to the War Office memorandum a mutiny of the Egyptian 
Army was less likely to happen in the future. The Egyptian army was not 
homogenous and was distributed all over the Sudan, The Sudanese regiments
Aw
had no sympathy with the Egyptians and the Egyptian soldiers would not
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rise unless the Sudanese led the way. The elimination of the disaffected 
Egyptian officers which was systematically carried out by Wingate after 
the mutiny of 1900 had deprived them of the opportunity of working on the 
ignorance of the Sudanese and as long as the Sudanese remained staunch, 
a mutiny of the Egyptian army must fail. Yet it was a possibility which 
could not be safely disregarded.
In the event of a serious mutiny, a rapid and decisive action was 
considered essential. The security of the Nile - Red Sea railway was 
extremely important. Since the Egyptian army railway battalion was 
unarmed and undrilled, the arrival of even one or two companies would be 
valuable provided they came in time.
The establishment of a station for the British troops in the hills
at Sinkat near Port Sudan, as suggested by Wingate^on health grounds, 
would also be valuable in securing the safety of the railway. Failing 
this a detachment should be despatched from elsewhere as quickly as 
possible. It would be undesirable to post any British troops from Egypt at 
such a time, as the Egyptian troops in Cairo itself might be unreliable.
But if troops were unobtainable from Aden the risk of detaching one or 
two companies from Egypt would havp4:o be taken. The promptitude of the 
arrival of this force was considered of more importance than size.
The memorandum considered it unlikely that the mutiny of the Egyptian
army would take place unconnected with other disturbances. Prompt despatch
of a suitable force might check the outbreak of a general conflagration.
The strength of the force should not be less than one Mounted Brigade 
land one Division, The normal proportion of Artillery might be reduced and 
Mountain or Horse Artillery or especially organised batteries of light or 
machine-guns should be substituted for the field Artillery, A full 
proportion of Engineer units for railways, telegraph and pioneer work 
would be required. Garrison Artillery personnel or a small naval brigade
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should also he sent for duty with the gunhoats. It would also he necessary 
to reinforce the Army of Occupation in Egypt as follows 
One Regiment of Cavalry 
One Batterj'- of Field Artillery 
One Brigade of Infantry,
(3) A Mutiny of the Egyptian anrmy together with a native rising.
If a mutiny of the Egyptian army broke out combined with a general 
rising and if the measures recommended in the eventuality No,(2)£too long 
deferred or should they fail the memorandum recommended that a further 
reinforcement would become necessary. For this purpose an Indian Division 
of all arms less its Field Artillery would be suitable. If this force could 
not be spared from India or if the disturbances in the Sudan showed signs 
of developing into a religious war, this force would have to be detailed 
from England in which case its composition would be:- 
One Cavalry or Mounted Brigade,
One Horse Artillery Battery,
Two batteries Mounted Artillery
Two Brigades Infantry, with the proportions of Engineer and departmental 
services.
Further reinforcements would be required for Egypt,
(4) An Incursion from the West,
A militant religious movement headed by the Senussi was not ruled 
out as an impossibility. An incursion of this kind was to be met as far 
west as possible and the point of concentration would probably be at el- 
Obeid in Kordofan, It would be desirable for the British troops to take 
an active part in the campaign, A strong force should be despatched at the 
verv outset and the strength of this force should not be less than one
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Cavalry or mounted Brigade and one Division,
Internal troubles in Darfur might necessitate the active inter­
vention of the Sudan Government, In such a contingency the memorandum 
suggested rather extravagantly that the British garrison in the Sudan 
should be raised to the strength of:- 
One Brigade Infantry,
One Regiment Cavalry,
One Battery Horse Artillery,
A possibility of war with Turkey or Abyssinia was also considered 
in the War Office Memorandum, In the case of a war with Turkey, it was 
suggested that additions would be required to the British garrison in 
the Sudan, The tie of common religion would not soften the rivalries 
between the Arab and the Turk, but the Egyptian army, especially the 
officers, would probably sympathise with Turkey, Reinforcement at least 
sufficient to bring the British garrison upto a strength of one Regiment 
Cavalry, one battery horse artillery and one brigade infantry with the 
usual compliment of engineer and departmental services would be necessary. 
Apart from any Expeditionary Forces, Egypt would require reinforcement 
of one Regiment Cavalry, one Battery Artillery, and two Brigades Infantry 
with garrison Artillery for the defence of the Suez Canal against raiders 
and a proportion of Engineer and departmental services.
In the case of a war with Abyssinia the same reinforcements would be 
necessary.
In each case Port Sudan was considered the most suitable sea base for 
the expedition. Should it take place in the hot weather, the base hospitals 
and Troop Headquarters should be at Sinkat, The time required for the 
troops to reach Khartoum from various places from the time the order to 
take up sea transport was given approximately'as-below:-
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Prom Cairo 4 to 5 days
" Aden ( depending upon the availability of
transport).
" Malta 11 days
" ÏÏ.K, 2 battalions Infantry - 19 days
1 Brigade Infantry 25 '*
1 Regiment Cavalry 22 "
1 Brigade Ifavalry 32 "
" Bombay 17 ’’
While the schemes for the Defence of Egypt and the Sudan were still
under consideration by the War Office, the situation in the Sudan took a
sudden turn for the worse. The War Office nearly panicked when the news
of the rising of ’Abd al-Qadir in the Gezira in April 1908 reached them.^^^
Alarmed at the news, Gen, Ewart, the Director of Military Operations,
sent in a memorandum to the Foreign Office pointing out how weak were the
( 2)British Forces in the Sudan,' ' He further pointed out that if the 
British garrison and the European population were to be invested, a costly 
expedition would at once be necessary and the responsibility would be 
on the War Office if their views were not made known to the Foreign
(1) For the rising of 'Abd al-Qadir see Ch, III,
(2) The British Garrison in the Sudan on 1st May 1908 was as follows
R,G,A, 1 Officer and 64 men.
Infantry 20 Officers and 619 other ranks.
Army Service Corps 2 Officers and 6 other ranlcs,
R,A,M,C, 2 Officers and 10 other ranks,
A,0,C, - and 1 other rank.
Total 25 Officers and JOO other ranks,
(W,0. 106/42, C 3/28, Incl, in Gen, Staff to M.0,1, 12th May I9II).
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O f f i c e , For some time Ev/art appears to have been in contact with those 
Sudan officials who were in England, In July 1907 R. Owen had written to 
Wingate that Ewart ha,d told him that Egypt and the Sudan were being held
( 2)by bluff,' ' This throws a considerable light on the feelings of the 
Military Authorities in the War Office who were becoming increasingly nervous 
as regards the situation both in Egypt and the Sudan, Under these circum­
stances one can understand Evxart's anxiety to strengthen the British forces 
in these countries before the situation became worse. On 7th August 1908 
Ewart visited the Foreign Office and offered to send an additional British 
battalion to reinforce the garrison in the Sudan and wanted to know what 
accommodation could be made available for the additional troops,
About the same time Wingate had submitted a Memorandum to Gorst 
which was forvrarded to the Foreign Office on 18th A u g u s t , I n  his 
memorandum, Wingate pointed out that Mahdiism was not extinct in the Sudan, 
The danger was more serious in the outlying districts where the people 
were semi-civilized and disliked the restraint of the Government authority 
and were therefore too accessible to religious agitators. It was only the 
policy of pure bluff, he added, that upheld the Government's authority in 
those outlying provinces which were dangerously isolated from Headquarters 
by lakk of adequate means of communication.
(1) W.O. 106/42, C 3/28, Gen, Ewart to the Foreign Office, Incl, in General 
Staff to M.O.I, 12th May 1911.
(2)W.P, Durham, Box 281/1, R, Owen to Wingate, 24th July 1907.
(3) FO 371/452, Grey to Graliam, No, 181, Confidential, 12th August I9O8 ; 
Grey to Gorst, Confidential, 12th August 1908,
(4) FO 371/452, Memorandum by Wingate, dated Dunbar, 9th August 1908 in 
the Memorandum by E, Gorst respecting the situation in the Sudan,
18th August I9O8,
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Wingate proposed two alternative remedies. These were (a) to increase 
the military force in the Sudan or (h) to improve the internal communications 
of the country, thus giving the existing garrison increased mobility. Of 
these Wingate preferred the second one, for the expenditure under the first 
alternative would be unremunerative, and the Egyptian Government would not 
agree to bear any additional cost. Besides, even if British troops were 
brought in, there would be difficulties in employing them in the unhealthy 
stations of the southern, western and eastern Sudan, Wingate therefore 
wanted internal communications to be improved in order to bring the outlying 
provinces into closer connection with headquarters. Funds would be required 
and the Foreign Office should provide this by raising a Sudan Loan,
In a subsequent letter to Grey, Wingate conceded that Ewart’s proposal 
to send an additional British battalion would lessen the existing risks 
and therefore in itself would be advantageous, ^ ^ ^ Thou^ this force could 
not be utilized in the districts where disturbances were most likely to 
occur, their presence in the country would set free Sudanesentroops for 
service in those distant provinces which were as yet under inefficient 
control. However, according to Wingate, the Egyptian Government would 
object to any proposal which would increase its military expenditure. He 
referred to his proposal of making a hill station for British Troops at 
Sinkat and if this was approved, the maintenance of an additional British 
battalion there would not only improve the military situation in the Sudan 
but would materially strengthen the strategical position in the larger 
sense^^) as distinct from the question of the peace and security of the
(1) FO 371/452, Wingate to Grey, Strictly Confidential, Dunbar, 1?th August
1906,
(2) Ibid, Wingate had in view the developments in other countries bordering 
on the Red Sea, and the maintenance of an overland communications with 
India in the event of any prolonged interruption of traffic via the 
Suez Canal,
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Sudan itself. He therefore insisted that the cost of the additional 
battalion should be charged against Imperial Funds,
Referring to his request for a Sudan loan, Wingate added, ’’Should 
the raising of such a loan be feasible, and should the increased expenditure 
entailed by the addition of a battalion to the garrison in the Sudan be 
made a charge against this loan, thereby causing a smaller amount of money 
to be available for capital expenditure on railway development, then I 
should be reluctantly obliged to accept the risk of having an inadequate 
force pending the completion of the construction of the necessary 
railways, . . ^
Gorst entirely agreed with Wingate’s stand on the question of security 
in the Sudan, An additional battalion, according to him, would not solve 
the problem of the Sudan, but would merely add to the annual expense of 
administration unless the extra cost was charged to the Imperial Exchequer,^ ' 
Gorst added that British Government was ultimately responsible for the 
maintenance of order in the Sudan and in the event of costly measures 
beyond the resources of Egyptian Treasury becoming necessary for the purpose, 
the British Government would not be able in practice to avoid liability.
The repression of an actual outbreak would be a far more expensive 
operation than the adoption of preventive measures to reduce the danger 
in the Sudan,
On receiving the views of Gorst and Wingate on the situation in the 
Sudan and their insistence on the extension of railways. Swart v/rote to 
Grey pointing out that such an improvement of communications might
(1) FO 371/452, Wingate to Grey, Strictly Confidential, 17th August I9O8 ,
(2) FO 371/452, Memorandum respecting the situation in the Sudan, Gorst 
to Grey, No. I, (30903), 18th August 19081
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probably be advantageous from a commercial point of view and would give 
increased mobility to the existing garrison. But, according to him, the 
construction of railways might actually facilitate the spread of sedition 
and fanaticism by bringing the inhabitants of distant provinces into 
closer touch with each other. Railways when made, he added, had to be 
guarded if trouble broke out and this duty itself would absorb quite a 
number of troops. If this was the case, Swart wondered how the alternative 
suggested by Wingate and Gorst would diminish the risk which already
('1')existed, even if the construction of railways was started at once,' '
Wingate did not consider objections to railway extension as applicable 
to the Sudan and felt that they did not outweigh the importance of in-
( 2)creased mobility,' ' According to him the improvement in internal 
communications would be in the end the most economical way of assuring 
the security and tranquility of the coimtry, Wingate added that if it was 
not possible to guarantee a loan for the extension of railways in the 
Sudan, he would then agree to have an additional battalion, provided 
that no financial liabilities were imposed on the Egyptian and the 
Sudanese Governments,
Gorst shared Wingate's views on the point. He further added that if 
the War Office proposal was accepted, the British Treasury would bear the 
expenditure and in his opinion such funds would be better spent in 
improving railways communications in the Sudan than on maintaining an 
extra battalion to be stationed at Khartoum,
(1) PC 371/659, War Office to PO, 9th January 1909; W.P. Box 286/2,
(2) FO 371/659, Wingate to Gorst, No, 7, Confidential, 7th February 1909, 
Incl, I in Gorst to Grey, No,12, No, I, 12th February 19O9,
(3) Ibid,
(4) Ibid, Gorst to Grey, No,12, 12th February 1909.
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In a Minute on Gorst's letter the Foreign Office noted that security 
in the Sudan was dependent on better means of communication and British 
Government were responsible for finding the money. If the Sudan loan 
was not possible, the only alternative would be for the War Office to devote 
to communication such monies as they would have spent on the additional 
battalion and its barracks accommodation, Ewart was therefore informed 
that an increase in the garrison would not be advantageous but all possible 
effort should be made to increase the mobility of troops in the Sudan.' '
The question of sending an additional battalion appears to have
(2)been shelved,'"' An alternative scheme based on a flying column consisting
of one squadron of cavalry, one Mountain Battery, one battalion of Infantry,
two sections R,E. with the compliment of A.S.C,, R.A.M.C, etc, was taken
up for consideration by the British Military Headquarters in Egypt. This
flying column was to be available for any eventuality in the Sudan, the
Delta or Suez. It was intended to reduce the garrisons and increase the 
(striking force,
In 1911 the War Office wanted to reduce the armament at Khartoum as 
the R.G.A, detachment stationed there was considered too weak to man all 
the guns,^^^ The War Office approached the Foreign Office to find out
(1) Ibid, The Foreign Office Minute,
(2) WO 106/42, C 3/28 General Staff to M.O.I,
Papers 6143/197, M.O.I (a), 12th May 1911.
(3) W.P. Durham, N, Channer, War Office, Cairo to Wingate, 30th August 1909.
(4) The armament at Khartoum was as follows
2 - 5" B.L. Guns
1 - 6" B.L. Howitzer
4 - 15 pr qF, guns
4 - machine guns.
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from the Sirdar what portion of the armament, then in Khartoum, was
necessary for the defence of the city, what functions would be allotted to
the units which would be retained in the defence and where they would be
emplaced.(^) This drew protests from Wingate who considered any reduction
in the armament a great mistalçe. He pointed out that the fort at Khartoum
and its heavy armament was one of the most important British assets. It
showed the people of Khartoum and the Sudanese in general that the British
had come to stay in the Sudan,
For some time Wingate had been busy trying to demonstrate to the
British capitalists and cotton manufacturers, the cotton growing prospects
of the Sudan anc^n this connection some of them had visited Khartoum, He
a,greed that the existing R.G.A, detachment in Khartoum was too weak but
to overawe the Sudanese and to convince the British financiers that
Britain would not leave the Sudan, the a.rmament should not be reduced,
In a subsequent letter to Kitchener, Wingate explained that the 5"
B.L. guns and the 6” B.L.Howitzer were mounted on the fort from where they
%
commanded the city of Khartoum and the large and populous towns of Omdurman
and Khartoum North, and the four 16 pr qF guns were parked in the fort
and intended as movable armament to be used in such positions in the
defence area as might be found necessary. He added that he had trained
detachments of the Infantry battalion stationed in Khartoum with a view
(4)to working 15 pr guns in an emergency,' '
(1) FO 371/1115, War Office to the Foreign Office, No: 0145/196 M.O.I,, 
21st August 1911•
(2) FO 371/1113, Wingate to H.C. Norman (FO), Secret, Dunbar, 28th August
1911.
(3) Ibid.
(4) FO 371/1113, Wingate to Kitchener, 22nd Mlarch 1912,
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In order to overcome the shortage of men to man the armament in 
Khartoum, Kitchener suggested that the Egyptian Artillery might he 
permitted to man the guns. This suggestion was not accepted by the Army 
Council and an increase in the number of R.G.A, was refused,
In 1913 Gen, Ian Hamilton, the Inspector-General of Oversess/brces, 
carried out an inspection of troops in the Sudan, In his Report, he 
vn?ote, "All this wealth and prosperity rests on the foundations of security. 
The security in its turn is based on what? Six companies of English 
Infantry and a handful of garrison gunners,"^^^













Total 27 Officers 758 other ranks
Apart from the British garrison the establishment of soldiers and 
police in the Sudan was;-
Pellah Battalions (Egyptian troops) 11,477 ) This included British
SudanesenTroops 5,293 ! Oncers, Staff and Depts,
Sudanese Police 3,983 ) Excluding British officers.
(1) PO 371/1639, Reply of the Army Council in the Report of Ian Hamilton, 
the Inspector-General, 1st March 1913#
(2) PO 371/1639, Report by the Inspector-General of the Overseg.§Forcef, 
1st March 1913#
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The General pointed out that the numbers of the British garrison 
were "ludicrously" disproportionate to their responsibility, "As popula­
tion and wealth increases", he added, "the disproportion will become yet 
more extravagant. The utmost that can be claimed for the handful of British 
troops at Khartoum is that they stand as an outward and visible sign of 
the resources of the British Empire being at the back of the Government 
of the Sudan in case of need," He further added that if in 1857 the East 
India Company was open to reproach for attempting to run India on an 
insufficient margin of European troops, the same charge could be levelled 
against the British Government in the Sudan,
The Report brought out two further considerations. First, that the 
Sudan, growing richer from year to year, would soon become financially 
independent of Egypt, So far, the defence of the Sudan had been regarded 
as largely, if not mainly, an Egyptian interest. The British businessmen 
were content to rely on Egyptian guns to preserve peace, but the increase 
of the British capital in theccaountry would produce a change. The British 
public would demand more British troops in the Sudan,
Further, in future Port Sudan would count far much more than Alexandria 
or the Nile route in the commercial life of the countiy.
The General pointed out that the six companies of British Infantry 
could not be left isolated at a distance of 500 miles from their sea base 
while the line of communication by which reinforcements could reach them 
was utterly unprotected. The British Army of Occupation in Egypt could 
not be relied to reinforce the Sudan garrison. If the Sudan garrison were 
driven within its entrenchments near the British Cantonment, the causes 
of unrest which were operating in the Sudan would probably be felt 
equally and simultaneously in lower Egypt, The traditional British military 
strategy was to make sure of the sea bases before pushing the troops far 
inland.
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The General therefore reconnnended some protection for Port Sudan 
and for the railway thence to Khartoum, He supported Wingate's proposal 
Ho develop Sinkat into a hill station and military headquarters. In the 
event of internal trouble, the defence of Port Sudan and the protection 
of the railway would be of hardly less importance than the retention of 
Khartoum, He said that sooner or later British Infantry and garrison 
Artillery would have to be stationed at Sinkat to deal Trd-th sea and land 
attacks of a minor character.
The General agreed with the War Office that the detachment of the 
RGA could not man all the guns. With the exception of two men of the 
RGA for each gun, the field guns were manned by the Infantry battalion at 
Khartoum and an Infantry Officer acted as battery commander of the field 
battery. The General therefore recommended an increase of one subaltern 
and thirty other ranks in the establishment of the RGA. All girns could 
then be manned by Artillerymen and one officer and 40 men of the Infantry 
would be freed to perform their legitimate duties. But his recommendations, 
as/ioticed earlier, were not considered favourably by the War Office,
It appears from the Report of Gen, Ian Hamilton that Winga.te took 
the opportunity of the General's visit to the Sudan to impress upon him 
the need to reconsider the question of security in the Sudan, In Wingate's 
view security in the Sudan was dependent firstly upon the presence of 
experienced British officers in both civil and military posts in the Sudan, 
He mistrusted Egyptian officers and officials, but he could not dispense 
with their services while no alternative source of man-power existed. He 
therefore relegated the Egyptians to junior posts while appointing British 
officers in the higher ranks. Senior Egyptian officers, both in the army 
or the civil service were passed over for promotion or retired prematurely
(1 )in order to make way for British personnel,
(1) G. Warburg: The Sudan under Wingate, London (1971), P.21,
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Secondly, Wings.te based the security of Khartoum on the British 
garrison. There were 250 men of the British garrison •when Wingate took 
over the Govemor-Generalship of the Sudan in 1900, Working through Cromer, 
he not only succeeded in increasing the strength of the garrison to six 
companies but also persuaded the British War Office to construct permanent 
Barracks accommodation for these companies, so that the British garrison 
could be stationed in the Sudan throughout the year instead of being with- 
dra'vm during the hot months as -was the practice till 1902, Once the 
barracks were constructed, he had these fortified particularly by building 
a fort to the south of the British Barracks and arming it. The development 
of internal communications was Wingate’s special worry and after repeated 
appeals to the Foreign Office for a loan, he had to fall back on the 
Egyptian Treasury to complete immediate works,
Wingate had considerable difficulties in carrying out the above 
projects. The Home Authorities persistently refused to come to Wingate’s 
help in carrying out projects which he considered necessary for the 
maintenance of security in the Sudan, The Foreign Office considered the 
Sudan as an appendage of Egypt and the War Office was reluctant to send 
sufficient number of troops to the Sudan because Egypt would not bear the 
additional cost. In Egypt itself the Egyptian Government viewed with 
disapproval any proposal to increase their military; expenditure, more 
especially on projects in the Sudan, Hence the Consuls-General, Cromer, 
Gorst and Kitchener, for political reasons could not go all out to help 
Wingate,
With the outbrealc of the World War in 1914 the problem of security in 
the Sudan was engulfed in the greater problem of the war. The Egyptian army 
and the British Garrison at Khartoum assumed full responsibility for the 
protection of that country. The measures that Wingate took to maintain 
security will be discussed in the following pages.
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CHAPTER VI
Problem of Security in the Sudan 
during the First World War and the 
Question of the Reorganization of 
the Egyptian Army 
1914 - 1918
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The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 caused, considerable 
anxiety to the Sudan Government. Wingate, who was on leave in England, 
cut short his stay there and returned to the Sudan on the 9th September, 
1914. He knew that the war would produce rumours and doubts as to the 
stability of the Sudan Government and by his presence he could restore 
the confidence of the people in the Government, ^ ^
The news of the war, however, possessed little significance to the 
bulk of the Sudanese who had suffered severely during the previous year 
due to poor rainfall and low Nile, Widespread famine had been only averted 
by the Government by importing millet from India previous to the harvesting
(2)of the 1914 crop which was fortunately an excellent one,^ ' "The psycho­
logical effects of this were as potent as the economic, and the population 
was by August 1914 in a state of goodwill,
Turkey had not yet joined the war though it was expected that Germany 
would not miss the opportunity to make full use of the Sultan's religious 
influence over the Muslims living in the British Colonies, Wingate's first 
task was therefore to win as much support from the Sudanese notables 
and religious 'Ulama' for the British Government as possible before Turkey 
actually declared war. With this object in view he interviewed leading 
'Ulama' and tribal S^ykhs in Khartoum and Omdurman and visited distant 
districts to talk to the people and to find out the attitude of their 
leaders. What he found out was quite satisfactory. In October he wrote 
to Clayton, the Sudan Agent at Cairo, "One might call them enthusiastic
(1) W.F. Durham, Box 236/5, R, Wingate to Gen, C.E. Calwell, 1st September
1915.
(2) W.P. Durham, Box 191/2, Crawford to R, Wingate, 19th August 1914.
(5) H, Macmichael : The Sudan, P, 93.
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on our side, none of them want Germans or Turks . . . .  their whole object
is to be left alone under a Government . . . which helps to fill their 
( 1 )stomachs," Wingate was obviously referring to the famine relief 
measures the Government had undertaken for the distribution of cheap 
dhurra in the famine stricken provinces during 1913»
Vdiere ever he addressed meetings, Wingate made a point of avoiding 
any reference to Turkey. He wanted to show that if actual hostilities broke 
out with Turkey, this would be due to German machinations and therefore 
Turkey did not deserve any religious sympathy or s u p p o r t , H e  even 
thought of inducing the ’TJlama’ to issue a 'fatwa* on these lines which 
would counteract any Turkish attempt to tamper v/ith the loyalty of the 
Sudanese, A press campaign was also initiated by publishing inspired 
articles in the Arabic portion of the ’Sudan Times’ in order to impress 
upon the people that the religious bodies and the Egyptian officers were 
cooperating with the Government,
Wingate was less happy with the junior Egyptian officers and officials « 
"You know them well", he wote to Cromer, "and their love of sitting on 
the f e n c e " , T h e  majority of them were of Turkish descent and connected 
with Turkish families. They had graduated through Cairo Schools, the home 
of nationalist propaganda, and had developed anti-British and ir^ome 
cases pro-Turkish ideas.
The senior Egyptian officers on the other hand, as a body, had shown 
themselves loyal to the Government, Since the outbreak of the war some 20
(1) W.P. Durham, Box 469/7» Wingate to Clayton, 8th October 1914.
(2) W.P. Durham, Box 469/7» Wingate to Clayton, 24th October 1914.
(3) W.P. Durham, Box 469/7» Wingate to Clayton, 15th October 1914.
(4) W.P. Durham, Wingate to Cromer, 27th November 1914.
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of them had volunteered for service in Germany; further, an influential
committee of senior Egyptian officers had been formed and had issued an
appeal for the relief of the sick and wounded in the British army fighting
in Europe.According to the Intelligence Department the Egyptian army
would remain loyal in the face of an invasion by a non-Muslim power. But
Turkey, being a Muslim power, could bring to bear religious influences
which would necessitate a careful watch being kept in the army in the event
of an invasion by that power preceded by a powerful religious propaganda *
(o')
coupled with a promise of Egyptian autonomy,^ '
The other problem was to stop anti-British propaganda percolating
into the Sudan throu^ the frontiers of the country, Wingate therefore
effectively sealed off the following frontiers :
The Eastern Frontier
(a) Suakin and Port Sudan
The Red Sea with the Ports of Port Sudan and Suakin through which 
close connection was maintained during the season of annual pilgrimaë'e to 
Makka, with Eidjaz and the vsxious Arabian ports, which were at the time 
part of the Ottomqp Empire^radefended portqAnd from the naval point of view 
particularly vulnerable, Turkey could interfere in the affairs of the Sudan 
by raiding across the Red Sea if the Sea was not properly guarded,
(b) Eritrea
The Italian colony of Eritrea on the Red Sea was another source 
of anxiety to the Sudan Government, V/hen the war broke out it was not
(1) PO 571/1972, A Note/on the attitude of the Native Officers drawn up 
by the Intelligence department, in Cheethara to Grey, No. 157, 25rd 
September 1914.
(2) Ibid,
(5) W.P. Durham, Box 469/7, R. Wingate to Clayton, 3rd October & 15th 
October 1914.
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known how Italy would react towards the Allies, Italy's designs on 
Kassala were well known and if she were to press her claims at this 
moment, the Sudan might be dra.wn directly into the war. It was fortunate 
that Italy declared her neutrality which relieved the Sudan Government 
of much anxiety,
(c) The Abyssinian Frontier
The state of affairs on the Sudan-Abyssinian frontier was far
from satisfactory. After the death of Menelik, the authority of the
Abyssinian Government was at its lowest; in fact there was hardly anything
worthy of the name of 'Central Government' in Abyssinia, On the outbreak
of the war Abyssinia hoped that Italy would declare war on the Allies,
in which case she could recover with the help of the latter her last
province of Eritrea, Italy's neutrality, however, frustrated Abyssinian
designs on Eritrea and added one more cause to the already deteriorating
relations between Abyssinia and the Allies, A number of rumours were
afloat in the Abyssinian capital discrediting Britain and France. It was
said that the Germans had captured British East Africa and the Ifganda
railway. Lij Yasu, who had succeeded Menelik, was susceptible to Muslim
influences. Probably with his knowledge, if not with his active support,
Muzhar Bey, the Turkish Consul at Harar, was busy propagating Pan-Isla.mic
(2)
ideas in the Muslim parts of Abyssinia such as Jirama and Vollo,^
The frontier had been repeatedly crossed by the Abyssinian border.chiefs, 
some of whom were either interested in the arms trade or due to private 
reasons had exaggerated the reverses of the Allied forces in the war, (5)
(1) W.P. Durham, Box 191/2 Crawford to Wingate, 29th August 1914.
(2) FO 37I/I88I, Doughty Wylie to Grey, Addis Ababa, 24th October 1914.
(3) PRO 30/57/No,47, Adis Ababa Intelligence Report by Doughty Wylie,
6th September 1914.
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The Slaves and arms trades were the main cause of friction on the borders 
with the Sudan, British East Africa and the Somaliland Protectorates,^*'^
‘ The arms trade had become more troublesome to Britain especially after 
Austria Hungary promised to supply arms to Abyssinia.According to 
Wingate Turco-German intrigue had occasioned petty frontier raids since 
the outbreak of the war, and if these activities went unchecked, the 
Abyssiniens on the Sudan frontier, especially Muslims, towards whom Li.j 
Yasu was inclined, might adopt a hostile attitude towards the Sudan 
Government, He further added that the Merahan and Oga.den Somalis, who 
were practically unadministered, would be sensitive to incitement by the
(5)Turkish agents,Britain was convinced that hij Yasu would lead his 
country into the war on the side of Turkey and attack either the Sudan, 
Somaliland, Aden, or British East Africa,
The Southern Frontier
On the outbreak of the war the danger to the Sudan;alongiits southern 
border was in fact minimal. In any case the Germans could never get at 
the Sudan without first occupying Kenya or Uganda to the south. It was 
not the presence of the Germans that worried Wingate so much, but the anti- 
British propaganda which was likely to spread amongst the border tribes.
The Dodenga, Taposa and the Turkhpia tribes were known for their turbulence 
and the news of British reverses in the south could aggravate the situation. 
It was also necessary to seal off the southern frontier to stop the news 
of the British and French reverses reaching the Sudanese through the French 
and Belgian Congo ^ .
(1) A.S. Capian, British Policy Towards Ethiopia, P.20, (Ph.D, Thesis 1971)#
(2) Ibid, P,313.
(3) FO 371/25593, R. Wingate quoted in War Office, GOO East Africa,
Tel, No: M,1,13498, 19th February 1916,
(4) A,S, Capian, Op cit,, p,95.
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The Western Frontier
The existence of the Sultanate of Darfur in the West was a constant 
worry to the Sudan Government. ^  ^^ Thou^ not a model Sultan, ^li Dinar 
had maintained correct relations with the Sudan Government until 1909, 
when the French occupation of Wadai, which he considered an open aggression 
on his territories, made him restive. During the subsequent years he 
became exacting in demanding obedience from the border tribes such as the 
Rizaiqat and in dealing vûth the Kababish who frequently crossed the 
Eordofan-Darfur border. The declaration of War against Turkey and the 
removal of Abbas Hilmi, the Khedive, turned^li Dinar against the Sudan 
Government, against which he now openly called for jihad. This open 
defiance by the Sultan caused considerable anxiety to Wingate who knew that 
this would have serious effects on the tribesmen. But Wingate did not wish 
to be pushed into a war with^li Dinar before he had completed all 
preparations.
The Northern Frontier
Egypt was the centre from where ever^ r kind of alarmist and anti- 
British propaganda was being introduced into the Sudan, The effects of 
the Egyptian propaganda will be noticed in the next chapter in greater 
detail. It is sufficient to mention here that on the outbreak of the 
war a feeling of alarm and unrest was noticed amongst the younger 
generation who had been to Government schools and had acquired knowledge 
of the world,
(l) Dr. A.B, Theobald in his well documented work, " ’Ali Dinar, Last 
Sultan of Darfur", which was published in Great Britain in 1965,_ 
has covered every aspect of the histoiy of Darfur under 'Ali Dinar, 
There is little I could add to the invaluable research already 
undertaken except to refer to it whenever necessary.
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But security in the country could not he maintained by conciliatory 
measures or by closing the frontiers. It depended on the armj'- and the 
army at the disposal of the Sudan Government vas about 14 to 15 thousand 
all ranks, made up as follows;"-:
(a ) British Arm.v
(1) A detachment of RGA : 65 all ranks,
(2) 4 Companies (Territorials),
(b ) Egyptian Army
(1) 4 Batteries and two garrison Artillery Companies,
(2) 1 Squadron Cavalry and 3 companies of Mounted Infantry,
(3) 12 Infantry battalions,
(4) 6 Companies Camel Corps
(5) 4 double Companies Arab battalion.
To the above were added six companies of semi regular native terri­
torials, some 600 strong, who were in garrison in some of the southern 
districts and a provincial police force comprising 3925 rifles, mounted 
and dismounted, nearly all of whom had received elementary military 
training. ^  ^ The Egyptian army was spread over 46 garrisons and military 
posts in the country and the British garrison was stationed at Khartoum.
Fortunately there were very few resignations by British officers during
I la
(5)
( 2)the early stages of the war^  ^ though at a ter date when Wingate began
to complain that he was short of officers.
(1) FO 371/3713, Report of the Governor-General on the general situation in 
the Sudan during the first two years of the war. Part I by Wingate in i
Wingate to the Secretary of State for War, 26th February 1919, in War !
Office to the Foreign Office, No: 0143/1460 (C.2), April 1919» 1
(2) W.P. Durham, Box 191/2, Crawford to Wingate, 19th August 1914. i
(3) W.P. Durham, Box 236/3, Wingate to Col. H.H.S. Morant, l6th November 1915.|
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As the break with Turkey became a certainty, Wingate arranged \r±th 
Clayton to wire to him the text of the War proclamation that would be 
published in Cairo and at the same time obtained authority from the British 
Agent to modify it to suit the Sudan situation. He also interviewed the 
spiritual and temporal 'TJlama' and Shaykhs who assured him that the 
Sudanese as a whole did not want any change in Government,^  ^ ^ So when 
the war with Turkey actuaJly broke out, Wingate was prepared to meet the 
situation, \Ihen on 6th November, the news of the break with Turkey reached 
Wingate, he arranged to see some of the British and Egyptian officers on 
the next day,^  ^ He told the Egyptian officers that he was willing to 
place such of them on non-combatant list who were unwilling to take up 
arms against Turkish t r o o p s , B u t  Wingate was not able to get any public 
expression of opinion from them when he asked if any of them had any 
questions to put to him. He wrote to Clayton later that they would not 
take a definite line before they know what was going on in E g y p t , H e  
therefore told the officers that there was a strong force of British and 
Colonial troops in Egypt and that portions of the Egyptian Army were 
cooperating in the defence of the Canal,
On the next day Wingate delivered his oft quoted speech to the 
'TJlama' of Khartoum in which he assured them that Britain had no quarrel 
with the "Muhammadan" world and that the war would in no way affect her
(1) W,P, Durham, Bo%469/7, Wingate to Clayton, 7th November 1914.
(2) W.P. Durham, Box 469/7, Wingate to Clayton, 7th November 1914.
(5) FO 371/2349 SIR, No: 244, November 1914.
(4) W.P, Durham, Box 469/7, Wingate to Clayton, 7th November 1914.
(5) Ibid,
1 5 ?
attitude towards Islam, Thousands of copies of this speech were distributed 
throughout the .Sudan, Soon after his speech, Wingate received telegrams from 
al-Sayyid 'Ali al-Mir(^ani and S^rif Yusuf al-Hindi affirming their 
loyalty to the Government, Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahman, son of the late Mahdi, 
who had been living in Omdurraan since 1906 took this opportunity to declare 
his loyalty to the Government as saw in this an opportunity to come closer 
to the Government, 'Abd al-Rahman's declaration of his support was worth 
several battalions to the Sudan authority. As it will be noticed the southern 
and western tribes, most of whom were followers of 'Abd al-Rahman were 
quiet during the Darfur campaign. Though 'Abd al-Rahmin's support was welcome 
at the time, and considerable leniency was shown to him and his followers, 
he was to cause considerable anxietj^  to the Sudan officials in 1920s,
Besides this personal approach, Wingate had in the meantime quietly 
carried out more effective measures for the maintenance of security in the 
country. An intelligence system was inaugurated throughout the provinces 
and the Governors were supplied with daily bulletins of news which they 
communicated to the officers and tribal Shaykhs, An Aliens Committee 
comprising Bonham-Carter, Stack and Pearson was appointed to deal with the 
various Austrians and Germans who were in the country. Those in the
(2)
Government sentice were relieved of their duties and sent down to Cairo,^ 
Other non official aliens were required to sign a certificate promising not 
to give assistance by word or deed to the e n e m y , A s  the war progressed, 
the garrisons of the frontier posts were strengthened and a more effective
(1) See Chapter X,
(2) W.P, Durham, Box 469/7, Wingate to Clayton, 7th November 1914*
(3) FO 371/1970, Intelligence Report prepared for the Egyptian Army, 
6th September 1914,
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system of patrol v/as established particularly on the Red Sea and the 
Abyssinian frontiers. The Sudan Government Steamer 'Enterprise* was 
fitted with one 12-J- pr gun and two maxims and placed at the service of 
the Admiralty, ' But Wingate made it clear that the Na,vy was ultimately
(2)responsible for the defence of Port Sudan, ' On his representations the 
Admiralty agreed to place a couple of Torpedo-boat destroyers at this 
port.(3)
On the Abyssinian frontier the posts at Nasser, Akobo and Bojak: were 
maintained, but the effective administration of Garjale country and the 
measures for the subjection of the Anuaks to the south of the Sobat river 
had to be deferred.
Further south in Uganda, the British officials, ha.ving sent all the 
available trained troops to Kissi in British East Afrida, were grovâng 
nervous on receiving reports of the approach of German raiders towards 
Kigararaa to the west of Lake V i c t o r i a , T h e  Uganda officials now 
requested Wingate to garrison some of their northern posts with the 
Sudanese troops, Wingate was willing to send eight Sudanese companies to 
Nimule to be transported to any threatened point provided the Home Authori­
ties had no o b j e c t i o n , H e  was, however, told that Uganda would be 
reinforced from India, But the Government of Uganda was still interested 
in keeping a Sudanese force handy at Nimule, To this Wingate could not 
agree. His objection was that he could not keep troops tied up at Nimule
(1) FO 371/5713, Report by the Governor-General on the situation in the
Sudan during the first two years of the war, in War Office to FO,
No: 0143/1460, 0,2,, 3rd April 1919.
(2) FO 371/1972, Cheethara to FO, Tel, No: 218, 24th October 1914.
(5) W,P, Durham, Box 469/7, Wingate to Clayton, 7th November 1914.
(4) Military Operations, East Africa, Vol. I, P.41, Compiled by Charles 
Hordern, founded on a draft by the late Î4aj. H. Fitz M, Stack.,, HM 
Stationery Office (l94l).
(5) W.P. Durham, Wingate to R.C.R. Owen, 20th September 1914.
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on the mere chance of their being required. The Sudanese troops could 
not just watch whilst the Uganda troops were on active service. According 
to him the Uganda authorities should either use the Sudanese troops 
straightaway or tell him definitely that they do not want them,^ "'^  It 
is interesting to note that in spite of his own local security problems, 
Wingate felt confident enou^ to send one and a half companies to Madial, 
Morongole and Kitgum in order to protect the northern frontiers of Uganda 
from raids by the Dodings, tribesmen. The first of these troops arrived at
( 2)I'ladial early in October 1914« A detachment comprising two British 
officers, two Eg^rptian officers and 67 NCOs and men also cooperated with 
the Uganda troops in the operations against the Turkana tribe on the 
shores of Lalce Rudolf in April and May 1915.^^^
Further arrangements were made between the Sudan Government and the 
officials of the French and Belgian Congos for a joint action against 
the enemy in case of an attack,
To the west in Darfur AlihDinar’s relations with the border tribes 
such as the Rezaiqat and the Kababish were deteriorating. In May 1915 
Ali Dinar had written four letters to the Kababish Chief, 'Ali al-Tum, in
two of which he accused him of capturing and selling as slaves free Muslims
(5) r —  ------------
from W a d a i , T h o u g h  Wingate minimized the importance of Ali Dinar's
(1) W.P. Durham, Box 469/7, Wingate to Clayton, 23rd September 1914.
(2) Military Operations, East Africa, Vol. I, Comp* by Charles Hordern,
FN on P,24.
(3) FO 371/3713, Govemo^-^-Beneral's Report on the situation in the Sudan 
during the 1st two years of the war, in WO to FO, 3^^ April 1919.
(4) FO 371/2349, SIR No, 254, September 1915.
(5) Dr, A.B. Theobald: Op cit, PP 144-145.
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“ f 1 ^letters to 'Ali al-Tum^ \  the question of sending one company of Camel
Corps northwards from Bara to protect the Kababish and another to eastern
Nahud to protect the Hamar and Humr was discussed by the Sudan Government,
It was finally decided to send all available Slavery Department Camel
- - (2 )
police to the Inspector who was camping at the Kababish headquarters,' '
It was necessary to restore confidence in the Government amongst the 
border tribes. The apparent reluctance of the Government to meet*Ali 
Dinar's challenge was shaking their belief in the Government, Other forms 
of a sub-current of unrest were also not slow in making their appearance, 
Jackson, Governor of Dongola, reported to Wingate that the 'Umdas of the 
Kababish, Hawawir and other tribes had even refused to pay taxes as they 
were told that a new Government was about to take over the S u d a n , B y  
the end of 1915 it was clear that if Ali Dinar was not checked there would 
be raids and counter raids amongst the tribes and the Government's prestige 
would decline rapidly in the western districts. The tribes would be led to 
believe that after all the Government was too weak to vindicate its authority 
over so powerful a Sultan as 'All Dinar and self interest would prompt them 
to support what they considered to be stronger side. The situation on the 
Darfur frontier therefore demanded immediate action,
Wingate, who had long been preparing for the invasion of Darfur, 
completed the concentration of the Expeditionary force at Nahud by the 
middle of March I916, The force comprised the following:-
(1) 5 Companies Camel Corps,
(2) 2 Companies Mounted Infantry,
(1) Ibid, P, 145.
(2) Ibid.
(3) W.P. Durham, Box 469/8, Wingate to Clayton, 25th March 1915,
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(3) 12 Maxims and one Nordenfeldt Battery of six guns,
(4) 8 Companies of Sudanese Infantry,
3 companies of Egyptian Infantrj'' as well as other details besides
1200 baggage camels, made up into S transport companies. The force was
under British officers commanded by Lt, Col, P.Y, K e l l y , A s  a
precautionary measure, and so as to have reinforcements ready at hand,
Wingate stationed at al-Obeid a garrison of 70 men of Warvrickshire
Garrison Battalion (on Camels), a double company of Arab battalion, six
companies of Sudanese and one Egyptian battalion together with some maxims.
In addition a British Brigade was earmarked in Egypt which was to be
despatched in case of a sudden call from the Sudan,
But in the actual operations against ’Ali Dinar only the Eg^rptian army
finally participated (except for a detachment of Royal Plying Corps which
Wingate obtained from Maxwell, who was then commanding in Egypt,)
Before the expedition ivas launched, Wingate wrote a letter to 'Ali
Dinar calling up-on him to surrender and promising him safe conduct and
( 2)fitting arrangements for his comfort,' After these last minute attempts 
at conciliation having failed, the force was ordered to occupy the wells 
of Umm Shanqa and Jebel Billet on l6th March 1916, The occupation of these 
two places within the Darfur territory was of vital importance to the 
advancing army. Between the wells at Umm Shanqa and Nahud there was only 
a little water, stored in the Tebeldi trees, and if J, Hilla was not 
occupied the border tribes could easily be raided from Darfur, These two 
places were therefore occupied with estimated enemy casualties of 20 
Killed or wounded by 21st March 1916.
(1) W.P. Durham, Box 470/1, Wingate to Kitchener, 15th March 1916,
(2) A.B. Theobald: Op cit., P 178,
(3) PO 371/2671, Me Mahon to PO, Tel, No. 218(r), 24th March 1916,
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After the occupation of Umm Shanqa and J, Hilla, the force moved on
to Abiad, the next objective, a place 80 miles east of al-Pasher, which
was occupied on 9th April, Abiad became the base for further operations,
Wingate wanted thebforce to halt there, and to consolidate various posts
on the lines of communication, before it moved on to Pasher after the
ra i n s , K e l l y ,  however, entertained different ideas, . , , If we
wait until the rains to get into Pasher", he wrote to Wingate, "then the
whole military situation may alter considerably and we may conceivably
(2)find ourselves against good leaders and maxims and guns,' ' The question 
was referred to the Central Defence Bureau, Khartoum for consideration^ 
and the Poreign Secretary was informed and his approval for advance was 
obtained.
Thus the difficulties in the way of an advance on Darfur before the 
rains were cleared and on 15th May Kelly marched out of Abiad on the road 
to Pasher, But before Pasher was reached a short but decisive engagement 
took place between the Expeditionary Porce and 'Ali Dinar's force which 
was holding a strongly entrenched place behind Beringia Village, on 22nd 
May 1916, The Purs were defeated in this engagement and the road to Pasher 
lay open before the Expeditionary Porce, After their victory at Beringia, 
Kelly marched to Pasher and bivouacked a few miles outside the Capital, 
When 'Ali Dinar realized that everything was lost, he fled to Jebel Marra





with several of his leading advisers who were faithful to him in defeat.
Al-Pasher was occupied on the next day, hut the immediate pursuit of 'Ali
Dinar had to he called off due to the approach of the rains,
Kelly was well served hy the Royal Plying Corps who from their base
at Abiad bombed 'Ali Dinar's positions. Unfortunately, on the approach of
the rains, it was considered necessary to stop flying at once and the
aeroplanes therefore were withdrawn from the Sudan,' ' However, the hunt
for 'Ali Dinar continued and, as soon as the rains were over, a flying
column under Maj, Huddleston finally located him on 5th November at a
place called Giubu (or Juba) in the heart of the Iferra range. The royal
camp was surprised on the 6th and the Sultan was killed by a chance shot
( 2)in the act of mounting his horse,' ^
The conquest of Darfur had a sobering effect on the border tribes 
who had for some time been doubtful of the ability of the Government to 
fi^t 'Ali Dinar, The defeat and death of 'All Dinar therefore restored 
the confidence in the Government, If Darfur had not been pacified, Vinga.te 
was afraid that there might be trouble amongst the tribes living within 
the Sudan frontier and this would further complicate the security 
situation in the Sudan, The moral effect of the victory was generally 
satisfactory throughout the Sudan and for Wingate it completed the process 
of the reconquest which had been launched a couple of decades earlier. 
Within the Sudan, trouble of a diffèrent character was causing 
anxiety to the Government, The inborn dislike of the Nuba for any 
governmental control was reflected in March 1915 in the riaringittf Piqi'Ali, 
the chief of the Jebel Mfri in the Nuba Mountain province,It is not
(1) A.B, Theobold; Op cit, P, 195.
(2) Ibid, See Gillan's account PP 203 and 204,
(3) W.P. Durham, Box 469/8, Wingate to Clayton, 25th I^ Iarch 1915.
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clear what made Piqi 'Ali rise against the Government, but it is believed 
that rumours that the British were on the verge of defeat were widespread 
in the Nuba Mountains (l) and this may have set Piqi 'Ali on the road to 
rebellion,
Piqi 'Ali was summoned to Talodi to explain his conduct and according 
to the Intelligence Report he was actually on his way when he suddenly
returned to his hill and declined to meet Wilson, the Governor of the
province, who was camping at K a d u ^ l i , O n  29th March he openly declared 
his intention to attack the Government post. He was supported by the Nuba 
of Kasiga and Lima hills and according to one rumour had about 1000 men 
under him, half of whom were armed vrith rifles, A.li had also attempted to 
gain the support of those Miri Nuba, some 30 in number, who had joined the 
Nuba territorials and who at this time had grievances of their own,
Of these only two joined Piqi Ali,
All attempts to induce Piqi 'All to come in having failed, his 
stronghold was attacked and captured on 20th April 1915.^^^ J. Tuluk, 
the hill on which Piqi 'Ali had made his last stand, however, proved to be 
honeycombed with caves and had to be evacuated as being untenable at night.
But knowing that v/ater was scarce on the hill, it was cordoned off. Next
day the besCftged Nuba expressed their desire to surrender. Some 1200 Nuba
(1) G, Warburg ; Op cit, P, 107,
(2) W.P. Durham, Box 469/8, Wingate to Clayton, 25th March 1915.
(3) Recruitment for the Nuba Territorials was started in May 1914, and
about 50 were enlisted of whom 30 were^ /Wb©,, By mistake the men were /Miri 
issued 3 rotls of dhurra per day instead of 2 rotls and when the 
mistake was discovered, the ration was reduced to two rotls. The men
were therefore incensed and believed that they were not getting their
rights,
(4) PO 371/2349, SIR No: 249, April 1915.
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surrendered on the 23rd and a message was also received from Piqi 'Ali on 
the same day that he too wished to surrender. Piring was therefore stopped 
and Piqi 'Ali was seen coming out of the cave hut he escaped through 
the pickets.
Pirst reports reaching the camp showed that Piqi 'Ali had moved 
north to seek Baqqara help. But later reports showed that he had returned 
to the hills near Daloka, However, he succeeded in evading arrest till 
June 27th when he was captured with his brother Musa and a servant by the
sub-M^ur of Rahad and was talc en to Kadu(^li for trial^^^. He was tried 
for treason and sentenced to be h a n g e d , B u t  he managed to escape while 
being escorted to Talodi and joined the remnants of his followers who 
had taken refuge at J, Tuluk under his brother Idris, Piqi 'Ali was finally 
induced to surrender on a promise of pardon and the district reverted to 
its normal state.
These operations were not connected with the world war entirely, 
but they absorbed the services of a number of British officers who could 
have been used elsewhere. The War and the internal punitive expeditions 
put a severe strain upon the personnel and the resources of the Egyptian 
army, Wingate was short of British officers and to use his words the 
Sudan was garrisoned by "a most rickety old garrison Regimen t " , Y e t  
by the middle of I9I6 the political equilibrium had been restored in the 
greater portion of the country, Althou^ vigilance was still required, 
public confidence in the strength of the Government was re-established.
(1) Ibid,
(2) PO 371/2349, SIR, No: 251, June 1915.
(3) Ibid, No, 253, August 1915.
(4) W.P. Durham, Box 236/3, Wingate to Grenfell, 9th December 1915.
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In October 1916 Wingate was appointed as British High Commissioner
in Egypt and asked to take up this appointment by the end of the year,^^^
But before he took up the new post, Wingate busied himself in creating the
Sudan Reser^ /e Corps which would assist the Government in the defence of
the Sudan and in the suppression of disorder in the country. He \rrote to
Grey that there were about 400 civilians of British descent of whom the n
majority were resident at Khartoum, Atbara and Pgrt Sudan, About 350 of
these were in Government service. Before the war it had been thought
undesirable to raise a British Volunteer Corps tthou^ the British Rifle
Clubs existed in the principal towns and the members of these clubs were
included in the local defence schemes. Since the war, and the declaration
of a British Protectorate in Egypt any political objection to the establish-
( 2)ment of a British Corps had ceased, ' After the conquest of Darfur, 
according to Wingate, the Sudan was in a quiet condition and the time was 
favourable for constituting such a Corps without causing alarm or comment. 
The introduction of compulsory service in England was, in Wingate's view, 
a logical reason for a similar action in the Sudan, Wingate even recommended 
that men who were not British subjects could also be included provided 
they obtained the consent of the Adjutant General,
The War Office agreed to the institution of such a force provided 
the Sudan Government would meet the full cost of raising equipping and 
maintaining it. The military authorities, however, did object to the 
enlistment of alienë in the f o r c e , T h e  force was constituted, but there 
is no evidence of its being employed in the Sudan,
(1) PO 371/3722, Grey to Wingate, Personal telegram, 11th October 1916; 
Wingate to Grey, 12th October 1916, Grey to Wingate, 31st October 1916,
(2) FO 371/2930, Wingate to Grey, No, 5, 4th January 1917.
(3) FO 371/2930, War Office to Foreign Office, No: 0143/1113 SD2, 27th 
January 1917.
167
The War Office was in fact considering proposals about this time 
to raise additional native units for service to increase the man power 
of the E m p i r e . I t  was now clear to the Arms'- Council that war mi^t 
not end for a long time to come and that the white troops, then employed 
in minor theatres would not be available for service on the main British 
front unless replaced by native units. The Army Council therefore approached I 
the Foreign Office with the suggestion that the Sudanese battalions could | 
be usefully employed in the defence of Egypt in order to release a proportion!
(2 ) Iof the white troops then allotted to that theatre,'  ^ But Wingate did not I
consider this suggestion practicable, -He had tried to raise additional I
Sudanese troops during the war with 'Ali Dinar and found it i m p o s s i b l e , |
But the War Office wanted to know from T'Jingate whether recruiting could '
not be stimulated by increase of pay,^^^ The Foreign Office minuted on i
this letter that Wingate might modify his views if the British Treasury |
{5)
was prepared to bear the cost of an increased rate of pay,' ' In his 
reply Wingate made two points clear. As regards compulsory enlistment in 
the Sudan the time was not opportune to resort to this measure. This would 
lead to unrest and then it would be necessary to increase the existing 
British garrison and the native troops to enforce it. On the other hand
(1) FO 371/2672, War Office (Brade) to FO, No: 20/ General No: 4545 S,D,2, 
10th November 1916,
(2) Ibid,
(3) FO 371/2672, Wingate to FO, Tel, No:14, 11th November I916 in 
FO to War Office, No: W 226735/16, 15th November I916.
(4) FO 371/2672, Cubitt (wo) to FO, No: 20/Gen, No/4345 (S.D.2),
19th November 1916,
(5) Ibid, FO Minute ; FO 371/2672, FO to Winga,te, Tel, No: 23, 24th November
191^ .
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by the voluntary system it mi^t be possible to raise at the outset four 
battalions of Arabs and Sudanese for the period of war by granting pay of 
one shilling a day to privates and a corresponding increase to other ranks 
with free clothing and ration. But this would involve the following 
disadvantages;-
(1) Cessation of recruiting for Sudanese and Arabs units of the 
Egyptian army which were below establishment,
(2) No new units could be formed for garrisoning Darfur,
(3) It would be impossible to replace soldiers in the existing 
force who retired or became casualties,
(4) Discontent would arise if the soldiers of the existing military 
and police forces were not allowed to transfer on better terms 
to the proposed Imperial force,
Wingate felt that the situation created in the last contingency would
be so grave that he would not willingly accept the responsibility for it,^ **^
The War Office, however, took the view that additional Sudanese units
should not only be raised for service where they could suitably be employed 
that
but also/increased recruiting should be used to make good the deficiencies 
in the Egyptian army. The Army Coimcil suggested that steps should 
immediately be taken to recruit selected Sudanese battalions of the 
Egyptian army over establishment and subsequently expand them to two 
battalions,
Wingate thought that it would take so long to cariy out the War 
Office suggestion that it would make the scheme of no practical value.
(1) FO 371/2672, Wingate to FO, Tel, No: 4^ , 28th November 1916;
FO to the Secretary, Army Council, No: W,24022|/l6, 1st December 1916,
(2) FO 371/2672, Cubitt (wo) to FO, No: 0145/1067 SD2, 8th December 1916,
FO to Wingate, Tel, No: 44, 14th December 1916,
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He wanted 1000 recruits to bring the existing battalions upto establish­
ment, He was, however, willing to provide three existing and(fully 
trained Sudanese or Arab battalions for service in Egypt provided they 
could be replaced by three Egyptian battalions conscripted in Egypt 
for the period of the war,^ **^
In February 1917 Wingate was asked by the Foreign Office to raise 
three new Egyptian battalions in order to release three fully trained 
Sudanese or Arab battalions for service in Egypt by the 1st of August 
1917. The cost of raising and equipping additional battalions would fall 
on Imperial Funds,^^À^JVTostÿn of the War Office appears to have told 
the Foreign Office that it was not only the immediate need that the War 
Office was thinking of but also that of the future. The military authori­
ties felt that the shortage of troops in the Sudan was serious and that 
the number of troops should be increased permanently,In a subsequent 
despatch to the Foreign Office the War Office explained that in view of 
the difficulty in obtaining recruits and the depletion of the existing 
battalions, they wanted to review the terms of enlistment of the Sudanese 
units as a whole and felt that any additional inducement should be 
applicable to all existing units of the Egyptian army in order to get 
more men. According to the War Office existing deficiencies should first 
be made good after which the units could be expanded for service outside 
the Sudan,
(1) FO 371/2672, Wingate to FO, Tel, No; 90, 17th December 1916,
(2) FO 371/2931» FO to Wingate, Tel, No: 144, 15th February 1917;
WO to FO, No: 0145/1067, S.D.2, 15th February 1917.
(5) FO 571/2931, FO Minute on Cubitt to FO, No: 27/Gen/No, 5941 (S.D.2) 
11th February 1917.
(4) FO 371/2931, War Office to FO, No: 0145/1067, S.D.2, 28th February 
1917, FO to Wingate, Tel. No,215, 5th March 1917.
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The War Office suggestion to make good the deficiencies in the 
existing Sudanese battalions was taken up by Stack, who was now acting 
as Governor-General and Sirday of the Egyptian Army.^ The Arab and 
Sudanese Irregular units were brou^t up to establishment in 1917 though 
the Sudanese Regular units were still short of 500 men. In order to 
compensate for their deficiency Stack provided each Sudanese battalion 
with a Machine gun Section, Further a new scheme for gratuities and 
pension which was under consideratiorÿÉiy the Egyptian Government was 
expected to reduce wastage by retaining soldiers longer with the colours.
In order to meet the requirements for the garrison of Darfur and 
other outlying districts, two batteries of Artillery, one Sudanese and 
the other Arab, was formed. One company of Mounted Infantry was being 
raised and trained, A force known as Western Arab Corps was also in the 
course of formation and in the southern Sudan two additional companies 
of the Equatorial battalion (Sudanese Irregulars) were raised. This resulted 
in the release of Sudanese Regulars who were available for strategic 
concentration. In the Nuba Mountains a second company of Nuba Territorials 
(Sudanese Irregulars) was also under formation. According to Sltack the 
above was the absolute minimum required to garrison Darfur and to furnish 
posts in the outlying districts.
Besides an increase in the Sudanese battalions. Five Eg^ rptian 
battalions had received an increase of two companies to their pre-war 
establishment of 4 companies. Two new battalions, each of 4 companies 
were also raised, A new Egyptian Sapper Company was formed and an addition 
of 50 men was made to the newly formed Egyptian Camel Corps,
(1) FO 571/5197, Stack to Wingate, No,90y 10th January 1918 in Wingate 
to A.J. Balfour, No,8, 15th January I9I8 ,
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The Army Council did not view with satisfaction the recent measures 
taken hy Stack to remove the deficiency in the Egyptian army.^ *'^  They 
said that the deficiency still existed though a considerable improvement 
had been made; that Stack had not taken into account the number of Sudanese 
who were still serving who had become inefficient through age, and that the 
Îl!fech]iiçiq6un Sections for the Sudanese units could not be a sufficient 
compansation for déficiences in the Infantry Regiment itself.
As regards the Irregular formations the Army Council felt that they 
were at best good for local service and of doubtful military value. They 
considered that the scheme of pension and gratuities in the regular army 
may promote a rapid intake of fresh recruits rather than vetrxti ewtCjcOnegi^  ^
longer period of service with colours. They therefore called for a fresh 
statement from the High Commissioner indicating in detail the strength
of the garrisons to be maintained in Egypt and the Sudan, and how that
garrison was to be provided, having regard to (l) the external and 
internal situation on the borders of Egypt and the Sudan, and (2) the
conditions that would attend demobilisation of the Imperial forces at the
end of the war; and (3) any necessary measures that should be taken at 
once in view of the fact that many material improvements in the condition 
of the army could be affected only gradually and would need considerable 
time.
In reply to the War Office request for a fresh statement. Stack pointed 
out that the number of Sudanese who were inefficient through age was about 
400, With the addition of these to the existing déficiences, the Sudanese
( 2)units would require about 1000 recruits to bring them upto establishment.'
(1) FO 371/5197, Cubitt (wo) to FO, Secret, 6th March 1918.
(2) FO 571/5197, Stack to Wingate, No; I46, 8th August 1918, in Wingate 
to A.J. Balfour, No: 182 (4407), 17th August I9I8 ; Wingate to War 
Office, No, 8W, l6th August I9I8,
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He agreed with the War Office view that the machine gun Sections did 
not compensate for the déficiences in the Infantry units, but they 
mitigated the situation to a certain extent. He said that the number of 
machine guns 'in the Egyptian army \MO-S 17 before the war and during the 
war the number had increased to 150, In addition, the army had been re­
armed with the magazine rifle.
As regards the Irregular formations, Stack explained that they were 
originally raised on a territorial basis owing to the difficulty of 
obtaining sufficient recruits by voluntary enlistment in order to expgnd 
the Sudanese regular units and to provide for new garrisons. They were 
designated as Irregulars only to draw a distinction between their 
conditions of service and pay and those of the Regular troops. Their 
training and discipline was in every respect similar and their military 
value equal to that of Regular troops and they could be employed anywhere 
on active service.
As regards the intake of fresh troops, according to Stack, two 
measures held out hopes pf giving adequate results. These were (l) raising 
pay so as to correspond with thevages ruling in the labour market and
(2) introducing a modified form of conscription on a short service basis 
(5 years colour service and 5 years in the reserve). The advantage of the 
first measure was that a highly trained long service force suitable for 
the Sudan might be raised; but if this objective were not attained, 
financial liability would still be increased and from this increase there 
could be no retreat. By adopting the second measure the financial increase 
would be avoided and the future of the existing battalions assured. But 
the serious drawback in the scheme was that its enforcement might lead to 
local trouble which would have to be dealt with and that it would train 
to arms a higher proportion of the native community, which could be a
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possible source of danger after the war to white supremacy unless a 
rigorous control of the arms traffic >/as instituted. Stack, however, 
recommended conscription as the only alternative which would guarantee 
the maintenance of existing cadres of Sudanese battalions upto their 
establishment. The total strength of the existing garrisons of the Sudan, 
exclusive of Departmental Corps, and exclusive of British troops, was 
510 officers and 13,654 other ranks. The force was distributed as follows
Eastern Sudan (comprising Sennar, Kassala and the Red Sea Provinces)
2 Company Garrison Artillery,
2 Egyptian Battalions,
1 Company Sudanese Infantry,
The Eastern Arab Corps,
Western Sudan (comprising Nuba Mountains, Kordofan and Darfur Provinces) 
1 Battery Field Artillery,
1 I^ achine Gun Battery,
2 Battalions Sudanese Infantry,
2 Companies Territorial Infantry,
5 Companies Camel Corps,
The Western Arab Corps,
Southern Sudan (comprising Upper Nile, Bahr al-Ghazal and Mongalla
Provinces)
2j Battalions Sudanese Infantry,
7 Companies Territorial Infantry,
Northern Sudan (Khartoum, Khartoum North, Omdurman and Shendi).
1 Squadron Cavalry,
3 Companies Mounted Infantry,
2 Field Battery Artillery,
1 Machine Gun Battery,
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l(a) Companies Garrison Artillery
2 Egyptian Battalions
2 Sudanese Battalions and two Companies,
Stack considered that the above force, reinforced by the return of 
the Egyptian battalion and one of the Field Batteries, from Hedjaz, and 
reorganization of the 12 Infantry Battalions would be sufficient to 
provide garrisons for the maintenance of order and security in the Sudan, 
They would also repel external aggression to the extent of armed raids 
across the Sudan frontiers for some years to come.
Stack further explained that the existing Egyptian Infantry was 
organized in battalions of 4 companies and Sudanese in battalions of five 
Companies, It was proposed to introduce the double company system in 
substitution for this organization and adopt fixed war and peace establish­
ments, Battalions on the former establishment would consist of 4 double 
companies of four platoons with a headquarters and machine gun section.
The battalions on the latter establishment would be similarly organized 
but the double companies would only have 3 platoons. Of the 5 Egyptian 
battalion^&nly two would be on the War establishment, but in the case 
of the Sudanese battalions all the seven would be on the same footing.
This would give an increase of 1200 effectives to the existing garrison 
in the Sudan, 700 of whom would be Sudanese, If the latter number was 
added to the 1000 men already deficient to establishment, a total of I7OO 
recruits for the Sudanese battalions had to be raised under conscription. 
Stack proposed to raise these men in two years.
To effect the introduction of conscription with the minimum of 
disturbance and friction. Stack wanted to start in those out districts 
where Sudanese battalions were already stationed so that recruits could 
be posted to these battalions, thereby enabling them to serve in their
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owi districts. The working of this system would be placed in the hands of 
civil authorities, who, being in touch with the chiefs and the people would 
be in a better position to fix the proportion to be furnished by each 
tribe,
f 1 ^Wingate approved Stack’s policy of conscription in the Sudan,^ '
He said that in normal circumstances he would have preferred to postpone 
the adoption of conscription for several years; but in view of the satis­
factory state of native opinion in the country and the existing emergency 
Stack was justified in accepting the risk attendant on its immediate 
adoption. It was believed that conscription would provoke local dis­
affection which would possibly require an increase in the British garrison 
to put it down but this could be largely reduced with the cooperation of 
the local civil authorities.
Referring to "the increased exposure of the Sudan to possible
exterior influences" which the Army Council had mentioned in their letter,
Wingate said that if Abyssinia was meant by this, then the Egyptian army
by itself and without the assistance of Imperial Troops could not repel
armed aggression by Abyssinia, The formation of a ’striking force’ drawn
from units at Khartoum was being considered, but even if this force were
constituted, it could hardly be expected to withstand an Abyssinian army 
( 2]of invasion,\ *
The Army Council concurred with the proposals put forvrard by Stack, 
but they hoped that Stack could raise a largecjnumber of voluntary recruits 
to provide for the mobile central force and local garrisons. They proposed 
that as large a proportion as possible of the troops employed in the
( 1 :) PO 371/3197, Wingate to WO, No, 8,W, l6th August 1918;
Wingate to A,J. Balfour, No: 182 (4407), 17th August 1918,
(2) Ibid,
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Sudan should he S u d a n e s e , T h e  Army Council further suggested that 
military service should he given a special status by the remission of 
taxes and similar minor privileges.
Finally the Army Council asked for a definite scheme from Egypt 
showing:-
(a) The total number it was proposed to maintain, with details 
of means of provision and maintenance,
(b) The troops which could be made available for service with the 
Egyptian Expeditionary Force and estimate of the time within 
wliich they would be available,
Wingate objected to the Army Council's proposals on the reorgani­
sation and employment of the Egyptian army abroad on financial grounds.
He asked for definite instructions from the Home Authorities on this 
point before making any mention to the Egyptian Government of the
(2)
likelihood of increased expenditure for the Egyptian army after the war,^ 
Moreover, he informed the Foreign Office that the British conquest of 
Syria and its effect on the general situation might modify the requirements 
mentioned by the Army Council in their letter.
The Army Council concurred with Wingate that under the changed 
circumstances the active employment of Egj'^ ptian and Sudanese units in 
Palestine and Syria was no longer necessary. Besides, the reorganization 
of the Egyptian army would depend on the future status of Egypt as a 
British Dependency and on the future relations, military, administrative
(1) FO 371/3197, War Office to FO, No: 0143/l067(S,D,2), 23rd September 
1918; FO to Wingate, No, 229, 27th September 1918,
(2) FO 371/3197, Wingate to FO, Tel, No: 1545, 20th October 1918;
FO to War Office, No: 175343/Vi23rd October I9I8 ,
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and financial of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan to Egypt,However, the 
Army Council suggested that for the time being it would be sufficient if
(a) a thorough examination was made of the recruiting resources of both 
Egypt and the Sudan; and (b) immediate steps to be taken to increase the 
numerical strength and efficiency of Sudanese and Arab elements of the 
Egyptian army, as suggested by them earlier. If the information was 
available, it would be a valuable basis for the introduction of reforms
(2)at the opportune time,^ ^
The security situation in the Sudan during the First World War can 
be divided into two distinct periods, viz,, (1) until the conquest of 
Darfur in 1916 and (2) from I9I6 to I9I8, The first period was an 
anxious time for the Sudan officials who watched the development of the 
war with growing concern. However much the religious leaders, the ’Ulama', 
and the tribal ^ aykhs professed loyalty to the Government, the involve­
ment of the- Muslim Turkey in the war on the side of Germany could not 
have other then unsettling effect on the Sudan, a country predominantly 
Muslim, It v/as also not known how the Egyptian army would react in case 
of an attack by Turkey or any other Muslim power. These fears, however, 
proved false and with the occupation of Darfur, the only province of the 
Egyptian Sudan which had so far defied the Sudan Government, the situation 
was brought fairly under control and the anxious phase had passed. By 
1916 the Sudan Government had emerged stronger in military terms than 
ever before,
(1) FO 571/3197, War Office to FO, No: 0143/1389, 30th October 1918,
(2) FO 371/3197, War Office to FO, No: 0143/1389, 30th October I9I8 ;
FO to Wingate, Tel, No: 1333, 3th November I9I8,
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The war had, however, put a strain upon the personnel and resources 
of the Egyptian army and the Sudan Government. The number of officers 
and officials in the Sudan was barely adequate even in the normal times; 
and officers were needed in every theatre of war. But fortunately a veto 
was put by Kitchener on the wholesale release of British officers and 
ciirilians on the ground that a release of a comparatively small number 
of individuals could have no effect on the war comparable with the chaos 
which their departure would cause in the Sudan,
Prom 1966 until the end of the war the Sudan did not pose a security 
problem. On the contrary it became a happy hunting ground for the Imperial 
strategists who saw in the Sudanese a rich source for increasing their 
manpower. The British War Office which had until previously been indifferent 
to the proposals submitted by Wingate time and again to improve the 
efficiency of the Egyptian army, now suddenly changed their attitude and 
they were not only willing to listen to proposals to improve the efficiency 
of the Egyptian army, but were also willing to pay for such improvements.
One reason for this change could be the presence of Kitchener in the War 
Office, The Sudanese soldier had always fascinated him. As early as 1902
he had proposed that 4 Sudanese battalions should be raised for Imperial, 
purpose,^ and it is quite probable that he himself drew the attention 
of the War Office to the Sudan as a source of military manpower.
(l) WO: 106/4 1, War Office to FO, 24th October 1902,
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In November I9I8 three of the leading Egyptian Nationalists, Sa’ad 
Pasha Zagilul, ’Abd al-Aziz Bey Pahmi and ’Ali Pasha Sharavi, met Wingate 
in Cairo and requested permission to proceed to London to discuss the 
future of Egypt.Wingate rejected their r e q u e s t , S o o n  after, 
the Egyptian Prime Minister himself, Rushdi Pasha, wished to proceed to 
London with the Education Minister Adli Pasha, Wingate supported their 
case and was willing to send Sir William Brunyate and Sir M. Cheetham 
to explain the Egyptian situation to the Home Authorities. He also 
suggested that the Nationalist leaders might be allowed a hearing in Lon- 
don^(^) The Foreign Office considered that in the first instance Wingate's 
reception of the Nationalists was unfortunate and had placed the British 
Government at the very outset in a position from which it would be very 
difficult to recover.Mr. Balfour, the Foreign Secretary, saw no 
reason to receive the Nationalist leaders whose demand for complete 
independence for Egypt could not be considered. However, he had no 
objection to receiving the Ministers if they could defer their visit 
for the next few months during which period he was busy with the Peace 
Negotiations in Paris. Wingate was told that his presence would be 
essential in London when the Ministers made their v i s i t , T h e  two 
Egyptian Ministers who insisted on visiting London immediately now 
resigned. Wingate, however, asked the Sultan not to accept their 
resignations till he had received further instructions from Britain.
(1) FO 371/3204, Wingate to FO, Tel. No: 1710, 17th November 1918,,
(2) FO 371/3204, Wingate to FO, Tel: No. 1751Î 25th November 1918,,
(3) FO 371/3204, Wingate to FO, Tel, No: 1710; 17th November 1918;
FO 371/3713, Note on the unrest in Egypt, prepared for the War Cabinet, 
9th April 1919.
(4) FO 371/3204, FO to Wingate, Tel, No: 1463, 2nd December 1918,
(5) FO 371/3204, FO to Wingate, Tel, No: 1428, 27th November 1918,
(6) FO 371/3204, Wingate to FO, Tel. No: 1813; 5th December 1918,
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Early in January 1919 Wingate was summoned to England and at the same 
time invitations were sent to the two Ministers to visit London about the 
middle of February, However, they now declined to come unless the National­
ists were permitted to accompany them, Wingate explained that the Egyptian 
Ministers would never come without the Nationalist leaders, Egyptian 
opinion would assume, he said, that Ministers had failed to obtain satis­
factory terms from the British Government because of the absence of the 
Nationalists, He therefore suggested that the Nationalists should be 
allowed to come to Britain but not be officially received. This would 
strengthen the position of the Ministers, The other alternative, according 
to Wingate, was to accept the resignation of the Ministry, But he warned 
that it would be difficult to form another M i n i s t r y . T h e  Foreign 
Office, however, held to their view and the Ministers maintained their 
decision to resign.
In the meanwhile the Nationalists had launched an active agitation 
for Independence which proved far more popular than any moderate programme. 
As foreseen by Wingate the Sultan found it impossible to form a new 
Ministry especially in the face of opposition by the Nationalists who 
successfully prevented a Ministry being formed by resorting to methods 
of intimidation, Cheetham, who was now acting as High Commissioner in
the absence of Wingate, was authorised by the Foreign Office to take
(2)
necessary steps to maintain law and order in Egypt, .4 As a first step to
restoring peace, Cheetham had Zaghlul arrested along with Isma'il Sidqi,
Muhammad Mahmud and Hamid al-Basil on 8th March 1919 and deported them 
« # •
to Malta,
The arrest and deportation of the Nationalist leaders opened the 
flood gates of trouble never to close again. Riots broke out in Cairo 
and other provincial towns necessitating reinforcements from Palestine
(1) FO 371/3713, Note on the unrest in Egypt, 9th April 1919,,
(2) FO 371/3713, Note on the unrest in Egypt, 9th April 1919.
182
under Gen, Bulfin who was able to restore peace,-^ ^^  On hearing from
Cheetham that the situation in Egypt had deteriorated, the Foreign 
Office despatched Gen, Allenby, who had arrived in Paris about this 
time, as Special High Commissioner to Egypt with supreme authority in 
Civil and Military matters. By the time he arrived in Egypt on 25th 
March the violent phases of the rebellion were on the wane.
The rest of the events in Egypt fall outside the scope of the 
subject, but the effects of the Nationalist agitation on security in 
the Sudan are discussed in the following pages.
The Sudan could not remain unaffected by this Nationalist agitation 
in Egypt, In fact conditions in the Sudan were to some extent favourable 
to the spread of such an agitation. There was a considerable Egyptian 
population, mostly belonging to the merchant class, in the towns from 
Khartoum northwards. The Government was largely staffed by the Egyptians 
in the junior administrative posts and the army itself was the Egyptian 
army. Besides the Egyptian element in the Sudan, there was a growing 
student class which included a high proportion of the Sudanese who drew 
inspiration from Egypt, An attempt is made in the following pages to 
discuss the effects of the Egyptian agitation of 1919 on the Egyptians 
in the Sudan and the Sudanese and its implication for the security of 
the Sudan during 1919-1922,
(a ) The Egyptians in the Sudan
The Egyptian element in the Sudan did not in itself pose a serious
(2 )threat to the security in the country,^ ' According to Stack they were hand: 
capped by the fact that they lived in a remote country where any active
(1) FO 371/8972, Memorandum on the Political situation in Egypt by J, 
Murray, 4th January 1923,)
(2) FO 371/3717, Stack’s observations on the growth of National Aspirations 
in the Sudan in Allenby to Curzon, No: 204, 4th May 1919.
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movement would be ineffective and would probably recoil on themselves.
They were also a comparatively small community and were susceptible to 
the influence of the senior men among them who were fortunately loyal to 
the Sudan Government, Further most of them, being Government servants and 
having no independent element amongst them such as lawyers, landowners, 
press-men etc,, had a good deal to lose in setting themselves against the 
Government if they were to fail,^^^ However, the presence of the Egyptian 
army in the Sudan gs.ve force to the nationalist sentiments of the Egyptians, 
There were five Egyptian ’fallah’ battalions'and three Egyptian Field 
Batteries in the Sudan, In addition to these there were two Egyptian 
garrison companies of Artillery and various other technicals and Departmental 
troops and a number of Egyptian officers serving with the Sudanese, i,e,, 
black, and Arab units. The juniopbfficers were mostly Egyptians and were 
thoroughly infected with extremist views and looked to Egypt for a lead.
In Egypt itself, during the early stages of the Nationalist agitation, 
there had been a ceaseless propagandist movement to either cajole or 
provoke by taunts the Egyptian troops to support the nationalist movement. 
This had affected the junior officers of the Military School but the 
majority of the troops, however, remained l o y a l , D u r i n g  this period 
there was a certain amount of anxiety in the British command in Egypt 
lest the Egyptian troops in Cairo should get out of hand and there was 
talk of disarming them,^^^ Stack was opposed to taking such an extreme 
step. He feared that this would effect the Egyptian army in the Sudan
(1) Ibid,
(2) 1st, 2nd, 5th, 8th and the 17th battalions,




and trouble in the Sudan would be a more serious problem than in Egypt
where there were troops from all over the Empire to face any eventuality.
He therefore recommended that if signs of unrest were noticed in the
Egyptian army in Egypt it would be preferable to break up the Egyptian
garrison by distributing it in localities where British troops were in
large numbers or to let a great proportion of them go on furlough,' '
Fortunately there was no need to resort to this extreme step. The
Egyptian troops remained loyal during the active phase of the Egyptian
agitation in March 1919# In fact they cooperated with the British army
in restoring peace in Egypt,
Stack does not then appear to have been unduly anxious regarding
the loyalty of the Egyptian army. When trouble broke out in Upper Egypt
in March 1919 he found it possible to send 100 men of the Hampshire
Regiment to Shellal, Later he sent a further force consisting of Egyptian
and Sudanese battalions and 40 men of the Artillery, numbering about 65O,
(2)
to reinforce the troops at Luxor and Assuit,' ' His real anxiety during 
this period was that if the situation in Egypt continued to be serious 
and if communications with the Sudan were interrupted for a long time 
the senior officers of the Egyptian army in the Sudan might be eventually 
over ruled by the "hot heads". They could cause as much embarassment 
to the Government as possible by witholding assistance expected of them 
if there was an outbreak of violence in the Sudan due to shortage of 
essential commoditiesStack  therefore recommended that a regular
(1) Ibid,
(2) FO 371/3724, Monthly Intelligence Report No;296, March 1919;
FO 371/3722, Stack to Wingate, 7th April 1919.
(3) EO 371/3714, Situation in the Sudan from Acting Sirdar in Cheetham
to FO, Tel. No; 423, 23rd March 1919.
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steamer service should he instituted between Suez and Port Sudan in 
order to carry mails and evacuate those awaiting passage to Europe, He 
also wanted one additional British battalion, not less than 600 strong, 
to reinforce the British garrison in the Sudan which was at its minimum
and had been further depleted by the despatch of 100 men to Assuan and
1)
(2)
( 1 ')also to protect the Sudan Railways,' ' In response to Stack's request
a guard ship was sent to Port Sudan,
The release of Za#ilul in April 1919 and the ensuing demonstrations
caused a considerable stir in the Egyptian community in the Sudan, The 
news arrived just before Easter and some Muslim junioiy^officers and 
officials visited the Coptic Church to show their national unity,
Again, on Easter Monday a considerable number went to the Coptic Library 
at Khartoum and a draft telegram was circulated and^'signed by the majority 
of those present to be sent to the Sultan congratulating him on the return
of Zaghlul, The senior officers, however, intervened and the proposal to
send the telegram was dropped.
The stir in the Sudan soon quietehjfdown. But the arrival on the 26th 
April of S.S. Bakhalieh at Port Sudan from Egypt caused fresh troubles. 
Some 90 Egyptian troops, officers and men, were returning to the Sudan 
from leave in Egypt, They had left Egypt before the U.S.A. had recognised
'British Protectorate over Egypt, Confident of the American support for
their cause they had demonstrated on the way from Suez to Port Sudan#
(1) Ihid.
(2) PO 371/5714, A telegram from the Dir. of Naval Intelligence, 23rd 
March 1919.
(3) PO 371/3724, M.I.H. No:297, April 1919.
(4) PO 371/3724, M.I.R. No: 297, April 1919.
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On their arrival at the latter Port they renewed their demonstration. The
officers proceeded ashore and ignoring their commanding officer, Sidqi Bey,
went straight to the Egyptian barracks in the town. The troops subsequently
forced their way on shore, the local police being powerless to prevent
them,(^) Later the troops were persuaded to return on board by the local
Egyptian officers under orders of Sidqi Bey, but the officers did not
return till late in the ni^t. Meanwhile the ship was shifted to an
anchorage close to E.M.S. Clio and the commanding officer of H.M.S. Clio
was requested to take charge of the ship. On the next day the Egyptians
were landed and entrained on the wharf. This was carried out without
incident; but while the train was at Port Sudan Passenger Station further
demonstrations took place. According to the Officer Commanding E.M.S. Clio
the presence of his ship at Port Sudan was a marked deterrent to any
irregular proceedings. In her absence the presence of such a large number
of Egyptian troops in Port Sudan would have enabled them to carry out
practically any operation they thought fit. As the disaffection was more
marked among the officers than the men, the potentialities of the situation
could not be ignored particularly at Pgrt Sudan which was the principal
(2)
centre of communication, ' The troops made further demonstrations on 
the journey between Port Sudan and Atbara, but were met by Midwinter, 
the General Manager, Sudan Railways, and his staff officer before they 
reached the latter place and were warned that if they gave any more 
trouble it would be a serious matter. They were sent on to Khartoum with 
an Egyptian guard and the rest of the journey was uneventful. The senior
(1) PO 371/3717, Report by the C.O., H.M.S. Clio, 29th April 1919 in 
Admiralty to PO, 2nd June 1919.
(2) Ibid.
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Egyptian officers requested that they should be allowed to deal with the 
matter themselves and took^charge of the officers at Khartoum.^
Port Sudan and Atbara, however, continued to be the scene of further 
disturbances during May 1919. On 7th May a few Egyptians were found 
shouting Egyptian, nationalist slogans around Port Sudan and again on the 
15th some 20 Railway battalion men paraded through the town after breaking 
out of barracks and shouted for the independence of E g y p t , T h e  arrival 
of the Coptic Bishop from Egj’-pt about this time was made the occasion for 
a further demonstration in which the Railwaymen were joined by some 
Egyptian youths waving the NationalistaiJag, The authorities did not take 
any action on this occasion except to warn the demonstrators to go home 
which they did,^^^
At about the same time immense excitement was caused at Atbara by , 
a rumour that the British had communicated to Rushdi Pasha an announcement 
of the Independence of Egypt and that the British troops had already begun t 
to evacuate Egypt, Stack immediately contradicted the rumour and the 
General Manager, Sudan Railifays, issued a circular that demonstrations 
would not be permitted,Inspite of the prohibitory orders three clerks 
were found shouting the Nationalist slogans. They were arrested and deported 
' to Egypt,
In August an attempt was made to murder Col, Muhammad Bey Padil,
(1) PO 371/3711, Stack to Wingate, 8th I%y 1919 in Wingate to Curzon, 
4th June 1919.
(2) PO 371/3721, M.I.R., No: 298, May 1919.




the Officer commanding the Railway battalion at Atbara^^^ who had
reported to the General Manager of the Railways the names of some of
the Egyptians as being leading agitators. During the trial three men
were found guilty and sentenced to terms of imprisonment from six to 14 
(2)years,' '
Sporadic outbreaks of nationalist feelings amongst the junior 
officers continued to occur in the Sudan, In November, for instance, 
some 60 of them met at the Egyptian Officers Club to discuss the question 
of signing a declaration asking for the independence of Egypt, The following 
resolutions were passed:
1, In favour of a full independence of Egypt,
2, Protesting against the Milner Commission,
5. Protesting against the action taken against Maj, TMiammad Riad• »
who had been reprimanded for writing to the Egyptian Press demanding 
full independence for Egypt,
4. Protesting against the recent killing of unarmed Egyptians in 
Alexandria by British troops,
5. Demanding publication of the above resolutions in the%yptian Press, 
The senior Egyptian officers protested against the resolutions but
the motions were carried aga.inst their advice. The incident was then 
reported to the authorities. But the question was dropped when the officers 
concerned subsequently tendered an apology and gave assurances that there 
would be no recurrence of political discussion by them,
(1) FO 371/3724, M.I.R., No:301, August 1919.
(2) FO 371/3724, M.I.R., No,302, September 1919.
(3) FO 371/3724, M.I.R., No: 3O4 , November 1919.
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The Egyptian officers, however, continued to pose a serious threat 
to security in the Sudan, Thou^ Stack did not expect any revolutionary 
or rebellious outbreak in the Sudan either from the Egyptian civil 
population or the army,^ ^ ^ the fact remained that the Sudan Government 
was restrained from dealing more effectively with the effects of the
Egyptian nationalist agitation on the Sudan %due to the presence of the
(o)
Egyptian army in that country,' '
(b ) The Sudanese and the Egyptian Nationalist Movement
Until the end of the First World War the word "Nationality" 
meant little to the Sudanese, No ancient history or common tradition 
united the different races thou^ under the old Egyptian and the Mahdist 
governments large areas of the Sudan had been under centralised adminis­
tration, But the Sudanese were neither conscious of any national ambition 
nor sufficiently organized for such an idea to occur to them.
During the period under study the Sudanese population can be 
divided into four main groups as follows:-
(a) The educated class. This included the heads of the religious
fraternities known as Turuq (Sing, Tariqa meaning path), the 'Ulami' or
theologians, and those who had passed through the higher government schools,
(b) The tribal and territorial Shaykhs of the northern and central 
Sudan who were mostly Arab or partly Arab,
(c) The tribesmen and villagers of northern and central Sudan,
(d) The Blacks of the southern Sudan,
(1) PO 371/3717, Stack's observations on the growth of National Aspirations 
in the Sudan, in Allenby to Curzon, No: 204, 4th May 1919.
(2) FO 371/4984, Mr, Keown-Boyd to Allenby, 14th March 1920 in Allenby to 
Curzon, 24th March 1920,
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Numerically the last two groups outnumbered the rest, but the groups 
(a) and (b) though few in number represented what could be referred to as 
public opinion. Most of them were Muslims and belonged to one or another 
Tariqa and looked to the head of their respective Tariqa for guidance in 
matters spiritual and temporal. The rivalrj'" of the Turuq, for which there 
were historical and religious reasons, influenced the political alignment 
not only of individual but of tribal groups. It would not be out of place 
to refer to the three heads of the religious fraternities who exercised 
a considerable influence amongst the Sudanese,
(1) Sayyid 'Ali al-Mirghani, He had many Egyptian connections, having 
spent his boyhood in Cairo as a refugee from the Llahdists, After the re­
occupation of Kassala in 1897 he was invited from Egypt and installed as 
the custodian of the famous Qadima or mosque of Kassala, He was profoundly 
venerated in the Eastern Sudan and the B.èja once again began to flock to 
Kassala on pilgrimage to liis ancestor's tomb. The Government patronage 
extended to him increased his influence considerably,Though he had taken 
refuge in Egypt dinring the Jlalidiyya, he was opposed to the Egyptian claim 
to the Sudan,
(2) Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahman al-I%hdi, He had lived under a political 
cloud and in comparative obscurity after the overthrow of the Mahdiyya 
until the outbreak of the World Jar, This, however, did not prevent him 
from exercising influence over his father's followers in the southern and 
the western Sudan, VJhen the war broke out he openly declared his loyalty 
to the Sudan Government, Wingate, who was then in the Sudan, realised the 
importance of his support and relaxed the restrictions on his movements 
which greatly helped 'Abd al-Rahmâi to consolidate his influence over 
his people,
(3) Sharif Yusuf al-Hindi, the leader of a smaller Tariqa, does not
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appear to have enjoyed the widespread popularity as the first two 
religious Shaykhs, He had no political ambitions, but he disliked Egypt 
and the Egyptians,
All the three Shayldis recognized the fact that a well advertised 
support of the Government would redound to their great advantage and that 
their best interests and hopes for future lay ip identifying themselves 
with the British control. The Nationalist agitation in Egypt and the 
attitude of the Egyptians in the Sudan caused some alarm amongst the 
Sudanese, They were given to understand that there was going to be a big 
change in politics involving the substitution of Turkish officials in 
the higher positions to take the place of British officials, the restoration 
of slave trade, the exploitation of the southern slave provinces, 
retaliation on pro-British natives and a general calling to account of
('1')those who had displeased the Egyptians in any way, ' This led to a
feeling amongst the Sudanese that the British might withdraw from Egypt 
and that a withdrawal from Egypt meant a withdrawal equally from the 
Sudan,
In an informal conversation with Stack the three religious leaders
expressed concern over the effects of the Egyptian propaganda in the
Sudan, Sayyid 'Ali al-Mirghani in particular expressed his ambition to see 
the
the people of/Sudan grow up under the guidance of Britain, a united
people with their own laws, customs and administration, capable both of
governing and defending themselves. All the three requested him to
institute among their followers a kind of propaganda which would foster
loyalty and cooperation with Britain with the ultimate object of culti-
(2)
vating a spirit of national unity amongst the Sudanese,' '
(1) EO 371/3711 ; A Note drawn from the information collected by Willis, 
Intelligence Department, in Stack to Wingate, 22nd December 1918 in 
Wingate to Hardinge, 27th December I9I8 ,
(2) PO 371/3711, Stack to Wingate, 23rd February 1919 in Wingate to Curzon, 
26th March 1919.
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In the absence of any declared British policy as regards the future
status of the Sudan, Stack could only assure the Sudanese leaders that
whatever happened in Egypt, the Sudan would remain unaffected and the
administration under the existing system would be carried on,^^^ He
did not approve the institution of pro-British propaganda in the Sudan
as suggested by the religious leaders. If the sense of nationality was
to grow it would do so naturally and to cultivate it by means of
(o')
propaganda would be a false move,' '
However, in order to convince the Sudanese tha.t Britain meditated 
no change in the existing system of the Government in the Sudan, Stack 
wrote to Wingate to approach the Foreign Office,to make the appointment 
of Governor-General and Sirdar permanent,According to Stack such a 
measure would not only have a beneficial effect on the country but also 
on the Egyptian army,^^^
While recommending Stack's confirmation, Wingate urged the Home 
Authorities to keep the Egyptian and the Sudan questions totally apart.
He added that as long as the Sudan remained under British control, Britain 
held the key to Egypt because Britain would then be controlling Egypt's
(1) FO 371/3711, Stack to Wingate, Personal, 22nd December 1918 in Wingate 
to Hardinge, Personal, 27th December 1918,
(2) FO 371/3711, Stack to Wingate, 23rd February 1919 in Wingate to Curzon, 
26th March 1919.
(3) When the post of the High Commissioner in Egypt was offeredto Wingate 
in October 1916 it was agreed that the officer appointed as Governor- 
General and Sirdar would, until the end of the war, consider holding 
these appointments temporarily, after which the question of his con­
firmation or otherwise would be gone into, (See: FO 371/3722, Grey to 
Wingste, Personal Telegram, 11th October 1916; Wingate to Grey, Tel, 
Personal, 12th October I916; and Grey to Wingate, 31st October 1916),
(4) FO 371/3711, Stack to Wing8,te, 22nd December 19I8 in Wingate to Hardinge, 
27th December 1918,
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water supply. He urged that whatever the eventual political fate of 
Eg3''pt may he", , , , the Sudan may he entirely excluded from its orbit", 
According to Wingate the Sudan was of greatest importance to Britain 
strategically, besides being a future asset to the Empire as a cotton 
growing country. But as an EgjT-ptian province it would become a positive 
danger, for it would at once become a hot bed of Egyptian and foreign 
intrigues. He suggested that if it was possible the assent of the powers 
at the Peace Conference should be obtained for its definite acquisition 
by Britain,
The Foreign Office held the view that the Sudan's complete severance
(2 )
from Egypt was not possible,' ' Egypt had made large financial advances 
to the Sudan and therefore had a perfect rightt to be interested in the 
country. If the financial claims of the Egyptian Government in the Sudan 
could be met by the British Government the situation would then be 
different. Since this could not be considered, the Foreign Office decided 
to express their intention to stay in the Sudan by confirming Stack as 
Governor-General of the Sudan and Sirdar of the Egyptian army,'^'
The Sudan Question
' In the meantime Sir William Brunyate, the Acting Financial Advisor
to the Egyptian Government was asked to draw up a Note to serve as a
had
basis for discussion by a Special Commission which/been constituted in , liad 
I9I8 to consider constitutional reforms in Egypt, Discussing the question
(1) FO 371/3711, Wingate to Hardinge, Private, 27th December 1918,
(2) Ibid, The Foreign Office Minutes,
(3) FO 371/3722, B.B. Cubitt (WO) to FO, No: 0143/1457, M.S.1, Col, 14th 
March 1919.
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of the Sudan, Brunyate pointed out that the combination of the two
offices of the Governor-General and Sirdar in the same hand was not
desirable particularly at a time when no senior British officers who
had close connection with Egypt were available. In his view the Govemor-
Generalship itself would occupy the full time of any man in view of the
continued development of the Sudan, Moreover, the transfer of the office
of the Adjutant General to Khartoum had resulted in difficulties in dealing
with the army matters in Cairo, '
Another point which Brunyate raised was that politically it would be
advantageous to Egypt if the Sudan could be separated from her for all
purposes, both military and financial, in the sense that it would look to
Britain rather than to Egypt for any garrison not locally raised and
for any necessary funds. In other words Brunyate was advocating the
revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Convention of 1899. According to him the
Convention was somewhat in the nature of an expedient, and after twenty
years it might be revised. Now that the Egyptian Nationalists were asking
for the definition of the status of the Protectorate, Brunyate suggested
that the opportunity should be taken to define more accurately the status
(2 )of the Sudan and Egypt's obligations with reference thereto, ^
Finally Brunyate referred to the question of the routine irrigation 
in the Sudan which the Sudan officials wanted to control locally. He 
said that even if a separate Department for the Sudan irrigation was 
created, there should be free inter-change of personnel between the 
Sudan and Egyptian Departments,
(1) FO 371/3722, Portions of Sir William Brunyate's Note relating to 




Stack agreed with Brunyate that there were difficulties in dealing
with military' matters in Cairo after the transfer of the Headquarters
Staff to Khartoum, But as the hulk of the Eg^/ptian army was in the Sudan,
its organisation and administration had to he governed mainly hy the needs
of that countr^ r. As regards the combination of the two offices in a single
hand it was convenient to follow the existing practice,
Stack also referred to the difficulties of separating the Sudan
militarily and financially from Egypt. Egypt paid for the Egyptian army
and the Sudan was not in a position to take on the cost of that army.
In Stack's view if the British Government could give assistance in this
respect a good case for a greater measure of separation could be put up.
As regards the irrigation question Stack did not agree with Brunyate'g
suggestion that there should be inter-changeability of personnel between
the two departments. He said that the conditions in the Sudan required
continuous study and this was not possible when the irrigation officials
(2 )from Egypt were changed frequently,' '
In a subsequent letter to Wingate, Stack pointed out several practical 
difficulties involved in the separation of the Sudan from E g y p t , I n  
the first place there was the scarcity of educated Sudanese to take the 
place of the Egyptians in the administration. In the second place the 
military needs of the Sudan would have to be supplied from Egypt, He 
explained that the revenues of the Sudan were sufficient to meet the civil 
needs of the country but without outside help the country could not yet 
pay for a sufficient military force. Finally there was the question of
(1) FO 371/3722, Stack to Wingate, 26th January 1919.
(2) Ibid,
(3) FO 371/3717, Stack to Wingate, 23rd February'' 1919 in Wingate to Curzon, 
26th March 1919.
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the Egyptian interests in the waters of the Nile, In any settlement of
the Sudan Egypt's interest in the Nile waters had to he taken into
consideration. Stack therefore suggested that the time had come to readjust
the relations between the Sudan and Egypt in such a way that British
should gradually take over the part in the Government of the Sudan
played by the Egyptian Government, The nationalist agitation in Egypt,
Stack added, afforded an opportunity as well as reason "to get rid of
much that is unsatisfactory in the present administration,*" '
Wingate shared Stack's views on the question of the future of the
Sudan, Early in April 1919 he wrote to Curzoiyemphasising the importance
of maintaining the British paramountcy in the Sudan, which might be
seriously affected if the Egj^ p^tian Nationalists gained their ends. He
suggested tliat Britain should definitely take over the Sudan and inflict
on the Nationalists in Egj'-pt, "who sou^t to gain their ends by lawlessness,
pillage and murder, the well deserved punishment ofühsing a country
which their mis government had forefeited many years ago and which would
(2)
never have been regained without British aid,"' '
In the meantime Stack was getting anxious over the British silence 
on the developments in Egypt, In Ifey he wrote again to Wingate that he 
had no idea what the British policy would be in regard to the future 
government of Egypt, Vftiatever line the British Government might take, he 
i\Tote, it would affect the Sudan, As the Sudanese were growing nervous 
that Britain was about to leave the country, or at any rate would admit 
a larger measure of Egyptian control over the Sudan, Stack desired that 
the Sudan should not be placed under Egypt:in any settlement with the
(1) EO 371/3717, Stack to Wingate, 23rd February 1919, in Wingate to 
Curzon, 26th March 1919.
(2) FO 371/3711, Wingate to Curzon, 3^d April 1919.
1 9 ?
Egyptian Nationalists, If the Sudan was placed under Egyptian control,
Stack pointed out that the position of the Governor-General would become
most difficult and a way would be prepared for either Pan-Islamism or
fraternization with the Egyptians as the only alternatives left open to
( 1 )the people of the Sudan,' ^
In order to reassure the Sudanese leaders and to cement the friend­
ship between them and Britain, Stack proposed in I-Iay 1919 to send a ^
Sudanese deputation to London consisting of Sayyid 'Ali al-Mr^ani,
Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi and ^arif Yusuf al-Eindialong with official
(2)
and tribal representatives,' ' The Foreign Office approved the proposal 
and the delegation visited London in July 1919 and was received by the 
King,The visit of the Sudanese delegation to London was much criticised 
by the Egyptian Nationalists,But it helped the Sudan Government to 
come closer to the religious leaders and the tribal Shaykhs who now 
found themselves more dependent upon Government support.
Meanwhile, the Foreign Office was studying the question of the Sudan,
All the information they had received from the Sudan officials showed 
that the only fear of the Sudanese was that the British might abandon 
them. It was suggested that a telegram should be sent to Stack authorizing 
him to reassure the Sudanese that the British connection with their 
country would c o n t i n u e , B u t  before the telegram was sent, Mr, J,
(1) FO 371/3711?- Stack to Wingate, 8th I^Iay 1919 in Wingate to Curzon,
4th July 1919.
(2) FO 371/3711 ; Stack to Wingate, 8th I%y 1919 in Wingate to Curzon,
4th June 1919.
(3) See Muddathir 'Abd al-Rahira: Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan, 
PP, 99-101, Oxford University Press 1969,
(4) FO 371/3716, FO Minutes on Allenby to FO, No, 733, 8th May 1919.
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Murray^^^ and Mr, J, de V, Loder^^^ submitted a joint memorandum suggesting 
an outline of a future British policy on Egypt^^\ Writing on the Egyptian 
army, Mr, Murray pointed out that with the exception of about two battalions, 
the whole of the Egyptian army was normally stationed in the Sudan, The 
cost of the maintenance of this army fell on the Egyptian Treasury and 
represented thereby a disguised subsidy to the Sudan Government, The 
Egyptian Chamber would view this arrangement%avourably if the rapid 
development of the Sudan should enable its Government to meet the cost 
of defence from its own resources. If a miliàary separation were then 
effected, the Sudan could easily find sufficient recruits for its own 
purposes and apart from the Sultan’s bodyguard no real necessity would 
any longer exist for an Egyptian army at all. The maintenance of a small 
Egjrptian force, in Murray's opinion, would satisfy the Egyptians and 
these troops might be brigaded with the British units in Egypt" under 
a British commander to form an "Egyptian defence force", thus eliminating 
the objectionable "Army of Occupation", The administration of each 
section of the force would be under the British and Egyptian War Offices 
respectively, but unity would be preserved if the Commander of the British 
Contingent was also Sirdar of the Egyptian army. He would report directly 
to the British War Office on all matters of general military policy. 
According to Murray the Sudan would be freed from all the ties
(1) Head of the Egyptian Section of the Eastern Department of the 
Foreign Office,
(2) Mr. Loder was in the Foreign Office Service,
(5) EO 371/3722, Memorandum on the Future of Egypt by Mr, J, Murray 
prepared for the Foreign Office, 23rd January 1920,
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which united her to Egypt once it had achieved economic independence 
and the withdrawal of the purely Egyptian (fallah) troops. The Governor- 
General could then deal directly with the Colonial Office instead of 
reporting through the Residency, Though there was no need to revise the 
Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, Murray suggested that the British policy 
should he to strengthen British connections with the Sudan whilst relaxing 
those with Egypt, Under Murray’s plan the legal status of Egypt would he 
complete independence hut- she would be bound by a treaty to have a 
permanent British Secretary for Foreign Affairs and War and a British 
military force in the country.
Whilst the Foreign Office was still discussing Mr, %rray’s memo­
randum on the future of Egypt, Allenby, who was on a tour of Inspection 
of the Sudan,informed the Foreign Office that the time had come when the 
British Government should settle definitely the status and future of the 
Sudan and its relation to the British Empire, He quoted Stack as saying 
that the direct effect of the war and the Nationalist agitation for 
independence in Egypt was the rapid growth among the Sudanese of the idea 
of Sudan as a nation, Allenby warned that failure to give an advantageous 
outlet to the existing enthusiasm and excitement by defining the position 
of the Sudan as under British care would sooner or later lead to trouble. 
He added that many of the men of 22 and under would make a good soil for 
the planting of nationalist or revolutionary ideas' once the influence 
of the elders began to decline,
He also informed the Foreign Office that he had invited Ld tlilner 
and the members of his Mission, who had arrived in Egypt in December 1919, 
to enquire into the causes of the late disorders in Eg^ '-pt, to visit the
(l) PO 371/4983, Message from Allenby in Cheetham to Curzon, Tel, No: 119, 
10th February 1920,
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Sudan, In response to his invitation Gen, rlaxwell and Sir Owen Thomas 
were expected to visit the Sudan, He considered the following points 
were essential for the proper definition of the Sudan*é future status:-
1, An agreement between Great Britain and Egypt under which Great 
Britain would guarantee to secure Egypt’s water supply and the 
Sudan frontier on condition tliat Britain should have unfettered 
control of the entire internal affairs of the Sudan,
2, Separation of the offices of Governor-General and Sirdar of the 
Egyptian amgr.
According to Allenhy, in the existing undefined position, it was 
always possible if Egypt obtained a greater measure of independence, that
ACL
a Prime Minister might give orders to^Sirdar and Governor-General with 
which it might be impossible to comply. He therefore suggested the 
appointment of a Sirdar of the Egyptian array with his residence in Cairo, 
while the Governor-General of the Sudan would be Commander-in-Chief of all t 
troops in that country, the British or Egyptian Government paying a 
contribution for the maintenance of their troops in the Sudan,
In a Foreign Office Minute, Mr, î-îurray noted that Allenby’s proposals 
were very serious. He agreed with Allenby that the germs of future 
trouble from the new and partially educated generation already existed 
and that the situation would need careful handling if political agitation 
was to be avoided. However, he felt that in view of the vast extent of 
the country and its very small population, the conception of the Sudanese 
nationality could not be deep rooted; besides, the widely different 
characteristics of the inhabitants of the Sudan militated against national 
unity.
He agreed that from the Sudan * : point of view the moment was ripe 
for a more precise definition of its status and its relation to the
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British Empire, But this would make it difficult to come to terms with 
the Egyptian Nationalists who were preaching, as an afterthought, the 
essential unity of the two countries, Itoray noted that if the settlement 
of the two countries became impracticable then the British Government 
might have justification for dissolving the Anglo-Egyptian Convention, 
as desired by the Sudanese, regardless of the protests of the Egyptian 
Nationalists,
Murray further added that in any settlement with Egypt some such
guarantees as suggested by Allenby would be required. But he pointed
out that the Egyptian army really represented a disguised subvention to
the Sudan Government and that if Egypt was to be definitely debarred
from interference in the Sudan it would not be fair to expect her to
continue contributing to its defence. Since the Sudan could scarcely
bear the cost even of a small army, the British Treasury would be called
upon to carry on the Subvention withheld by Egypt,
A paraphrase of Allenby’s letter was sent to Wingate, and his
opinion was invited on the political consequence in Egypt of a Sudan 
( 1 )settlement,^ ' Wingate replied that everything depended on what the
British Government's decision would be in regard to the future status of
(2)Egypt under the Protectorate,^  ^Wingate made it clear that the principal 
difficulty was financial, Egypt paid for the army and the Sudan was not 
yet ready to bear this extra charge « He said that it could be argued 
that Egyptian misgovemment having been responsible for the loss of the 
Sudan in 1883-85 and its recovery having been made possible throu^
(1) W.P., Box 258/8; also
EO 371/4985; Hardinge to Wingate, 20th Eeb, 1920,
(2) EG 371/4983; Wingate to Hardinge, r(_st March 1920,
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British arms, the British Government had decided that in giving a 
certain amount of self-government to Egypt, the administration of the 
Sudan should he undertaken solely by Britain who would then become 
definitely responsible for safeguarding the southern frontier of Egypt 
and guaranteeing its water supply. In return for these safeguards, Egypt 
should pay a fixed sum - such a sum might be calculated on the extra 
cost to the Sudan Government necessitated by the transference of the 
Government from an Anglo-Egyptian to a purely British administration.
He said that there would be protests in Egypt, "but the sop to their 
vanity by a concession of a measure of self-government for Eg'’"pt (to be 
with-held if they refused to accept the new arrangement as regards the 
Sudan) would achieve the desired result provided that it was put forvjard 
with firmness,"
However, Wingate thought that the solution of the Sudan question 
could be greatly simplified if the British Government would guarantee 
the necessary funds for the payment of the military forces required for 
the adequate garrisoning of the Sudan; but there would be some difficulty 
in reconciling the British taxpayer to this extra charge unless it was 
made clear that the development of the Sudan, especially in regard to 
cotton cultivation, would amply justify the additional financial burden.
As soon as any definite pronouncement of future Egyptian policy was 
made, a simultaneous pronouncement that the Sudan would be entirely 
divorced from the Egyptian control would give complete satisfaction to 
8.11 classes of Sudanese,
As regards the separation of the offices of Governor-General and 
Sirdar, Wingate said that if the existing political system was continued 
then there was no need to make any change. If on the other hand a measure 
of self-government was given to Egypt, this should be made the occasion
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to divorce the Sudan from Egypt and in that case the two offices should 
be sépara,ted.
In a P.O. Minute ÎMaïrray pointed out that Allenby’s recommendations
( 1 ^were the logical outcome of Wingate’s own policy. ' One aspect of the 
case, Murray noted, which Wingate had not touched upon was that when
the Egyptian battalions had been withdrawn from the Sudan, they might be
rather a nuisance in Egypt where there were no barracks accommodation 
available. Another point was that there would be no logical necessity 
for an Egyptian army at all, Murray felt that the Foreign Office need
not take any action till Milner had submitted his Report,
In the meantime Mr, Keown-Boyd, the Oriental Secretary in the 
British High Commission in Egypt, submitted a Report on the future
( 2)military organisation of the Sudan,^  ^ His Report was based on three 
parts. The first part, with which we are concerned, dealt with the Array, 
leesubSivided this under the following headings
1, Scheme for the elimination of the Egyptian personnel serving 
in the Sudan,
2, Note on the disbandment of the l6th and 17th%yptian battalions,
5 , Composition of the Sudan Army.
4, Distribution of the Egyptian army in the Sudan,
There were five Egyptian battalions, three field batteries besides 
two garrison companies of Artillery and various technical departmental 
troops serving with the Sudanese and Arab units. In addition to these 
there was the Railway battalion, 2500 strong, stationed at Atbara, It
(1) PO 371/4983? EO Minutes by J^ îurray dt, 4th March 1920 on Wingate 
to Hardinge, 1st March 1920,
(2) PO 371/4984? Mr, Keown-Boyd to Allenby, 14th March 1920 in 
Allenby to Curzon, No: 293? Confidential, 24th March 1920,
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was, in fact, the Engineer Corps of the Egyptian arnç’^, hut was paid for 
by the Sudan, According to Keown-Bo^rd’s scheme the Egyptian element of 
the army in the Sudan could be gradually eliminated in three phases.
The first phase was:-
1, Move the 17th battalion to Egypt and there disband it along 
with the I6th battalion. These two battalions were raised during the 
war as a war measure and the necessity therefore for their further 
retention had ceased to exist after the war,
2, Move the 5th battalion to Egypt,
3, Move one field battery to Egypt,
4, Convert the '^rd. and 4th battalions from British to Egyptian 
command. These two battalions were attached to the Eg^rptian Expeditionary 
Force and were employed with RAF and at Solium respectively,
5, Start enlisting natives of the Sudan into Medical and Veterinary 
Corps and into Artillery (garrison companies) for service in southern 
stations,
6, Start enlisting Sudanese for a military works departments,
7, Gradually reduce the establishment of the Cairo Military School,
8, Make arrangements for the employment of surplus Egyptian officers 
in the administration of Egypt,
9* Arrange with the British Military authorities to hand over the 
Red Barracks in Cairo to the Egyptian army,
10, Hand over the Egyptian army barracks at Port Sudan and Atbara to 
British control and garrison these v/ith British troops.
The above would leave three battalions and two batteries of Egyptians 
in the Sudan apart from the Departmental Personnel,
The second and third phases would then follow:-
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The Second Phase
1. Move the 8th battalion to Egypt on the release of the IX Sudanese 
from Darfur,
2, Move one Field battery to Egypt,
3, Raise an Arab macliine gun battery,
4. Raise an extra Idara western Arab Corps,
The Third Phase
1, Bring an extra British half battalion to Khartoum temporarily.
This would be required until such time as the newly raised Arab battalion 
could take over duties in Khartoum, If, however, an Air Section was posted 
in the Sudan, it would according to K-Boyd, be^necessary to ask for the 
additional half British battalion.
2, Move the 1st and 2nd battalions to Egypt,
3, Move one field battery to Egypt,
4, Raise one Arab battalion and one field battery,
5, Continue the process of substituting natives of the Sudan for 
Egyptians in all Departments and Army Services,
6, Raise Labour Companies at Khartoum and the Sudan,
The Railway Battalion
According to K-Boyd it was a very difficult matter to dispense with 
this battalion. He proposed in the first place to reduce its strength to 
2000, Deficiencies of labour would have to be supplied by contract men.
The next step would be to raise 500 old soldiers^^^ as railway police, 
and a further 500 men for various duties. Once these were raised the 
battalion could be reduced to 1000, K-Boyd was not sure how these 1000
(l) Reservists from Black battalions.
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could be replaced. The lines from Abu Hamid to Haifa and from Abu Hamid 
to Kereima and a good part of the line from Atbara to Port Sudan passed 
through the desert. The Station Staff and permanent way patrols on these 
stretches of line were men from the railway battalion. Unfortunately the 
Sudanese and Arabs could not be induced to go voluntarily to a desert 
station, K-Boyd saw no solution of the desert station problem, but he 
added that there could be no danger from Egyptian soldiers engaged on 
this duty.




4* Companies Mounted Infantry
1 Mounted Machine Gun Company
Motor Unit
1 Motor Machine Gun Battery
Artillery
1 Field Battery
2 Machine gun batteries
2 t w  garrison Artillery Companies
Infantry
1 Battalion British Infantry
( 1 ')7 Sudanese battalions' ^
1 Arab battalion 
Equatorial Battalion




(1) The Camel Corps consisting of;- 
2 Camel Companies
1 Company Mounted Infantry 
1 Idara Infantry,
(2) Eastern Arab Corps consisting of:- 
1 Camel Company
1 Section Field Artillery 
4 Idara Infantry
1 Depot Company,
(3) The Western Arab Corps consisting of;-
2 Companies Mounted Infantry 
1 Section Field Artillery
1 Section Garrison Artillery 
4 Idaras Infantry.
Mr, K-Boyd was convinced that the result of his scheme when 
completed would constitute a Sudan Army, The cost of the Sudan army would 
ultimately be fE 800,000 a year. He did not fix any time limit for the
completion of the phases but he said that Stack was anxious to begin
the first phase at once; and this could be carried out within the next 
few months without arising serious comments in Egypt,
According to Murray, who examined the Report, Keown-Boyd’s tliree 
phases were workable from the Sudan point of view. ButKëcM^-Boyd had
I if '
considered neither the effect of these moves on Egypt nor the problem 
of paying the Sudan army,^ But Murray agreed that the question of
(1) FO 371/4984? FO Minute by Murray, 10th April 1920, on Allenby to 
Curzon, No: 293, 24th March 1920,
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disbanding the l6th and 17th battalions and the transfer of the 3^d and 
the 4th battalions from British to Egyptian command could in any case be 
considered.
Meanwhile Ld Milner and the members of his Mission had left Egypt
in March 1920 and reached London about the middle of April to draw up
their Report, The Mission had difficulties in meeting most of the
Nationalist leaders. But they had succeeded in collecting sufficient
material for the Report, Fortunately, before the final report was written,
Za^lul Pasha, who had been living in Paris, agreed to meet Lord Milner
and the members of the Mission, and a meeting was arranged in London on
7th June, Conversations between Milner and Za#ilul lasted"till the middle
of August and a memorandum was agreed upon which laid down in general terms
the main features of the settlement. This document which came to be known
as MiIner-Zaghlul- Agreement was in fact merely an outline of the basis on
(2)which Milner hoped an agreement mi^t subsequently be framed, ^
The Sudan was not mentioned in the memorandum but Milner, while
handing it over to Adli Pasha, who had arranged the meeting, recorded in
a separate letter that the Sudan was not discussed during the conversations
between himself and Za-gilul and that it lay outside the scope of the
that
proposed agreement with Egypt, He further noted/there was a wide difference 
in conditions between the two countries and that they should be dealt with 
on different lines. The Sudan had made progress under the existing
(1) In January 1921 the transfer of the two battalions to Egyptian command 
was carried out,(FO 371/&316, FO to Allenby, Tel, No:102, 27th January 
1921) and in March the XV Sudanese and the 17th Egyptian battalions 
were disbanded,
(2) FO 371/4978? Report of the Special Mission to Egypt in Milner to 
Curzon, 9th December 1928,
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administration and no change in the political status of Egypt should be
allowed to disturb the further development of the country. However, he,
assured the Nationalists that the Mission would make proposals which would
protect Egypt’s vital interests in the supply of water reaching her througii
the S u d a n , M i l n e r  further clarified the status of the Sudan in his
final Report, As regards the distribution of the Nile waters, he proposed
that a permanent Commission should be set up, composed on the one hand
of experts and on the other hand of the representatives of all the countries
affected - Egypt, the Sudan and Uganda -, to settle all questions affecting
(2)the regulation of the river,' ' Milner added that the contiguity of Egypt 
and the Sudan and their common interests in the Nile made it desirable 
that some political nexus between the two countries should be maintained 
but this connection should not take the form of the subjection of the 
Sudan to Egypt, According to Milner, it was too early to determine the 
ultimate political status of the Sudan, Hence the existing system as 
defined by the Convention of 1899 was sufficient as it provided the 
necessary political connection between Egypt and the Sudan,
Regarding the Egyptian army, Milner noted that the military forces 
in the Sudan were all paid for by Egypt, Hitherto the Govemor-Generalship 
of the Sudan and the Command-in-Chief of the Egyptian army had been 
united in one person. He felt that this arrangement was indefensible on 
a permanent basis. He therefore recommended that at the first opportunity, 
a Civil Governor-General should be appointed and the Sirdar of the 
Egyptian army with his Headquarters Staff should be transferred to Egypt* 
Milner also wanted the question to be considered whether those
(1) PO 571/4979; Milner’s letter to Adli Pasha; dt.'iBth August 1920,
in E.M.B, Ingram ( (PO) P.S. to Chairman) to Mr, Murray, dt, 20th August 
1920.
(2) Ethiopia was not suggested in the report and the British, behind the 
masks of Sudan and Uganda, would presumably have a permanent majority.
210
regiments of the Egyptian array which were composed of Egyptians should 
not he hrou^t hack to Egypt and the remaining Sudanese regiments converted 
into local gendamerie. In his view, the duties which the Sudanese regiments 
were required to discharge were those of a gendarmerie, rather than those 
of an army proper. A strong striking force could he maintained at the 
centre but for the rest, order and security would be maintained better 
by a number of bodies locally recruited and commanded by British officers. 
This would facilitate recruiting, as it would be much easier to get men 
to serve in their own districts than in a force which might be employed 
far away.
Finally Milner recorded that it should be the aim of the British 
policy to relieve Egypt from any financial responsibility for the Sudan 
and to establish the relations of the two countries for the future upon 
a basis wliich would secure the independent development of the Sudan while 
safeguarding the vital interests of Egypt in the waters of the Nile.
In a memorandum on the Egyptian Proposals of Milner, Curzon discussed.
Cl )
among other things, the future of the Sudan.' ' He said that according 
to Milner Egj^pt’s interest in the Sudan was fourfold; (1) Her life was 
dependent on the water which flowed down or tlirough the Sudan; (2) The 
Sudan Civil Service was largely filled by Egyptians; (5) The Sudan army was 
part of the Egyptian army, and (4) Egypt paid the deficit in the Sudan 
budget. Under these circumstances, Curzon said that the Sudan could not be 
omitted from the Treaty with Egypt, His reasons were that Egypt would 
insist upon its inclusion; that Egyptian finances were involved; and 
finally it was in the British interest to settle its future by agreement 
with the Egyptian Government, Milner had advocated continuance of the
(1) PO 571/6295» Memorandum by Curzon on Milner's Egyptian proposals; 
11th October 1920,
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Anglo-Egyptian Convention of 1899 but Curzon pointed out the difficulties
in maintaining a position in which, while Egyptian participation both in
the Civil Service and the army v;as expected to dwindle rapidly and
disappear, Egyptian revenues were to continue to bear considerable cliarge,
Curzon therefore suggested that Egypt should continue to bear the expense
as a price for the water that she would enjoy; and moreover, that part
of the price she must pay for the withdrawal of the British garrison
from Egypt was the withdrawal of the Egyptian garrison from the Sudan,
He made it clear that the complete political and military independence
of the Sudan was the ulterior object which British interests demanded.
Before taking any action on the Miner Report, Curzon informed
Allenby that the British Government would like to discuss the future of
Eg^ rpt with an Egyptian delegation. He was asked to arrange the despatch
Cl')
of the delegation and also to give his own opinion on the Report, '
\Ih±le Egypt was preparing to send a delegation to London, further
discussions inihe Foreign Office resulted in a memorandum by Mr, Cooper
in which he summarised the various points which would have to be decided
C 2 )
in a political settlement with Egypt,'  ^ As regards the future of the 
Sudan he noted that the Anglo-Egyptian Convention of 1899 should be 
reaffirmed though it would be better simply to say nothing, thereby 
leaving the Convention in full operation; a conservation Board should 
be set up to approve reservoir projects and arrange for the distribution 
of the Nile waters; Egypt should undertake to contribute towards the 
expenses of policing the Sudan either by providing men, i,e, the 
Egyptian army, or by providing the money - a million pounds p,a, -
(1) FO 571/6292, Curzon to Allenby, Tel, No:15; 6th January 1921,
(2) FO 571/6295; A Memorandum by Duff Cooper on a Treaty with Egypt; 
26th April 1921,
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According to Cooper the second alternative was preferable.
As many of the points involved consultations with other Departments, 
a Conference was arranged on 9th June 1921 to discuss the proposed treaty 
with Egypt. Representatives from the Army Council, the Admiralty and the 
Air Ministry participated in the discussions.
On 5th July 1921, Sir L, Worthington-Evans, Secretary of State for 
War, pointed out in a memorandum to the Foreign Office that Milner had 
said that the military forces employed in the Sudan were large and that 
in the Mission’s opinion the reorganization of the military forces should 
be reconsidered in order to reduce the financial burden upon Egypt, If 
this was the British Government's policy, a large extra charge would be 
thrown upon the Imperial Exchequer, Though it was generally known in semi­
official circles that Egypt would not give up her share in the duty of
Cl)
garrisoning the Sudan, he wanted this point to be made clear,' '
The Foreign Office minuted that the question of the defence of the 
Sudan and the provision of Barracks for the British forces in Egypt 
would depend on the extent to which the Egyptian delegation would accept 
the proposed treaty,' ^
At a meeting of the Cabinet, held on 11th July 1921 a draft of the 
Treaty with Egypt was c ons i d e r e d , A s regards the Sudan, the Cabinet 
came to the conclusion that thou^ the country was a liability at the 
time, it was potentially an asset to the Empire, It was therefore recorded 
that the peaceful development of the Sudan being essential to the security
■ ■ ■ ■' '        ■ "   —             ■
(1) FO 571/6299, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War, 5th July 1921,
(2) Ibid, FO Minutes.
(5) FO 571/6301 ; Conclusions of a meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Dotming 
Street, on Monday the 11th July 1921,
213
of Egypt and for the maintenance of her water supply, Egypt should under­
take to continue to afford the Sudan Government the same military assistance 
as in the past, or in lieu thereof, to provide the Sudan Government with 
financial assistance to an extent to be agreed upon between the two 
Governments. All Egyptian forces in the Sudan should be under the orders 
of the Governor-General,
During the same month the Egyptian delegation arrived in London 
under the leadership of Adli Pasha, The conversations lasted for nearly ^ 
four months, but the future status of the Sudan was never discussed. It 
was soon clear that the chances of the delegates agreeing to the draft 
Treaty were slender. In fact the negotiations broke down and Adli Pasha 
returned to Egypt' ^ and resigned on 12th December 1921,
Meanwhile Allenby who had gone to London to participate in the 
Negotiations had returned to Egypt early in November and on the 17th 
informed the Foreign Office that any decision which did not admit the
principle of Egyptian independence and vAiich maintained the Protectorate
C2)
involved a serious risk of a revolution in Egypt,' ' He anticipated 
that Adli Pasha would resign but promised to help form a Ministry if the 
British Government could formulate a more acceptable programme. Further 
telegrams were exchanged between Curzon and Allenby, examining various 
proposals to solve the Egj'-ptian crisis. Finally on the 12th January 
Allenby informed Curzon that he wished to communicate to the Sultan a 
letter bearing the following proposals'^;-
(l) That HMG should propose to Parliament the termination of the
(1) FO 371/6301, Egyptian Negotiations, 1921,
(2) FO 371/7730; Allenby to FO; Tel, Nos: 628 and 629; in the FO Minute
by Mr, Murray reviewing events in Egypt,
(3) EO 371/7730, Allenby's proposed letter to the Sultan in Allenby to FO;
Tel, No: 19; 12th January 1922,
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Protectorate.
(2) Revive the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
(3) Favour the election of native Parliament,
(4) Agree to the abolition of Martial Law,
As soon as the above had been carried out Allenby wanted the British 
Government to undertake in concert with the Egyptian Government to examine 
the conclusion of an agreement on the folloVing:-
(a) Security of communications ,
(b) Defence of Eg^ rpt,
(c) Protection of foreign interests and minorities in Egypt,
(d) The Sudan,
Allenby added that his proposals were the result of exhaustive 
negotiations with Sarwat Pasha who was willing to form a Ministry,
Curzon agreed that the first part of Allenby's proposals was not in 
excess of anything that the British Government was prepared to make. But 
he was afraid that once the first part was accepted, Egypt would then be 
an independent country and the Ministers might refuse or hinder negotiations 
on any or all the reserved points and might even threaten to resign if 
they did not get their way,
On 25th January 1922 Allenby urged the Foreign Office to take immediate 
and conciliatory action on lines suggested by him. This time he offered to
(2)resign if his proposals were not accepted,' ' He hinted that the British 
Advisers in Egypt might also resign along with him.
(1) FO 371/7730; Memorandum by Curzon, Secret, C.P. 36l6; l6th January 1922,
(2) FO 371/773O; Allenby to FO; T.No: 31; 25th January 1922,
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British
The/Cahinet on the 26th and 27th January discussed the situation in 
Egypt, Curzon informed the meeting that he was told that if Allenby 
resigned he would be followed by his British Advisers and if this happened 
there would be a complete dislocation of Government in Egypt, The Cabinet 
then decided that Allenby should come to London and report to the Cabinet 
the situation in Egypt, In the meantime he should not take any action on 
his proposed letter to the Sultan,
Allenby arrived in London in February and at a meeting held on the 
15th which was attended by Lloyd George and Curzon he convinced them 
that the time for a Treaty with Eg^ p^t had passed and that Britain would 
have to make an unilateral declaration oh lines suggested by him. He
( 2 )said that he would resign if his advice was not taken,' ' There was now 
no alternative but to take his advice, Allenby was therefore authorized 
to go back to Egypt and communicate the declaration to the Sultan by 
which Egypt was declared an independent sovereign State subject to 
certain reservations. This was done on the 28th,
The Sudan question had defied solution once again. The main question 
facing the Sudan Government immediately after the termination of the First 
World War was how to separate the Sudan from Egypt without openly declaring 
it as their policy. Both Wingate during his long tenure of office as 
Governor-General and Sirdar and Stack after him strongly advised the 
British Foreign Office to take advantage of the political disturbances 
in Egypt to bring the Sudan more exclusively under British control. The
(1) FO 371/7730? Conclusions of the Meetings of the Cabinet held on 26th 
and 27th Januarjr 1922,
(2) FO 371/7731 ; Memorandum of the Conversation between Prime Minister, 
Curzon and Allenb^ r? 15th February 1922,
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conditions in the Sudan during this period were favourable for such a 
move. The religious leaders, who between them controlled the loyalty of 
the Sudanese, or at least of the older generation, had thrown their 
influence on the side of the Government, The younger generation had not 
yet come to the forefront. They were still under the influence of their 
elders though most of them considered Egypt as a centre of Islamic civi­
lization, The war and nationalist agitation in Egypt had instilled in them 
the idea of Sudan as a nation. The British officials in the Sudan were 
therefore anxious tliat before this idea gained ground and whilst the 
influence of the elders lasted, Britain should decide the future status 
of the Sudani-
The only disturbing faster!, in the Sudan at this time was the Egyptian 
element in the country. The Egyptian civilian population in itself was 
innocuous, but the Egyptian officials and the junior officers of the 
Egyptian army constituted the main danger to security in the country. The 
Sudan Government could do little to solve this problem, Egypt paid for 
the army and the revenue of the Sudan was not sufficient to meet the 
expense of a force of its own. This was a larger problem and had to be 
solved by agreement between Britain and Egypt, Stack was therefore anxious 
that in any Agreement between Britain and Egypt, the Sudan should not be 
placed under Egypt,
Britain, however, failed to produce a formula which would satisfy 
both the Egyptian Nationalists aspirations and protect the British 
interests in Egypt, Finally under threat of resignation, Allenby forced 
the British Government to announce the Declaration of February 1922 by 
which Egypt was given her independence but with certain reservations.
The Sudan was one of the reserved subjects; but t>iis satisfied neither
c n
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the Sudanese nor the Egyptians, order to reassure the Sudanese and 
more to satisfy Stack who had been asking for an official declaration 
by the British Government, Me, Lloyd George announced in Parliament, 
on the same day that Egypt was given independence, that the British 
Government would never allow the progress which had been made in the 
Sudan and the greater promise of future years to be jeopardised, "His 
Government would never agree to any change in the Sudan which would in 
the slightest degree diminish security for the British capital in its 
development,"
The declaration let loose a storm of protest in Egypt, Until now 
the Sudan had not figured prominently in the Egyptian Nationalist demands. 
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Lloyd George’s speech in the House of Commons on the 28th February 
1922 created a considerable stir, amongst the Egyptian nationalists.
Until now the Sudan had played a secondary part in the Nationalist 
Movement in Egypt, though attempts were made throu^ junior Egyptian 
officers and officials, then stationed in the Sudan,to seduce the 
Sudanese notables into joining the Egyptians in demanding independence 
for the whole of the Nile Valley, Anonymous pamphlets were smuggled 
into the Sudan emphasising the unity of the two countries and calling 
for the Sudanese support for ejecting the British from both the 
c o u n t r i e s , N o w  that Britain had officially declared her intentions 
to stay in the Sudan, apparently at the request of the Sudanese people, 
the Egyptian Nationalists intensified their activities in the Sudan 
where they had already formed Leagues and Societies to promote their 
cause•
In Egypt itself Rushdi Pasha, as Chairman of the Sub-Committee of
the Constitution Commission, wanted to include in the Constitution
clauses to the effect that the Sudan constituted an integral part of
Egypt to whose sovereignty and King it was subject; that its form of
Government should be settled by a special statute; and that the King of
(2)
Egypt should assume the title of King of Egypt and the Sudan, ' '
Allenby immediately informed Sarwat Pasha, the Egyptian Prime
Minister, that the British Government would not approve any unilateral
declaration by Egypt on the Sudan, The future of the Sudan was one of the
( 5 )
Reserved subjects and no change in status of the Sudan was permissible' 
After considerable correspondence, Allenby forced the Sultan on
(1) PO 371/6524, Intelligence Report, No: 3I6, November 1920,
(2) FO 371/7735, Allenby to FO, Tel, No: 174 (R), 8th May 1922,
(3) IMd.
2 20
3rd February 1923 to accept the modified clauses relating to the Sudan
Cl)
which left the future of the Sudan to be decided later,' '
The future of the Sudan, however, continued to figure prominently
in the Egyptian Press, Eveirj?- conceivable subject of grievance wa.s seized
upon in the hope of stirring up trouble among different classes of the
Sudanese, The religious prejudices of Muslims and the personal grievances
of dissatisfied officials were alike appealed to. The idea of the Sudan
for the Sudanese was fostered in places where it found favour, while
simultaneously the unity of Egypt and the Sudan was preached in quarters
where such a prospect might be popular.
The Egyptian propaganda affected the different classes of the
Sudanese in different ways. The religious chiefs and tribal Shaykhs
supported the continuance of British rule in the Sudan, Sayyid »Ali al-
Mir^ani had already expressed his desire to Stack that Sudanese nationalism
(2)
should develop under British guidance, '  ^ in this al-Minj^iani was supported 
by ’Abd al-Rahman and other chiefs and their followers. The Sudan Government 
looked to this group for support and with their collaboration hoped to 
govern the country.
Apart from this groupwwhich was solidly behind the government, there 
were other elements who were to cause considerable anxiety to the Sudan 
authorities. First a new generation had risen, small but vocal and 
possessing influence out of proportion to its numbers. This was the 
generation referred to by Allenby which had to be guarded against,
They had ideas and aspirations and had acquired definite conceptions as
(1) FO 371/8959, Allenby to PO, No,55, 3rd February 1923.
(2) See Oh, 7.
(3) See Oh, 7.
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regards rights and national development and were in a mood which made 
them responsive to the promptings, subversive or otherv/ise, of any one 
who could show them a way to the realisation of their desires. To them 
Cairo was the centre of intellectual progress and the freedom oy Press 
and the bold speeches of the politicians were evidences of liberty and 
courage.
The second group on wliich the nationalists worked upon was that of
the native officers, mostly blacks. They posed an even more difficult
problem than the educated class with whom they shared the ideas as rega^ rds
the future of the Sudan, They were in complete touch with the civilian
population and their position as officers rendered them to a great extent
free from supervision. It was from among these ranks that ’Ali jâbd-al
Latif arose who first published a pamphlet entitled "the claims of the
(1)Sudanese Nation",' ' In this he claimed the right of the Sudanese to 
choose their own ruler and according to him the ruler should be one of 
the Sharifs, His arrest and imprisonment in May 1922 threw him into the 
arms of the Egyptian nationalists, under whose influence^after his 
release a year later, he founded the League of the v/hite Flag,
The intensification of the Egyptian propaganda in the Sudan and its 
effect on the different classes of the Sudanese since the independence of 
Egypt created a new situation in the Sudan, During his visit to England 
in October 192-3 Stack discussed some of his difficulties with Curzon, 
particularly those connected with the Egyptian army. Later in a memorandum 
he explained that under the new Egyptian constitution it was provided 
that no more foreign officials were to be appointed in the Egyptian
(l) FO 371/7735; H.W, Jackson to Allenby, No,6 6; 29th June 1922 in 
Allenby to Balfour, No,560; 15th July 1922,
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Government without the sanction of the Council of Ministers,' ' Hë 
added that the Egj’^ptian Minister of War wanted to apply this principle 
to the personnel of the Egyptian army, which was in the higher and more 
responsible appointments officered by the British officers. On being 
told that in most cases Egyptians were in command of all Egyptian (fallah) 
units of the Egyptian Army, the Minister had expressed his wish to 
replace British officers by Egyptians in the Arab and black units of the 
Egyptian army also. Stack added that in his dual capacity as Sirdar and 
Governor-General he was responsible to both the British Government and 
the Egyptian Government for public security in the Sudan, According to 
him the replacement of British officers by Eg^rptians would impair the 
efficiency of the Egyptian army stationed in the Sudan, He further added 
that as Sirdar and a paid ser^ /ant of the Egyptian Government, he might 
be asked to carr;;,’- out orders which as Governor-General he might consider 
dangerous to the security of the country. Stack therefore wanted the Foreign 
Office to prevent Egyptian Ministry from interfering in the affairs of 
the Sudan,
In a covering memorandum Mr, Murray agreed with Stack that the 
Egyptian Government could embarass him in his capacity as Sirdar of the
Egyptian army and could drive him into a position in which he would have
(?) E^ptian
to consider resignation,'^' lîurray added that the An^lp/Convention clause
which laid down that, "the supreme military and civil command in the
Sudan shall be vested in one officer, termed the Governor-General of the
(1) FO 371/8991? Stack to Mr, J. Murray, 11th October 1923.
(2) Î M d .
(3) Ibid; FO Klnutes by Murray dt, 30th October 1923,
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Sudan", had led to the Governor-General being also Sirdar of the Egyptian 
army. This implied, according to Murray, that the Governor-General should 
be a soldier of some standing with a knowledge of Arabic, If Stack were 
to die, Murray continued, there would be no military officer in the Sudan 
at the time who could be considered suitable as a successor to Stack, 
Murray thought that this difficulty could be got over by appointing a, 
distinguished soldier who had had previous service with the Egyptian army. 
But he pointed out that the Egyptian Government was not under treaty 
obligation to appoint a British Sirdar and might.appoint an Egyptian 
Sirdar without infringing the letter of 1899 Convention, The Egyptian 
Government could also refuse to pass, or could reduce, the budgetary 
provision for the Egyptian arn^ in the Sudan,
After discussing the question of financial liabilities in case of 
a rupture with Egypt over the Sudan, Murray added that the Sudan was more 
essential to Britain than was Egypt, and that the British Treasury had 
already guaranteed Sudan loans. Under these circumstances there was no 
going back and if no satisfactory arrangement could be reached with 
Egypt, then, according to I^rray, annexation was the only alternative.
Such a step would lead to anti-British feelings in Egypt,
The Foreign Office then sent Stack’s memorandum id.th Murray’s 
covering memorandum to the War Office and the Treasurer for their remarks. 
In reply the War Office said that they had sent the memorandum to 
Gen, Haking, General Officer Commanding in Egypt, and that they would be 
better able to assess the probable military'- requirements after hearing
(2)
(1) FO 371/8991, FO Minutes by Murray, 30th October 1923 in Stack to 
Murray, 11th October 1923,
(2) FO 371/8991 ; Foreign Office to the Secretary Army Council; 1st November 
1923, and Foreign Office to the Secretary, Treasury, 1st November 1923.
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from him. In the meantime they observed that the military measures required, 
should the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations break dovrni,would depend mainly on 
the attitude of the Sudanese troops and of the people of the Sudan,
However, they made it clear that to face the issue with the weak force 
then in the Sudan would be to invite trouble, and it would be desirable 
for reinforcements to reach the Sudan before a definite rupture with 
Egypt occurred. This, however, did not apply to the British position in 
Egypt where the existing garrison would be able to deal in the first 
instance with immediate developments. But the garrison in Egypt would 
not be able to spare reinforcements for the Sudan except possibly one or 
two batteries of artillery. Such additional troops for the Sudan would 
have to be found from England or elsewhere in the Empire, They thought 
that the provision of a permanently increased garrison for the Sudan 
should be considered,^
On 23rd January 1924» the War Office informed the Foreign Office 
that they had heard from Gen, Haking who, after consulting Allenby and 
Stack, had come to the conclusion that any danger resulting from a rupture 
with Egypt would probably occur in Egypt rather than in the Sudan,
According to Haking the Sudanese units of the Egyptian army would not 
view with favour the Egyptian claim over the Sudan, Hg also did not expect 
any difficulty in removing Egyptian units from the Sudan or in removing 
Egyptian officers from Sudanese or Arab units. He expected that with the 
help of certain temporary reinforcements, which in normal conditions 
could be made available in three or four weeks, the .existing garrison 
would be adequate to deal with the military/ situation both in Egypt and 
the Sudan, provided that the initial rupture was caused by political
(1) FO 371/8991? H.J. Greedy, [^ War Office) to Foreign Office; No: E 11534/ 
10086(16), 3rd December 1923.
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action and not by a general revolt,
The encouraging tone of the War Office was not reflected in the
Treasury letter of 12 December 1925 in which they said that they would
not rega,rd any solution of the question as satisfactory which involved a
charge upon British Exchequer for the civil or military administration
of the Sudan, The Treasury was not ready to recognize any financial
responsibility for the expenditure of the Sudan Government, They considered
that the Sudan Government ought to be in a position to meet any temporary
dislocation of revenue either from its reser\re fund or by temporary
borrowing. They further added that there was no adequate reason for
assuming that the Sudan Government should take any responsibility for
the pay or disbandment of the Regiments of the Egyptian army stationed
in the Sudan, Egypt could withdraw such regiments from the Sudan or, if
(2 )they were not required by Egypt, could disband them,^ '
Murray minuted that the Treasury had gone v^rong over the question 
of the disbandment of the Egyptian army battalions in the Sudan, The rank 
and file of the Egyptian army in the Sudan were for the most part not 
Egyptians but Sudanese, officered to some extent by Egyptians, If it came 
to a break with Egypt, the Egyptian officers would have to go back to 
Egypt, but there could be no question of throwing out the Sudanese, The 
Sudan Government would have to pay the Sudanese soldiers and for the 
Sudan Government to leave the soldiers without pay would be to invite a 
rising which would be all the more serious for it would be backed by 
disciplined and trained elements,
(1) PO 571/10049; B.B. Cubitt,(^War Office)to Foreign Office, 
No: E 735/ 735/ 16; 25rd Januarj^  1924.
(2) PO 371/8991; Treasury (G.L. Barstow) to PO; 12th December 1925#
(3) PO 371/8991 ; PO Minutes on Treasury to PO; 12th December 1928,
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Meanwhile the general elections in Egypt, early in 1924, brought
the Wafd to power with an overwhelming majority. With the formation of
the new Ministry in Egypt, the British Government appears to have been
anxious to start negotiations on the 'Reserved Subjects', Though there
were advantages in the initiative being taken by Egypt in such discussions,
Mr, Selby from the Foreign Office informed Mr, Kerr, the Acting High
Commissioner, that in view of the serious situation developing inethe
Sudan due to Egyptian propaganda, the British Government was keen to
find out the general feeling amongst the Egyptian politicians as regands
fl')early discussion on the 'Reserved Subjects',^ ^
In a Foreign Office memorandum on Anglo-Egyptian negotiations
prepared in April 1924 the question of the Sudan was discussed with a
special reference to the Egyptian propaganda in that country. It was
agreed that the Egyptian propaganda would not make the Sudanese wish
for union with Egypt, Mahdiisra was far from dead and there was much
inflammable material which a spark mi^t easily ignite, V/hat kept the
Sudanese quiet, according to the Foreign Office, was the popular belief
in the stability and permanence of the Sudan Government, The farthest
limit to wliich the Foreign Office was willing to go to satisfy the
Egyptian claim over the Sudan was a re-affirmation of the Condominium
Agreement of 18991 Once the political issue was settled, other problems
(2)between the two Governments could be adjusted,^ ^
The urgency of settling the Sudan question at an early date was 
further increased by public declarations which Zaghlul Pasha made 
demanding complete unity of the Nile Valley, As expected, the Egyptian
(1) FO 571/10059? Mr, Selby to Kerr; 6th March 1924,
(2) FO 571/10042; PO Mémorandum on A-E- Negotiations, 7th April 1924,
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army did not escape his notice. In May 1924 he made a reference to the 
command of the Egyptian army which was under a foreigner with his Head­
quarters in the Sudan and promised that the Egyptian Government would take
('1')steps to put these irregularities right,^  ^ Minuting on the reported 
declarations of Za<^ul, Mr, Ikirray said that the ultimate solution of 
the military problem lay in the creation of the Sudan Gendarmerie 
maintained and paid for by the Sudan Government, The purely military 
garrison of the Sudan might then consist of one British battalion and one 
Egyptian battalion, each partner paying equal contribution. The Egyptian 
army would then be a purely Egyptian affair. He further added that the Sudan 
would not be able to pay for the Gendarmerie without assistance from the 
British Government, It would, he thought, be better to grant this extra 
amount than to suggest tha.t Egypt should shoulder part of the cost of the 
gendarmerie,
Under pressure from Egyptian propaganda in the Sudan and in view of 
the impending Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. Stack submitted a memorandum 
on 25th Maj'' 1924 to Allenby embodying the proposals of the Sudan Government 
on the future status of the Sudan, At the very outset Stack pointed
out that the British Government should make a definite declaration in
regard to the future status of the Sudan, that the British control would
not be withdrawn. He said that any compromise with Egypt would be inter­
preted by the people as a prelude to a gradual withdrawal of British control 
from the Sudan and its effects would be to destroy the confidence of the
(1) FO 371/10060; Times dt, 19th May 1924.
(2) FO 371/10063; FO Minutes by Murray on the Reported declaration of 
Zaghlul on the Egyptian army command in Times dt, 19th May 1923.
(3) FO 371/10042; Memorandum on the future status of the Sudan by Stack; 
No: 69 Secret, 25th May I924 in Allenby to Mac Donald; 1st June 1924.
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people in the British Government and in consequence endanger the security 
of the country. Though there was no need to alter the form of the 1899 
Agreement, Stack wanted the financial arrangements between the two 
Governments to be revised and steps taken to place the military garrison 
of the Sudan under the complete control of the Sudan Government,
Stack proposed three different courses for consideration. These 
were as follows:-
1, That the removal of British control from Egypt should be followed
by its removal from the Sudan and inclusion of the Sudan in Egypt,
2, That the status quo should be maintained,
5, That not only should there be no weakening of British influence in
the Sudan, but on the contrary, as a corollary to the removal of 
British advice from Egypt as the other partner in the Condominium 
over the Sudan, the predominance of British control should be 
defined more clearly and established more securely.
Stack considered the third course the most desirable. Once this was 
accepted changes in the finance and army regulations could be effected.
Speaking of the Egyptian army. Stack stated that 65/o of the Egyptian 
Rifle Strength was stationed in the Sudan and was maintained at Egyptian 
cost. With the advent of Zaghlulist Ministry, the Egyptian Government was 
determined to Egyptianising the army command. He said that the danger to 
the Egyptian army subject to such influences could not be ignored. The 
army itself could become a menace to the security of the Sudan if Egyptian 
influences were to filter in.
Referring to the suggestion that the Egj^ptian army should be bifurcated 
into two portions - an army for Eg^ rpt and a Sudan army - each under its 
own Sirdar, Stack pointed out that the principal difficulty in the creation 
of the Sudan force was financial. He wondered whether Egypt would pay for
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the force which was not to he under her control. However, he suggested 
that Egypt could he asked to contribute part of the expenditure if she 
wished to benefit by the peaceful development of the Sudan and the security 
for the exercise of her water rights,
Allenby agreed with Stack that it was desirable to change the system 
of command of the Egyptian army in the Sudan and to reorganize it on a 
less lavish scale. However, he thought that Egypt would not agree to 
contribute half a million pounds while surrendering her direct military 
connection with the Sudan throu^ the Minister of War,^^^
Meanwhile, since Za#ilul had come to power, organized opposition to 
the establishment of the Sudan as a separate entity under British tutelage 
had begun to appear there as a result of Egyptian propaganda for the unity 
of the Nile Valley, The propijtganda, stimulated and supported by the press 
campaign, promised the younger and more impressionable Sudanese, particularly 
those in Government employment, a larger share in the Government of the 
Sudan, political careers in the Egyptian Parliament and better prospects 
of promotion in Government Service, Similar propaganda was spread in the
(2)provinces by Egyptian executive officers,^  ^ According to Stack the 
Egyptian Nationalist propaganda had affected the younger Sudanese officials 
to such an extent that in some cases they bycotted those who supported 
the British administration, The sudden outburst of the pro-Egyptian 
propaganda was not without effect on the more influential and pro-British 
Sudanese who, thou^ convinced that Britain would not abandon the Sudan,
(1) FO 37I/IOO6O; Allenby to FO; No: 203(h); 24th June 1924.
(2) FO 371/10049; stack to Allenby, Secret, 8th May 1924 in Allenby 
to Mac Donald, No: 338; 23rd May 1924.
(3) Ibid,
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looked to their ovm interests in the event of a change of Government,
The information collected by the Sudan Government on the effects of
the Egyptian propaganda, however, showed that a vast majority away from
the principal towns remained indifferent to the Egyptian claims except
in Khartoum province where there was some sympathy and support for the
Egyptian Nationalists amongst a minority of the educated classes, the
Muwallads or half bred Sudanese Egyptians and the ex officers of the black 
(1 )battalions, ^ A majority of the educated group believed in "the Sudan 
for the Sudanese" and accepted British control as the least objectionable 
in the existing circumstances. Stack did not expect any serious result 
from the Egyptian propaganda in the immediate future, but he warned the 
Foreign Office that definite steps would have to be taken to counteract 
it. He suggested that a definite declaration from the British Government 
assuring the Sudanese of the continuation of the British predominance in 
the Sudan would not only steady the Sudanese but remove the uncertainty
( 2)of the future status of the Sudan,^ ^
Mr, Murray concurred with Stack’s suggestion that a declaration 
that Britain would maintain her position in the Sudan would help in 
steadying the Sudanese during the early stages of the Egyptian propaganda. 
But he feared that this would not stop the propaganda. Even if an agreement 
on the future status of the Sudan was concluded with Zaghlul Pasha, his 
political opponents would only redouble their anti-British propaganda 
in the Sudan in order to embarass him, Murray feared that the situation 
might become so serious that the British Government might be compelled 
"to pass from words to acts",^^^
(1) FO 371/10049, Documents (k). Attached to Appendix II, Part II in 
Allenby to Mac Donald, Cairo, 1st June 1924; also see W.P. Box 248/3 7,
(2) FO 371/10049, Stack to Allenby, Secret, 8th May 1924 in Allenby to 
Mac Donald, No, 338, 23rd I%y 19241
(3) FO 371/10049, FO Minutes by Murray on Stack to Allenby, Secret,
8th May 1924 in Allenby to Mac Donald, No.338, 23rd May 1924,
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In fact the situe.tion in the Sudan was becoming serious. In May 1924 
a secret meeting was held by the pro-Egyptian Sudanese in the house of 
’Ali Abd al-Latif, who after his release had thrown in his lot with the 
nationalists. One Taufik Wahbi, an Egyptian Civil Judge of the lower Courts 
in Khartoum, directed the proceedings of the meeting, wliich had for its 
^object the definite inauguration of the League of the IVhite Elag,^^) The 
name was decided upon, rules and constitution were adopted and finances 
were discussed. The formation of the new League gave the younger generation 
of the Sudanese a Sudan League and a Sudanese Leader, »Ali Abd al-Latif, 
to fight under. Branches of the League were established in many of the 
principal towns of the northern Sudan and even in places as remote as 
el-Fasher and Talodi, Organization having proceeded thus far, a period 
of intense activity set in. Protests and demonstrations were engineered 
and telegrams were sent to the Governor-General in May and June protesting 
against the separation of the Sudan from Egypt,
In June 1924 a certain Mulazim Awal Zain al-Sl^din^Abd al-Tam, a 
sub-mamur in the Nuba Mountain province took with him to Egypt what v/as 
later alleged to be a declaration in support of the unity of the Nile 
Valley from certain Slmy^s of the Nuba Mountains, He had along with him 
Muhammad al-Mahdi, a son of the Khalifa ’Abdallahi who was travelling on 
the same warrant as a servant. They were stopped at Wadi Haifa and sent 
back to Khartoum, This led to, the first political demonstration on the 
arrival of the train on the 17th of June on which Muhammad al-Mahdi was 
sent back. The Government authorities, sensing trouble, had already removed
(1) PO 371/10039, No: 358, July 1924.
(2) PO 371/10051, The Lea(?ue of the White Plag, Appendix in Mr, C. Kerr to 
MacDonald, No, 500, 3rd August 1924; also PO 371/10039, Appendix in
3.I.E. No; 359, 1924.
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Huhairanad al-Mahdi at Khartoum North and the assembly of two to three 
hundred demonstrators at Khartoum Station found no one to demonstrate 
about•
The next incident was an outbreak in Omdurman on 19th June on the 
occasion of the funeral of an Egyptian Mamur, Pro-Egyptian politics were 
introduced into the graveside ceremonies by Taufik Wahbi who was supported
^ I
by one Shay^ Wad TTmar, a jaali, whose followers carried the demonstration
into the town and created considerable disturbance which necessitated
( 1 >
intervention by the police. ^
The Acting Governor of Khartoum, R.E.H, Baily, issued a proclamation 
on 22nd June declaring all public assemblies illegal in the three towns 
of Khartoum, Khartoum North and Omdurman, Instructions to issue similar 
proclamations were given to the Governors of other provinces if need 
should arise.
The proclamation was, however, ignored by the nationalists who on 
the verj'- next day under the flag of the League started from a place not 
far from the house of ’Ali Abd al-Latif, All himself retired into the 
background as soon as the demonstration was well started. The procession 
was joined by a considerable crowd and before long a number of men believed 
to be soldiers in mufti began to throw dust in the air while boys with 
baskets of stones were encouraged to throw them. The police then arrived 
and arrested the flag bearer with three others. Further disorders, 
however, occurred on 25th and 26th June,
One of the men arrested on the first day of the disturbance turned 
King’s evidence and informed the authorities that ’Ali abd al-Latif was 
directly implicated in the demonstrations. He was therefore arrested on 
Uth July and imprisoned.
(1) FO 371/10051 ; Allenby to FO; T. No: 199? 22nd June 1924.
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The arrest of Ali ’Ahd al-Latif did not put a stop to the League's 
activities in the Sudan, These activities culminated in August and 
September 1924 in serious incidents in the Sudan, The first incident 
occurred at Port Sudan on 5th August 1924 when Salfch 'Abd al-Gadir, a 
Post Office and Telegraph Clerk*was arrested on a charge of conspiracy 
against the Government, On the 7th when the train carrying Saleh left 
Port Sudan for Khartoum where he was required to stand his trial, a 
demonstration was made by a crowd of Sffendia and some of the men of 
the railway battalion. The crowd was dispersed by police, A further 
demonstration took place on the 10th August led by a civil employee who 
was awaiting trial and a few men of the railway battalion. The demon­
strators eventually dispersed quietly. Wo further demonstrations were 
made by the disaffected element in the town but reports reaching the 
Government authorities revealed that an attempt was being made to influence 
the surrounding Beja tribesmen. It was feared that a small incident would 
be sufficient to start a fight,^ ^
As a precautionary measure, two British platoons and one company 
3rd Battalion (Egyptian) was sent to Port Sudan on 12th August, Before 
the arrival of troops, to provide safety of European officials and the 
wireless station in the event of the situation becoming worse, H.M.S,
Weymouth which was in the vicinity was called in. She remained in Port
(2)Sudan until the 14th when the sloop Clematis took over,^ ^
The disturbances at Atbara on 9th August were directly connected 
with the arrest of Saleh at Port Sudan, The arrival of the train at
(1) PO 371/10053; End, 4 in Wo« I, Port Sudan, in Mr, Kerr to Mr, Mac 
Donald, No,557; 31st August 1924.
(2) Ibid.
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Atbara carrying Saleh 'Abd al-Gadir, attracted a large crowd of effendia 
and a certain number of soldiers from the railway battalion,After 
the train had left, the crowd paraded the town, visited the barracks, 
where in spite of the efforts of the commanding officer, Mu^^mmad Pasha 
PaJLl, they were joined by the men of the railway battalion. The soldiers, 
however, returned to barracks about midni^t.
On the 10th the soldiers went out again and proceeded to the market 
place where demonstrations took place. Prom here the demonstrators went 
to the workshops and stopped men from coming in.
At this stage two platoons of British infantry from Khartoum and 
one dismounted Company of Sudanese Mounted Infantry from Shendi were sent 
for to reinforce the detachment of the IX Sudanese and to deal with the 
situation. During the night the detachment arrived by the special train, . 
Local arrangements were also made for all European population to assemble 
at the Sports Club and the General Manager’s house and all British officials 
were armed.
On the 11th the British troops turned out and accompanied by the 
Governor, Mr, Leach, proceeded to the market place where they came into 
contact with the demonstrators who were rounded up with the assistance of 
a company of Mounted Rifles and marched off to their barracks. Once they 
were in, they were surroimded by guards. However, they renewed their 
attempts to break up the cordon. After a hand to hand struggle, in which 
the Arab soldiers used the butts of their rifles, brick throwing commenced; 
as a result the Arab company opened fire killing 21 in all. After removal 
of the casualties, the demonstrators were confined in the barracks of
(1) Ibid ; Encl. 3 in No, I.
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the IX Sudanese under a strong guard and sixteen ring leaders were placed 
under close arrest.
On the 12th August a further detachment of troops was sent from 
Shendi as it was clear by now that the mutiny was spreading to the rest 
of the railway battalion. On the 15th the Atbara garrison was further 
reinforced by one compsiny and two machine guns of the IX Sudanese, Arrange­
ments were then made on the 28th to evacuate the railway battalion from 
the Sudan,
Simultaneously with the disturbances at Atbara and Port Sudan, trouble 
of a different sort broke out in Khartoum, On the morning of the 9th the 
cadets of the Military School at Khartoum refused to go on parade and 
informed the authorities that they intended to make a demonstration and 
that if interfered with they would use their arms. They carried with them a 
green Egyptian flag and marched through Khartoum where they stopped at the 
mosque and at the house of 'Ali Abd al-Latif and presented arms for him.
Then they returned to their barracks where they were surrounded by a cordon 
of British troops. During their absence from the School, all spare ammunition 
had been removed. On learning this on their retujm, they became excited 
and refused to give up their arms, threatening to shoot anyone attempting 
to take them. The cadets made offers at various points to hand over their 
rifles if their ammunition was returned, or if the cordon was removed. In 
the evening, however, they surrendered their arms.
On the 10th August, some eleven cadets who appeared to be the ring 
leaders were arrested and removed under a guard of Egyptian troops and 
the remainder wèreeconfined to the School,
(l) EO 371/10055; End,2 in No: I, Sterry to Allenby, No:143S, 21st August 
1924 in Mr, Kerr to Mr. MacDonald; No, 557? 31st August 1924.
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According to Wasey Sterry, the Acting Governor-General, the mutiny
of the cadets thou^ serious in itself was made much more so by thg&nfluence
it must have in the future in the officering of the Arab and Sudanese
units of the army. According to him it raised serious doubts as to the
reliability and loyalty of all ex-cadets of the Khartoum Military School
serving as officers, Sterry was convinced that the secrecy with which the
conspiracy was hatched appeared to be the result of the most skilful
anti-British propaganda which had been successful to an unexpected extent,
The disturbances at Atbara and Port Sudan, though serious when they
occurred, did not have the far reaching result of the mutiny of the Cadets,
The majority of the Egyptian officers engaged in civil and technical
employment for many years liad lost whatever powers of command they had and
the railway battalion itself was a battalion only in name - their discipline,
(2)according to the authorities, had never been good,^ ^
In the meantime Sterry had urgently asked for an increase in the
British garrison. In his opinion the situation was so serious that it was
impossible to say how far the Sudan Government could rely on the Sudanese 
and Egyptian b a t t a l i o n s , I n  fact MacDonald had offered Stack an
additional British battalion if he required it and now Stack asked for it,^^)
The War Office wired G.O.C, Egypt ordering a British battalion from 
Moascar to proceed to Port Sudan, ^ According to Murray, once the second
(1) EG 371/10053; Sterry to Allenby, No:145» Secret, No,I, 21st August 1924 
 ^ in Mr, Kerr to MacDonald; No: 557; 31st August 1924.
I%id,
(2)/incl, 5 in No, I; T’o m U
(3) PO 371/10051; Kerr to PO; T, No: 259; 11th August 1921,
(4) PO 371/10051 ; PO î'îinutes dt. 11th August 1924 on Kerr to PO; Tel,Nos; 
259 and 260,
(5) PO 371/10051; WO to GOG; No: 92253; 12th August 1924.
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battalion reached the Sudan it should be possible to take a firm line.^^^
The situation in the Sudan continued to be unstable during the course
of August and September, Stack, who was in London, urged the Foreign
Office not to defer talcing steps to clear up the situation in the Sudan,
In a memorandum he wrote that unless a definite policy was effectively
adopted by the British Government which would enable him to have the
garrison of the Sudan under his sole control and freed from Egyptian
influences, he could not guarantee the maintenance of order, Ee said that
even if there wa§6o further outbreak of disorder, the discipline of the
army might be permanently damaged and the sense of security among the
(2)
civil population destroyed,^  ^ Stack referred to the proposals he had 
put forvrard in his memorandum of 25th May I924 for the Sudan Government 
and added that if 2aighlul came to England and demanded as a condition 
for accepting the 1899 Convention,that Egypt's share in the Condominium 
should be definitely acknowledge, then the British Government should stand 
by the proposals he had made on the 25th May, namely "that not only should 
there be no weakening of British influence in the Sudan but on the contrary, 
as a corollary to the removal of British advice from Egypt as the other 
partner in the Condominium over the Sudan, the predominence of British
n
control should be defined more' clearly and established more securely.
He said that events in the Sudan had confirmed that a dual control shared 
with the Egyptians would be impossible.
If on the other hand Za^lul avoided the issue by making excuses to 
avoid negotiations or by making the negotiations abortive without any 
repudiation of the Status quo. Stack said that the Egyptians would then,
(1) PO 371/10051, PO Minutes on Kerr to PO; Tel, No: 263, 11th August 1924,
(2) PO 371/10051 ; Stack to MacDonald, No: 14IL, 11th August 1924,
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■under the guise of the nominal continuance of the status quo, carry 
out a policy of passive obstruction. Unless the British Government was 
prepared to abandon the Sudan, the possibility of carrying out such a 
course should be denied to the Egyptians, It would be necessary for the 
British Government to declare its policy.
And if Zaÿhlul definitely joined issue with the British Government 
and persisted in the demand for complete British evacuation and complete 
Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan which would involve repudiation of 
1899 Agreement, Stack proposed that British Government should immediately 
declare a British Protectorate over the Sudan, In such a case, Stack 
warned the Foreign Office that an increase of the British garrison would 
be necessary for a time.
The Foreign Office was not sure which of the three alternatives 
Zagilul would adopt if he came down to London for negotiations,^
On 18th August Stack submitted another memorandum to the Foreign 
Office in which he explained in greater detail the proposal for the 
replacement of the military garrison of the Sudan by a Sudan Defence
(2)
Force,\ ' As a first step towards the formation of this force, he 
suggested the withdrawal to Egypt of all Egyptian (fallah) units stationed 
in the Sudan and also of all Egyptian officers serving with the Sudanese 
units; and the reorganisation of the remainder, the Arab and Sudanese 
units, on a territorial system of local enlistment into a Sudan force. 
According to his estimate the approximate strength of the proposed fighting 
force would be 5189 strong,
(1) FO 57I/I805I; FO Minutes on Stack to I4acDonald; No: I4IL, 11th August 1924,
(2) FO 371/10052; Memorandum in Stack to Mr, MacDonald; Seéret, 18th Aug, 1924,
(3) See Appendix,I, "Infra P.321.
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According to Stack the re-organisation of the Egyptian 
army he had proposed would result in a reduction in rifle 
stength of over 6000. He wanted this reduction to be spread 
over a minimum period of three years. The Egyptian officers 
and troops would go first and the numbers of the remaining 
Sudanese would be gradually reduced. He was aware of the 
risks from the dissatisfied ex-soldiers who would have been 
discharged faster than they could be absorbed into the re­
maining units or into the normal life of the country(^),
Stack added that the large decrease in rifle strength 
would be counter balanced by an increase in the proportion 
(but a reduction in the total number) of British officers 
employed. The increased proportion of British officers 
would ensure that each outstation and each sub-unit at 
irregular Corps had a British officer in command. The 
primary duty of the re-organised army would be to maintain 
internal public security, and it would be in fact if not 
in name, an armed constabulary.
(1) PO 571/10052, Memorandum by Stack in Stack to Mr, MacDonald, 
Secret, 18th August 1924.
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Stack recognized the difficulties during the period of transition 
between the abolition of the Egyptian army in the Sudan and the organi­
sation of the Sudan army. He therefore thought it necessary to maintain 
the reduced garrison at the highest pitch of efficiency.
Early in September 1924 when it became definitely known that 
Zagilul was visiting England to discuss the ’Reserved Subjects’ with the 
British authorities, Stack addressed another letter to MacDonald urging 
him to discuss the Sudan question. Unless Za#ilul agreed to give up 
Egyptian claims on the Sudan, Stack wished tha.t steps be taken for the
( 2')implementation of his scheme for the reorganisation of the army,^ ^
He quoted a telegram from Khartoum in which Sterry had pointed out 
that the attitude of all the officers was anti-British, They obeyed 
the British because the British held the mnning cards, viz., an increased 
British battalion and the loyalty of the Arab and Sudanese units, V/hen 
the former was reduced and the latter sha,ken, the Sudan Government VTOuld 
lose control over them,
Murray agreed with Stack that there was only one condition on which 
any form of Egyptian participation in the internal administration of the 
Sudan could be permitted, and that was Za^lul should publicly repudiate 
the claims of Egyptian rights and the charges of British usurpation 
which he had made, Murray proposed that during the course of the forth­
coming conversations with Za^lul a clear definition of his position 
towards the Anglo-Egyptian Convention should be extracted from him.
Finally Murray added that if an agreed settlement was impossible, the
(1) Ibid.
[ (2) ?0 371/1005?, Stack to MacDonald, Secret, l4th September 1024.
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British Government should talce action without delay on the lines 
suggested by Stack regarding the military garrison.
Conversations with Za#ilul Pasha took place on the 25th and the 
29th of September and again on the 3rd of October 1924 and as expected 
broke down. Za^Mul refused to be drawn into discussion on the Sudan.
Mr, MacDonald attempted to draw Za/^lul’ s attention to his statements 
concerning the Sudan, To this he would only reply that he was voicing 
the opinion of the Egyptian nation and that he still adhered to that 
position.
After the break_^down of talks, MacDonald gave the gist of his 
discussions with Za(ghlul in a letter to A l l e n b y , A s  regards the 
Sudan, he added that Saghlul was informed that the duty of preserving 
order in that country rested upon/British Government and that they would 
take QYeTj step necessary for this purpose, Za-^lul was also told that 
the maintenance of the Status quo had become intolerable due to Egjrptian 
intrigues to shake the loyalty of both military and civil officers 
serving in the Sudan, The status quo could only be maintained if the 
Egyptian Government cooperated loyally until such time as new arrangements 
could be made.
On the same day Stack telegraphed to Sterr^ '" the gist of l^ac Donald’s 
letter to Allenby instructing him to give wide publicity to those portions 
of the letter which were relevant to the Sudan, He also suggested that 
Sterry should make it Imown that in future the cooperation of the natives 
throughout the provinces would be enlisted in advisory and consultative 
capacities,
(1) PO 371/10053, Foreign Office Memorandum by Murray, 17th September 1924,
(2) FO 371/10043, Mac Donald to Allenby, 7th October 1924,
(3) FO 371/10054$ Stack to Sterry, Tel, No:645$ 7th October 1924.
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Sterry replied that unless the British Government was prepared to
settle definitely thekrmj'- reorganisation, the proclamation of increased
offer of native participation would only provoke counter propaganda,^
Stack appreciated Sterry’s difficulties hut advised him to accept the
fact and make the best of the difficult circumstances. He said that the
Prime Minister was unable to take drastic action to get rid of the
Egyptian army from the Sudan, as this would mean declaring war on Egypt,
In this he was supported by Allenby. The British Government had now
issued a more explicit warning to Egypt, and if this was disregarded,
( 2^drastic action could then be insisted upon,^ '
Soon Stack returned to Egypt and a meeting was held at the Residency 
on 4th November at which it was decided that a demand for the appointment 
of more British officers was to be put to the Egyptian Government so as 
to bring the number of those serving with the Egyptian army upto 
establishment,If this demand was refused, the Residency should then 
take up the definition of the functions of the Sirdar with the Egyptian 
Ministry, A scheme was also discussed for the splitting of the Eg^ rptian 
army into two units, an Anglo-Egyptian Force under the supreme command 
of the Governor-General to be stationed in the Sudan, the chief command 
of the Egyptian army in Egypt being left to an Egyptian, It was hoped 
that b^ r this arrangement the difficulties of oath and allegiance could 
be got over and yet the 1899 Convention would be maintained. If adopted 
this would be a further reassertion of the Sirdar’s authority over the
(1) PO 371/10054; sterry;- to Stack, T.No: 341; 8th October 1924,
(2) PO 371/10054; Stack to Sterr^ r. Tel, No: 649; 8th October 1924,
(3) PO 371/10054; Mr, Bardsley (Cairo) to Col. Schuster, Tel. No:679;
5th November 1924,
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Egyptian army in the Sudan.
The cliange of Government in November 1924 from Labour to Conservative 
changed the situation. Chamberlain, who now became the Foreign Secretary, 
wanted to talce a tougher line with the Egyptian Nationalists, On the 
10th November he wired to Allenby that if Za#ilul continued to reaffirm 
his previous declarations in regard to the Sudan,i the British Government 
would make most serious representations to the Egyptian Government calling 
for a formal and public disclaimer of any intention on the part of the 
Egyptian Government to modify the Sudan administration. Failing a satis­
factory reply,4©- the British Government would unilaterally settle the
fllanamalous position of the Egyptian army,^ '
In reply, Allenby informed Chamberlain that %i^lul after his return 
from London had made no public statement amounting to"a provocative re­
affirmation of extremist claims. If he did, Allenby suggested that it 
would be better to inform Zac^lul at once the steps the British Government 
were taking rather than call for a disclaimer in the first instance which 
he would certainly refuse to make, Allenby considered it unnecessary and 
injudicious to call for a disclaimer from Zaghlul - unnecessary because 
Za^lul had already been warned and injudicious because it would give 
him an opportunity of defying the British Government which would in itself
be detrimental to British prestige and rally to him much support which 
[2 ')
he was now losing, ^ '
Allenby added that in the event of making a representation to 
Za^lul, his communication would embody the following proposals:-
(1) PO 371/10043; Chamberlain to Allenby, Tel. No; 209; 10th November 1924.
(2) PO 371/10043; Allenby to PO; No, 352, 14th November 1924,
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(a) Office of the Sirdar would he split into two parts, (l) an 
Egyptian Sirdar, (2) a Sudanese Sirdar. The appointment of the Egyptian 
Sirdar would he made by the Egyptian Government, His command would be 
independent and would be confined to the Egyptian army in Egypt. The 
Sudanese Sirdar would be appointed in the same manner as Governor 
General of the Sudan, All troops irrespective of nationality serving 
in the Sudan would be under his supreme command for all purposes with 
the exception of purely Egyptian units garrisoning the Sudan, These 
units would stand to Egyptian Government on the same footing as the 
British units to the British Government,
(B) If the Egyptian Government failed to accept the above proposals, 
all the Egyptian troops serving in the Sudan would be removed.
At the same time, Allenby added that he would give an ultimatum to 
Zaghlul that a reply would be expected expressing his acquiescence in
(a) within 24 hours and that in the event of refusal (b) would be applied, 
Allenby further added that Stack had informed him that he would be 
able to deal with the situation arising out of (b) with the two British 
battalions in the Sudan, provided a third, then in Egypt, was held in 
readiness to move to Khartoum directly action became inevitable. Mean­
while, Allenby was keeping in close touch with Gen, Baking,
On the 19th November the Foreign Office informed Allenby that his
(2 )proposals to Egypt should not assume the form of dangerous half measures,^ ' 
Chamberlain wanted to know why the Sirdar of the Sudan Force could not 
be appointed by the Governor-General who was himself an embodiment of 
Condominium, rather than by the Egyptian Government, Allenby’s proposal,
(1) FO 371/10043; Allenby to FO; Tel. No; 352; 14th November 1924.
(2) FO 371/10043; FO to Allenby; Tel. No; 215; 19th November 1924.
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in the event of death or sudden retirement of the Sirdar,would give an
unfriendly Egyptian Government an opportunity for obstruction. The
second point the Foreign Office wanted to clarify was, if the Egyptian
Government were to accept the proposals,who would issue commissions
to the officers of the Suddn force and to whom the force would owe
allegiance. According to the Foreign Office it was undesirable that
the Sultan should issue commissions. The Foreign Office also vranted to
know whether any Egyptian officers would be employed in the Sudan force
and lastly whether it was intended, in the event of an Egyptian refusal,
to evacuate the Egyptian officers serving vdth the Arab and Sudanese
units along with the purely Egyptian units, Allenby was told that on
receiving clarification on the above points, the Foreign Office would
finalise its policy on the Sudan, This telegram was sent to Allenby on
19th November 1924, the day Stack was fatally wounded in Cairo, Stack’s
subsequent death took away the initiative from the Foreign Office,
Allenby, their man in Egypt, now moved in and on his o\m authority, .
decided to tackle the problem in the li^t of the discussions he had
had at various times with Stack and the Foreign Office,
The period under study saw the beginnings of the Sudanese Nationalism,
Though little was changed in the provinces, there was a general awakening
in the principal^towns of the Sudan, A generation of educated Sudanese
was growing up to whom events in Egypt, and elsewhere in the Middle East "
were of absorbing interest, A-s early as 1918 the old students of the
Gordon College had opened the Graduates’ Club at Omdurman which now 
the
became the hub of/nationalist activity’'.
The grovdîh of nationalist aspirations amongst the Sudanese created 
new problems of security for the Sudan Government, On the one liand 
there were the religious heads, Sayyid ’Ali al-Mir<^iani, Sa^ /yid ’Abd al-
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RaWan al-Mahdi and the Sharif Yusuf al-Eindi, who wished to see 
Sudanese nationalism developing under British guidance, and on the other, 
the younger generation of the educated Sudanese, a minority?- amongst whom, 
some at least,sincerely believed in allying the Sudan with Egypt, To the 
Sudan Government both elements were dangerous to security in the countr;^ '’. 
If a long rope was given to the religious ^aykhs, they might expand 
their influence and power to such an extent that it mi^t become difficult 
for the Government to check their activities amongst their followers.
The leaders might get an exaggerated idea of their ovm importance and 
might be tempted to throw off Governmental control to a degree which 
could not be permitted. If, on the other hand, they were kept under too 
close a control, they mi^t turn hostile which was undesirable at a time 
when the Egyptian Nationalists had intensified their propaganda in the 
Sudan,
The educated class of the Sudanese was divided into two groups, A 
majority of these, during this period, was indifferent to the Egyptian 
aspirations in the Sudan, But there was a minority amongst them who 
demanded a closer alliance with Egji^ pt, The involvement of the ex officers 
of the black battalions of the Egyptian army with this latter group 
complicated the problem of securit]^  in the Sudan , The very loyalty of 
the Egyptian armj'- was in doubt.
Stack tried to solve the problem of security in two ways. In the 
first instance he allowed the religious Shaylcha freedom of action within 
certain limits and supported them wherever their views were not against 
the wishes of the Government, They were even permitted to launch a news­
paper, al-Hadara, which published a series of articles, the theme of 
which was that since the concept of the Sudan as a unit transcending all 
tribes was as yet rudimentary, it would be in the interest of the Sudanese
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to recognize British guidance till this object was achieved. Stack also 
urged the Home authorities to make an official declaration emphasizing 
the British Government’s decision to stay in the Sudan, He hoped that 
once the Sudanese know that Britain was going to stay in the Sudan., the 
uncertainty regarding the future status of the Sudan would be cleared 
and the Egyptian propaganda would have less chance of spreading amongst 
the Sudanese,
The events at Atbara and Khartoum and other outposts during 1924 
had shaken the confidence of the Government in the loyalty of the Egyptian 
army. Stack therefore submitted proposals to the Home Authorities dealing 
with the reorganisation of the army. He expected that once the Eg^rptian 
army was reorganized as suggested by him there would not only be a 
considerable reduction in the number of troops, mostly Egyptians, but 
the reorganized force would come under more effective supervision of the 
British officers. This would give the Sudan Government a more effective 
and trustworthy weapon with which subversive elements in the Sudan could 
be kept under control.
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CHAPTER IX
The Assassination of Stack 
and its consequences for 
the Sudan,
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The fatal attack on Stack in the streets of Cairo on the 19th 
'November I924 left no time for'further discussion on the question of
/  -j \  . ’ /
the Sudan,^ ' In a series of tele^ams to the Foreign Office^^', 
Allenby requested authority to demand from the Egyptian Government;
(1) an apology; (2) apprehension and punishment of the assailants;
(3) payment of an indemnity of a quarter of a million pounds;
(4) evacuation of the purely Egyptian (fallah) units of the Egyptian 
army and of the Egyptian officers then serving with the Sudanese and 
Arab jfctiUlfetl^ crai^ and the creation of the Sudan Defence force as 
contemplated in his telegram No; 352 of 14th November 1924^^^;
(5) that rules and conditions governing the service, retirement and 
pensions of foreign officials should be revised in accordance with the 
wishes of the British Government; (6) acquiscence in the maintenance 
and preservation of powers and privileges of the posts of Financial 
and judicial Advisers, In a further telegram he added that, "Egyptian 
Government shall consent to an increase, as need may arise, of land
to be irrigated under Gezira scheme" and also an additional clause 
which read, 'failing compliance,H.M.G, would take appropriate action 
to safeguard their interests in Egypt and the Sudan^^\"
The Foreign Office generally concurred in Allenby's proposals. 
However, they proposed that it should be made clear tliat the Sudan 
defence force would owe allegiance to the Sudan Government alone by
(1) Supra Ch, IX.
(2) FO 371/IOO4 3, Allenby to FO, Tel, Nos; 361(H), 362(h) and 363(H), 
19th November 1924#
(3) FO 371/10043, Allenby to FO, No; 352, 14th November 1924, Supra 
Ch, IX, P,
(4 ) FO 371/10043, Allenby to FO, No;36S(H), 20th November 1924#
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•whom it would he paid, and that this force should he under the supreme
command of an officer who would issue the necessary commissions to the
Sudanese officers and hrevets to the British officers seconded for
service with it,^^) They also wanted Allenhy to include a clause to the
effect that the Egyptian Government should undertake to appoint as
Governor-General a person selected hy the British Government for the
(2)
post in accordance with Article 3 of the 1899 Convention.^  ^ They 
added that the Foreign Office would consider later the question of an 
Egyptian contribution to the cost of the new Sudan force, as it would he in­
expedient to allow the commission of the crime to have as its first 
result the relief of financial burdens then home hy Egypt. Thou^ it 
was desirable to separate the military forces of Egypt from those of 
the Sudan, the Foreign Office felt that the question of separate 
commanders-in-chief for the two forces could not he considered at the 
moment. Allenhy was therefore asked to make arrangements for the appoint­
ment of anyActing Governor General and an Acting Sirdar.
Meanwhile Allenhy had been urging that the demands upon the 
Egyptian Government should he made without delay. He was not yet sure 
whether Zaghlul would resign or not, hut he wanted to impress the country 
as a whole hy a signal act of a s s e r t i o n . I n  a subsequent communi­
cation to Chamberlain he explained that it was of paramount importance
( 5)to choose rightly%the moment of attack.^ ' Allenhy assured the Foreign
(1) FO 371/10045, FO to Allenhy, Tel. Ho: 217, 20th November 1920.
(2) FO 371/10043; FO to Allenhy; Tel. No: 217; 20th November 1924,
(3) Ibid. Sterry was appointed as Acting Governor-General and Huddleston 
as Sirdar of the Egyptian army. See FO 371/10072, Allenhy to FO,
Tel. No: 373(R), 20th November 1924,
(4) FO 371/10043* Allenhy to FO;'M.No: 369; 20th November 1924,
(5) FO 371/10045; Allenhy to Mr. A. Chamberlain, No: 721; 7th December 1924,'
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Office that the demands he had made did not exclude further demands if the 
conduct of the Egyptian Government rendered these n e c e s s a r y . B u t  
Allenhy was told that the requirements of the British Government could 
not he satisfied hy any money payment. The reparation required was the 
adoption of such measures as should protect British officers and 
interests for the future against the incitement and crimes of the past.
He was asked to wire his draft communication, for approval hy the Cabinet
(2)before its presentation to the Egyptian Government.' '
On the same day Allenhy sent two telegrams to the Foreign Office.
In the f i r s t , h e  explained that he had made the draft communication 
into two parts, in order not to spoil the effects of the main part hy 
an overload of details. He also reiterated his opinion that a heavy 
fine should he imposed on the Egyptian Government. In view of Stack’s 
death he had in fact increased the amount to half a million. According 
to him it could he raised even to a million, for this was the sort of 
humiliation which the Egyptians understood. His proposals regarding the 
Gezira irrigation would strike the mind of the whole country, thou^ 
this threat would in no way affect the British guarantee for Egypt’s 
water supply. As regards the separation of the Army commands, Allenhy 
while maintaining his opinion that the commands of the Sudan and 
Egyptian Armies should he separated, was against making the change 
immediately on the ground that the inference would he that the Egyptians 
had secured the high command of their own arn^ r hy killing its British 
Commander-in-Chief,
(1) FO 571/10043; Allenhy to FO; No: 5&9; 20th November 1924.
(2) FO 371/10043; FO to Allenhy, Tel.No: 220; 21st November 1924,
(3) FO 371/10043; Allenhy to FO; Tel. No:380; 21st November 1924,
(4) Ibid.
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The second telegram from Allenhy contained the communication, which
( 1 )if approved, he wanted to deliver soon after Stack’s funeral.' ' In 
the first part he demanded that Egypt should:-
(1) present ample apologies for the crime;
(2) Bring the criminals to condign punishment;
(3) Pay H.M.G, a fine of half a million pounds;
(4) Immediately withdraw from the Sudan all Egyptian officers 
and purely Egyptian units of the Egyptian army "with such 
resulting changes as shall he hereafter specified";
(5) Consent to an increase of the irrigated area in the Sudan 
as need may arise;
(6) Withdraw all opposition to the wishes of H.M.G. concerning 
protection of Foreign interests in Egypt and the Sudan,
In part two Allenhy explained the specific requirements respecting 
the army in the Sudan and the protection of foreign interests in Egypt, 
The clauses relating to the army were that the Egyptian officers and 
purely Egyptian units of the Egyptian army having heen withdravm, the 
Egyptian Government should acquiesce in conversion of the Sudanese 
units of the Egyptian army into a Sudan defence force owing allegiance 
to the Sudan Government alone and under the supreme command of the 
Governor-General in whose name all commissions would he issued.
The draft communication reached the Foreign Office early in the 
morning of 22nd November 1924. Chamberlain thereupon informed Allenhy 
that the Cabinet had been summoned to consider the draft and the text
(1) FO 371/10044, Allenhy to FO, Tel. No: 381(H), 21st November 1924.
Stack was shot at and seriously wounded on 19th November 1924. He died 
on the 20th at 11.45 p.m. W.P. Box 466/IO/IG//S. 289.
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f 1of the official communication would then he sent to him,'  ^ At ahout
the same time Allenhy informed the Foreign Office that it was absolutely
essential to take action before the Egyptian Parliament assembled at
5 p.m. on the same day if Zaghlul’s intention to evade his responsibility
hy resignation was to he prevented. If Zaghlul were allowed to escape hy
resigning, the blow would fall upon some make-shift Government which
could neither reject the proposals nor carry them out. Besides, Zaghlul
would have hy then assumed the position of a man "who had defied unbeaten
and unscathed the foreign enemy, and who was in his own country a supreme,
( 2)irresponsible and revolutionary dictator.'  ^These were some of the 
factors which made Allenhy anxious to take early action against Zaghlul. 
Since he was informed that the Egyptian Parliament would he meeting at 
5 p.m. he arranged to see Zaghlul at 4.45 p.m.
In the meantime the Cabinet in London had been considering the draft 
communication from Allenhy. Thanks to the full AXé^^Ü-n^eof opinion between 
Chamberlain and Allenhy it was possible for them to arrive at their 
decision within less than fourteen hours after receiving the draft 
communication from Allenhy, and hy 2 p.m. on Saturday the 22nd it was 
cabled to C a i r o , B u t  2 p.m. G.M.T. was 4 p.m. Cairo time and therefore 
Allenhy did not receive the communication before his meeting with Za^ h^lul. 
He therefore met him as planned at the latter’g office at 4.45 p.m. and 
read his own draft communication. He then withdrew after demanding a
(1) FO 371/10044, FO to Allenhy, Tel. No: 224 and 225, 22nd November I924.
(2) FO 371/10044, Allenhy to FO, Tel. No: 385 and 384, 22nd November 1924, and
FO 371/10045, Allenhy to Chamberlain, No. 721, 7th December 1924.
(3) FO 371/10045, Chamberlain to Allenhy, No: 1284, 22nd December 1924.
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reply within 24 hours,
The expected Foreign Office communication reached Cairo only after
Allenhy had visited Zai^lul, The communication in its final form was
(2 )
substantially the same as the one Allenhy had presented.' ' One of the 
minor differences for instance was that under Clause 4 Allenhy had asked 
that the Egyptian Government should pay forthwith a fine of half a 
million pounds. The Foreign Office had substituted for this, "Pay the 
Sudan Government on the 1st of January 1925 and on the 1st of January 
in each succeeding year until H.M.G, otherwise determine a sum of a 
million pounds in respect of services which would he rendered to Egypt 
hy the Sudan defence force and which the Egyptian army would no longer
n
he called upon to perform in the Sudan.
In his communication Allenhy had not referred to the mode of the 
appointment of the Governor-General though the Foreign Office had 
specifically asked him to do so. The Foreign Office had therefore emphasised 
that the Governor-General should he appointed according to Article 3 of 
the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium of 1899. As regards the question of the 
Gezira irrigation the Official Communication read, "agree to such an 
extent of the area to he irrigated as might he considered possible without 
detriment to Egypt hy a technical commission to which the Egyptian 
Government would he invited to appoint a member", instead of Allenhy’s 
Clause 6 which was, "Notify competent Department that the Sudan Government 
will increase area to he irrigated at Gezira from 300,000 feddans to an 
unlimited figure as need may arise". Allenhy was told that the importance
(1) FO 371/10044, Allenhy to FO, Tel. Nos: 385 and 386, 22nd November I924.
(2) FO 371/10044, FO to Allenhy, No. 226, 22nd November 1922.
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of «taking into consideration public opinion abroad and at home was so
great that it outweighed the considerations which Allenhy liad urged and
had led the Foreign Office to confine its demands upon the Egyptian -
Government to those which could he shown to he no more than adequate
reparation to the Sudan for the injury inflicted upon that country hy 
( 1 )Egypt,' ^ Allenhy was also told that his insist'Bnce on the demand
relating to conditions of service, retirement and pensions of foreign
officials would he difficult to justify in law or equity under the terms
(2 )of the 1922 declaration,'  ^As regs,rds the imposition of a fine, the 
British Government considered that this would he regarded abroad as a 
vindictive penalty hardly in accordance with traditions of Britain, 
whereas the payment of annuity to the Sudan in respect of services to 
he rendered was amply justified and would guard against the danger that 
in the absence of any such provision, Egypt mi^t he represented as 
financially a gainer,
In a later telegram Chamberlain did not approve Allenhy’s haste in 
presenting the draft communication to Zafhlul without waiting for the 
official communication. Now that the communication had been presented, 
he asked Allenhy to re-state the British Government’s position, after
the crisis was over, tto the Egyptian Government in accordance with the 
terms of the official communication, Though he was promised full 
support, Allenhy was asked to keep the Foreign Office fully informed of
(1) FO 371/10044; FO to Allenhy; Tel, No: 228; 22nd November 1924,
(2) Ibid,
(3) FO 371/10044; FO to Allenhy; Tel. No: 228; 22nd November 1924.
(4) FO 371/10044; FO to Allenhy; Tel, No: 232, 22nd November 1922,
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the Egyptian situation and to submit to the Foreign Office his detailed
(1 ')views and intentions in order to avoid further difficulties.' '
In reply Allenhy stated that three days had already elapsed since
the attack on Stack without any public sign of disapproval from the
British Government. Stack’§ death might have been taken as calling for
a reconsideration of demands and it might well have been supposed hy
the Egyptians that action was intentionally delayed until Stack’s 
(2 )
funeral was over.' ' According to Allenhy, delay after the funeral 
would have been interpreted as an indication of hesitation on the part 
of the British Government. He further added that hours were of importance 
because it was necessary to act upon Za^lul personally before he had 
time to consider resignation and because Egyptian opinion was prepared 
for a severe measure, hut might rapidly become less so as the first shock 
of the murder passed off. Finally the foreign residents were much 
excited and were being increasingly worked up hy the foreign press. 
According to Allenhy there was reason to fear the possibility of European 
manifestations hostile both to Egypt and Britain, Allenhy added that the 
Italians had in fact organised an unofficial armed defence force. He 
hoped that in view of the above considerations the Foreign Office would 
approve his action.' '
Za<^lul, in the meantime, had replied to Allenhy that the Egyptian 
Government could not he considered responsible for the crime. It was 
committed under such circumstances that it could neither have been
(1) FO 371/10044» FO to Allenhy; Tel, No: 236; 23rd November 1924.
(2) Stack was shot at 1,30 p.m. on 19th November 1924. He died sometime 
after midnight of 20th November,
(3) FO 371/10044; Allenhy to FO; Tel, No: 388; 23rd November 1924.
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foreseen nor prevented. He refused to admit the British charge that the 
crime was the natural result of a political campaign.  ^ However, he 
promised to see that the criminals should not escape their just punishment, 
and agreed to present the Egyptian Government’s apologies. He also 
promised to make arrangements for the payment of £E 500,000, Zai^lul, 
on the other hand, declined to consider the creation of the Sudan Defence 
Force on the ground tha.t it constituted a modification of the status quo, 
which the British Government had declared its desire to maintain. In his 
opinion such a step was also in conflict with the provision of Article 46 
of the Egyptian Constitution wherein it was laid down that the King was 
the supreme commander of the army and that he appointed and dismissed 
officers. Referring to the proposal connected with the Gezira irrigation, 
Za^lul said that this question should he solved hy mutual agreement in 
view of the vital Egyptian interests in the Nile waters. Finally with 
regard to the proposals dealing with the service conditions of the 
foreign officials serving in Egypt, la^hLul pointed outthat their position 
was determined hy laws and diplomatic agreements which could not he 
unilaterally modified. Moreover Allenhy had not indicated the modifications 
to he introduced.
On hearing from Zai^lul that he was unable to comply with the 
recommendations in the second part of the communication dealing with the 
Sudan, Allenhy informed him that instructionsj^would he sent to the Sudan 
Government, (I) to effect the withdrawal from the Sudan of all Egyptian 
officers and phrely Egyptian units of the Egyptian army, and (2) to 
authorise the increase of the area to he irrigated under Gezira scheme
(1) FO 371/10044; Zaghlul’s reply in Allenhy to FO; Tel, No: 389; 23rd 
November 1924.
5S
fl )from 300,000 feddans to an unlimited figure as need may arise,' '
The Foreign Office had no alternative hut to approve Allenhy’s 
latest communication to Zaghlul and authorised him to take the necessary
(2)measures to maintain order and repress disturbances,' '
On the expiry of the ultimatum on the evening of the 23rd, Allenhy
informed the General Staff that the Egyptian'Government had refused all
hut the first four conditions. The Staff was therefore ordered to effect
the withdrawal, of all Egyptian officers and purely Egyptian units of the
Egyptian army and to take the necessary steps for the formation of the
( '5 ')
Sudan defence force,^
There were at this time two British battalions in the Sudan, This 
force was now reinforced hy an additional battalion from Egypt^^\
Gen, Baking, the GOC in Egypt, was also ordered to send a Brigade
Commander and a Brigade Staff to the Sudan and to hold in readiness one
or ' (5)
pack battery if requested hy Sterry,/ordered up hy the War Office.' ^
On receiving orders from Cairo to evacuate the Egyptian officers
and troops from the Sudan, Huddleston, who had already arrived in the
Sudan from Cairo, as Acting Sirdar, explained the general principles of
the scheme for evacuation at a conference of British officers held at
the War Office, Khartoum, on the night of the 2 3 r d . A s  a military
(1) FO 371/10044» Allenhy to FO; Tel, No: 391, 24th November 1924.
(2) FO 371/10044? FO to Allenhy; Tel, No: 237» 24th November 1924.
(3) Wingate Papers; Box 466/IO/I; Diary of events affecting the Sudan 
subsequent to the murder of Sir Lee Stack; 19th to 30th November 1924.
(4) FO 371/10043? FO to Allenhy; No: 217; 20th November 1924, and
FO 371/10044; The War Office to GOC in Egypt, No: 92356; M02 dt.21-11-24.
(5) IMd, and also FO 371/10044? GOC to War Office, No. 5155? 22 Nov. 1922.
(6) Gwynn; Imperial Policing, P.I6 0,
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precaution, the scheme did not allow the retention of either arms or
ammunition hy the Egyptians, However while the Conference was still in
progress, orders were received from Cairo that Egyptians should he
allowed to retain their arms hut not their ammunition. The enforced
evacuation would thus appear less like an act of war and would approximate
(1 )to a normal movement of troops.' '
The problem facing Huddleston was extremely difficult. There were 
two Egyptian infantry battalions, the and the 4th, and three 
batteries of Artillery, all stationed at Khartoum, besides a number of 
Egyptian officers serving with the Sudanese, i.e. Black, and Arab 
battalions or employed on various administrative capacities to he 
evacuated.
The troops available to enforce the order were the two.British
battalions in addition to the Sudanese Black%< battalions and the Arab
units. Unfortunately no reliance could he placed on the Sudanese and
(2)
Arab units as many of their officers were Egyptian.' ' With this inadequate 
force at his command, Huddleston had to he extremely careful in carrying 
out the order of evacuation. He warned the British officers to move 
their men as unostentatiously as possible and as far as possible to keep 
their men out of sight to avoid an unnecessary display of force.
After taking the above steps, Huddleston ordered his men to move 
out of their barracks at 3.3O a.m. on 24th November to their points of 
concentration at Khartoum and Khartoum North. A British officer of the
(1) W.P, Box 466/10/3 ; Report on the evacuation of Egyptian units and 
Officers from the Sudan.
(2) Gwynn: op cit., P.157.
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Egyptian army accompanied each force to act as a liaison officer between 
the British troops and the Egyptian troops which were being surrounded.
Each liaison officer then called upon the officers commanding the 
Egyptian units concerned in order to collect their ammunition and to
(''I')
inform them of the plans made for entrainment,' '
Five trains had been collected at Khartoum and the first train was
timed to leave Khartoum North Railway station at 12 midday followed by
others at the interval of half an hour.
At first no difficulty was experienced in persuading the 4th
Egyptian battalion at Sa’id Pasha barracks to collect their baggage at
the entraining point. However, while this was in progress, details including
Egyptian officers from the Sudanese units in Omdurman arrived at the
entraining point and persuaded a majority of the men of the 4th battalion
to carry back their baggage. The situation then remained at deadlock for
some hours. The battalion was, however, finally persuaded to entrain
after several parleys and conferences which on the Egyptian side were
(2)
presided over by junior officers who were in complete control, '
The 3rd Egyptian battalion, and the Artillery in Khartoum North 
ignored the orders issued by the two British Liaison Officers, They 
refused to leave unless they received orders to do so from the Egyptian 
Government,Huddleston informed Allenby that he was experiencing 
considerable difficulty in evacuating these troops. He said that he was 
avoiding the use of force but he might ultimately have to resort to it.
(1) W.P. Box 466/10/3, Report on the Evacuation of Egyptian Units from 
the Sudan,




In the meantime on the same day, 24th November, the sentenced cadets 
of the military school in the central prison, Khartoum North, broke into 
violence,' ' They broke down the doors of the rooms and cells, releasing 
the other prisoners and armed themselves with spades, iron bars and
( 2)anything they could lay their hands upon,'  ^ Nothing was between them and 
the outer world but the main perimeter wall. Order could easily have been 
restored by firing on the prisoners, as a prison guard from a Sudanese 
battalion under a British officer had replaced that previously furnished 
by Egyptian troops. But it was feared that firing would lead to an 
immediate outbreak in the Egyptian artillery and the Egyptian battalion, 
a very serious complication. The Sudanese guards were, however, given orders 
to fire if any attempt was made by the prisoners to escape from the
(5)prison compound.' ' On the next day, some of the prisoners, mostly non­
politicals who had been kept without rations, began to signal from the 
roof of the prison to the guards for help. Some 142 of them who could 
be reached were evacuated over the wall. Demonstrations were, however, 
carried on daily by the mutineers until the final repatriation of the 
Egyptian troops, after which order was restored.
In the meantime, thanks to Allenby's pressure, a telegram was 
received on the 26th from the Egyptian War Minister who advised the troops 
in the Sudan to cease offering any resistance to the orders of the Acting 
Governor-General. This had the desired effect on the Egyptian Artillery
(1) See Chapter VIII P.
(2) W.P. Box 466/10/1, Diary of the events affecting the Sudan subsequent 
to the murder of Sir Lee Stack, 1 9 -50  November 1924*
(5) W.P.,Box 466/IO/I; Diary of events affecting the Sudan subsequent to
the murder of Lee Stack, 19th to 30th November 1924? Gwynn; op cit.,P.l62.
(4) Ibid,
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whose officers now agreed to leave the country,'  ^ But this could not 
he immediately carried out due to the mutinywhich broke out on the 
27th in the XI Sudanese battalion.
By December 4th, 1924» however, the evacuation of the Egyptian 
officers and units was completed with the exception of a few individual 
Egyptian officers and details of the XIII Sudanese in the Bahr al- 
Ghazal, the Egyptian personnel of the Medical Corps and a few drivers
( 2)of the Egyptian Mechanical transport,' *
The only resistance to evacuation, outside the capital, occurred in 
the Nuba Mountains district at Talodi, where on the 25th November, some 
three Sudanese officers joined the Egyptian officers who had refused to 
leave the Sudan except under direct orders from Egypt, and demonstrated 
outside the gua.rd room and distributed ammunition to the men of the X 
Sudanese, Armoured cars from Khartoum and the Camel Corps from el Obeid 
were sent to Talodi and the situation was restored to normal by the 28th 
and then the evacuation of officers proceeded satisfactorily.
However, the mutiny which broke out in Khartoum on the 27th November 
1924 in which six Sudanese officers of various units and two platoons of 
the XI Sudanese were concerned created a much more serious situation in 
the Sudan than the earlier military insubordination at Port Sudan and 
Atbara or the mutiny of the cadets of the Khartoum military school during
August of the same year,' ' According to Huddleston the outbreak was
(4) I'*'completely unexpected,' ' it was generally believed that the mutiny was
(1) PO 371/10045; Allenby to EG; No: 442; 27th November 1924.
(2) PO 371/10046, Allenby to FO, Tel. No. 516, 9th December 1924.
(3) The XI Sudanese was brou^t from Omdurman to Khartoum in order^take 
over guard duties on the evacuation of Egyptian units; Gwynn: op cit.,
p. 165.
(4) FO 571/10054; Allenby to FO, Tel. No, 449 (H), 28th November 1924.
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the result of recent anti-British propaganda in Egypt where the ¥afd 
regarded it as urgently desirable to convince the world by a demonstration 
that the Sudanese desired union with Egypt and detested the British,
Wingate, now in retirement, saw in the mutiny a resemblance to, that 
with which he had to deal in January 1900.
The immediate instigation of the mutiny appears to have been carried 
out under the orders of el Kaim Rifa'at Bey, of the Egyptian artillery 
and of various other Egyptian officers who had been permitted to reside
in the Officers' Club and the Gordon Hotel pending their evacuation to
Egypt. The Sudanese Officers were promised that they would be supported 
by the Egyptian Artillery the moment the first shots were fired. In order
to convince the waverers, the Egyptians reported falsely that a native
officer and 25 men of the IX Sudanese who were on guard at the north end 
of the Blue Nile Bridge linking Khartoum with Khartoum North, had already 
joined them.^^^
The ring leaders among the Sudanese Officers were M.A. 'Abd al- 
Padl al-Mad and M.T. al-Sayyid Parah, both of the XI Sudanese battalion.
The former was in charge of two platoons of that battalion quartered in 
Sa'id Pasha Barracks, who were to have taken over guard duties in Khartoum 
after the evacuation of the Egyptian troops, and the latter was in charge 
of the guard on the Military prison. These were joined by M.A, Sulaiman 
Muhammad, Camel Corps, M.T, TMbit 'Abd al-HaMian, Cavalry and Mounted 
Infantry, M.T. 'Ali Muhammad al Banna, XII Sudanese and M.T, Hasan Fadl
(1) Wingate Papers; Box 466/10/2; The Mutiny of 27th and 28th November 1924;
PO 571/10054; Short Narrative of the Mutiny in Allenby to Chamberlain,
No. 708, 6th December 1924.
(2) Wingate Papers; Box 241/4/2, Wingate to Fred Milner; 1st December 1924.
(5) Wingate Papers; Box 466/10/2; The Mutiny of 27th and 28th Nov. 1924.
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al-Mula of the Musketry School,
The mutineers after having released the military prisoners, some 
time after 5.50 p.m. on the 27th November and having taken from the 
Musketry School four Vickers guns and ammunition, marched through the 
market district. Here they appear to have turned eastwards where one 
of the officers threatened Mr. Carless, the Inspector of the Khartoum
(2 ) ■
district, with a revolver, when the latter tried to question the officers.'  ^
Mr. Carless immediately reported the matter to Gen. Huddleston who 
went to see Col. Mac Cowan (Officer Commanding Khartoum District) in 
whose office he was informed by a Sudanese that he had just seen two 
bodies of the Sudanese troops running towards the British Barracks.
Mac Cowan went off to investigate while Huddleston telephoned the 
Leicesters to blow the alarm and warn the Argylls.
A party of the mutineers, in the meantime, were attempting to 
persuade the platoon of the XI Sudanese which was on guard at the War 
Office to join them. But Bimb, Mulhalland, who had taken charge of these 
men, was able to march them off.
Meanwhile, Mac Cowan went first to the Blue Nile Bridge to warn the 
guards there and then proceeded slowly westward along the Khedival 
Avenue to meet the mutineers. He encountered the mutineers, proceeding 
eastwards towards the bridge at the junction of Khedival Avenue with 
the road which passes between the Military Hospital and the veterinary
lines and called on them to halt. He asked them where they were going j
and they said, "to join our brothers of the Battalion in Khartoum . j
North"." After failing in his attempts to turn them back, he returned j
(1) Ibid, Gwynn: op cit, P.165. !
(2) PO 571/10054? Short narrative of the Mutiny of the XI Sudanese in j
Allenby to Austen Chamberlain; No: 708; 6th December 1924? also • j
W.P. Box 466/10/2. I
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after warning them that they would be fired upon if they tried to advance.
After receiving I-dac Cowan's report, Huddleston proceeded to the 
scene of trouble with Maj, Cooper of the Argylls and additional troops 
with six Vickers' guns to reinforce the Argylls who were blocking the 
road to Khartoum North. Huddleston then went forward alone and advanced 
to about 60 yards distance from the mutineers and shouted, "I am Huddleston 
Pasha", An officer replied, "Wesdo not know Huddleston Pasha, we only 
know Rifa'at Pasha", Huddleston then called out, "Will you take my 
orders?" to which the officers replied, "We will only take Rifa'at 
Pasha's orders".
Huddleston now returned to the Argylls and ordered them to open fire 
with all guns. The mutineers returned the fire but their shooting caused 
no casualties.
The opening of fire on the mutineers resulted in the invasion of the 
Hospital and its compound. A number of mutineers rushed into the Hospital 
where Maj. Carlyle, the Acting Principal Medical Officer, had begun to 
prepare the wards for patients and in the scuffle that followed Carlyle 
was shot dead and some others wounded.
In the meantime the Argylls had under Lt. Kerr worked forward on the 
south side of ^ edivial Avenue occupying one of the boarding houses of 
the Gordon College, while a platoon of the Leicesters worked through 
the veterinary Hospital on the north of the road. Another platoon of 
the Leicesters worked along the south side of Khédivial Avenue and gained 
touch with the left flank of the Argylls and then took up its position 
along the tramway line on the road, a block to the south of Khédivial 
Avenue. Firing continued until about 10 p.m., when both sides settled
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do'wn for the night. The area of the skirmish lay right in the middle of 
the residential quarters of the British officials. '
At dav/n on 28th November, the British advance was continued without 
much expectation of opposition but as soon as the troops approached the 
back of the Medical Corps Compound, which the mutineers were holding, 
heavy firing started. The compound contained a number of small buildings 
and it was difficult to locate the one held by the mutineers, but finally 
at the cost of several casualties and after seven hours' slow bombardment 
by a 4.5 howitzer, which was brought from the fort, all resistance was 
crushed.
One officer, Fadl al-Mad, and 14 other ranks were believed to have 
been killed and the rest broke up into small parties, some escaped, 
some were hunted down and some surrendered. Of those who surrendered, 
four were officers. These were court martialled and sentenced to death, 
but the sentence was carried out on only three, the sentence on 'All 
Muliammad al-Banna being commuted to 15 years' imprisonment.
On the same day (28th November, 1924), Huddleston asked Cairo for
further reinforcements, comprising two armoured cars and another battalion,
in view of the possibility that it might be necessary, as a temporary
measure to restore confidence, to place small British garrisons wherever
the Sudanese battalions were stationed.^ Huddleston appears to have
been convinced that the regular Sudanese units as opposed to the irregular (AtC
Arab units, could not be trusted. In a report to Allenby, he said that all
the irregulars (Arabs) had displayed an excellent spirit and that to them
(2)
their British officers mattered most.'  ^ But he thou^t that the
(1) FO 571/10054, Allenby to FO; Tel, No: 455; 29th November 1924,
(2) FO 571/10054; Allenby to FO; Tel. No, 455; 29th November 1924.
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morale of the XI Sudanese was entirely destroyed and they mi^t at any
time become fanatically dangerous. He was therefore anxious to disband
them as soon as he was in a position to do so.^^^
In the meantime, Gen. Haking at Cairo had agreed to send the
reinforcements asked for; but he informed the War Office that if he
sent these reinforcements to the Sudan, his own position in Egypt would
become weak. He therefore wanted the War Office to reinforce him with
(2)two additional battalions.  ^ However, Huddleston informed Haking
subsequently that the reinforcements were not immediately wanted but
)atti
(4)
that he might require the additional ba alion l a t e r . T h e  armoured
cars were, however, sent to the Sudan.
After the suppression of the mutiny, Huddleston concentrated all the 
detacteents of the XI Sudanese battalion at Omdurman. As a precaution he 
sent an additional company of Dorsets to reinforce the one which was 
already in O m d u r m a n . T h e  British troops during this period were 
distributed as follows:-
(1) Leicester: One Company at the Blue Nile Bridge and Wireless
Station, remainder in Barracks,
(2) Dorsets: One Company at the War Office emergency reserve and
two companies at Omdurman,
(1) Ibid.
(2) FO 571/10074? GOC to the War Office, No: 5196; 29th November 1924.
(5) FO 571/10074? GOC to War Office? No: 5206; 29th November I924.
(4) FO 571/10074? Rear Admiral, 2nd in Command, Mediterranean Fleet, to
HMS Caradoc, No. 8, 29th November 1924.
(5) FO 571/10054? Allenby to FO; No. 475(a), 1st December 1924.
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(3) Argylls: Two platoons at Civil Prison, Khartoum Worth and
h')the remainder at Gordon College,' '
On the 2nd of December 1924 Huddleston informed Allenby that he 
was sending one company of Argylls to the neighbourhood of Wad Medani, 
where though the situation was normal, the commandant had stated that 
he could not guarantee the XIV Sudanese, The Camel Corps stationed there 
could be relied upon, but their numbers were insufficient to cope with
(2)any grave outbreak.'  ^ He also sent a platoon to Malakal to prevent any
contacts between the XII Sudanese there and the Egyptian officers on their
way down from the X Sudanese at Talodi.
By now the situation in the Sudan was fairly well under control.
The concentration of the XI Sudanese was completed and the battalion was
reported to be carrying out its duties normally.However, the junior
f Sudanese officers were sullen and almost all of them were believed to be
tainted.According to Huddleston the Nuba regular soldiers were the
most dangerous element in the army and Egyptian propaganda had been
more successful with them than with other groups. He had therefore decided
to disband 600 Nuba of the XI Sudanese in December 1924 and some hundreds
more Nuba would be disbanded from other battalions in the course of the 
(6)next year.' *
(1) FO 571/10054, Allenby to FO, Tel. No: 475 (%), 1st December I924.
(2) FO 571/10054, Allenby to FO, Tel. No: 478(h), 2nd December 1924.
(5) Ibid&
(4) FO 571/10054, Sirdar to War Office, No. 969, 2nd December 1924.
(5) PO 571/10879, Mr. More (Sudan Agent) to Allenby, 17th December 1924 
in Allenby to FO, No: 776, 28th December 1924.
(6) FO 571/10055, Sudan Agent to the 1st Secretary, Residency, Cairo, 
12th December 1924 in Mr, Kerr to Mr. A. Chamberlain, No: 756,
21st December 1924.
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A rough picture of the general situation in the Sudan could he had
from a letter from Col. Schuster, the Sudan Government, Finance Secretary
to Sir J, Currie, former education head of the Gordon College, on his
return to Khartoum on 9th December, 1924® Schuster found Khartoum rather
unbalanced. In different ways, he wrote, everyone was suffering from the
shock of the mutiny, Huddleston had adopted the line that he had been
caught twice and was not going to be caught again. He. was watching the IX
and XI Sudanese and was insisting that he must at least disband the X
and XI Sudanese battalions immediately,'  ^ Sterry, as acting Governor-
General was insisting on hauling down the Egyptian flag, the visible sign
of Egyptian presence in the Sudan, and was even seriously considering
(2)doing this on his own authority,'  ^ The general feeling among British 
officers was that the Government would not be safe as long as the Egyptian 
flag flew, that "the Residency has let us down", and tliat "the Sudanese 
battalions do not understand the seriousness of the mutiny and must be 
taught a lesson",
Schuster, however, considered the disbanding of the X and XI 
Sudanese would be a mistake until confidence was restored between them 
and their British officers. He said that the feeling among the men was 
that they had been harshly treated. They were completely confused and if 
they were disbanded in disgrace, there would be trouble in the Nuba
(1) FO 571/10885; 'Situation in the Sudan* by Schuster dated 14th Dec, 1924,
(2) Ibid.
(5) Ibid, The British officials hoped that on the death of Stack, the 
Sudan could have been completely separated from Egypt, Allenby, on 
the other hand, was content to order the evacuation of the Egyptian 
troops from the Sudan and insisted upon maintaining the Condominium,
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Mountains (from where they were mostly recruited) and elsewhere for 
many years,
Schuster appears to have suggested to Sterry and Huddleston that 
instead of trying to haul down the Egyptian fla& or rushing to disband 
the Sudanese battalions, steps should be taken to straighten out the 
army issue and make it clear to the officers and men that from henceforth 
there would be only one allegiance, namely, to the British Crown, After 
further consideration, Schuster reported that the Sudan Government had 
come to the conclusion that since in the past the Sudanese and Arab 
units had formed part of the Egyptian army, it would be quite a logical 
development that they should in future form part of the British army,
Egypt having shown that she could not be trusted to provide for the 
defence of the Sudan without upsetting the existing regime, Britain 
would step into her place. According to Schuster, the Sudanese units 
could be disbanded and then be reformed and swear a new oath of allegiance 
to His Britanic Majesty, Thereafter the Union Jack alone would fly over
(2)the military buildings, ' Schuster added that since the Egyptian flag 
had formerly flown alone on military buildings, there would presumably 
be nothing inconsistent with the 1899 Convention in this arrangement.
Both flags, would, however, continue to fly over civil buildings. This 
would give Huddleston exactly what he wanted.
On 2nd January 1925 Mr. Murray, in a Minute on Schuster's letter 
stated that Britain would have a good opportunity to make the Sudan 
Defence Force a genuinely British concern if the Egyptian Parliament
(1) Ibid,
(2) FO 57I/IO883; 'Situation in the Sudan' by Schuster dt, 14th December, 
1924; FO 571/10054; Allenby to FO; No: 554; 14th December I924 and 
FO 571/10055; Allenby to FO; No: 555; 14th December 1924,
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declined to vote the contribution which Allenby had been trying to get 
towards the cost of the Sudan administration. He suggested that Allenby 
should be informed that until the question of the Egyptian contribution 
to the Sudan was settled, the Sudan Government.should go slow in dis­
banding the Sudan units, Chamberlain approved this suggestion and agreed 
to discuss the flag question with the Prime Minister,
The question of the Egyptian flag was a subject of further corres­
pondence between the Sudan authorities and Allenby, the Sudan authorities 
contending that the use of the flag over the Barracks occupied by the 
new defence force would be impossible and that as the mutinous Black 
battalions could not for the moment be disbanded, it was dangerous to
(2 )leave them under the Egyptian fla^; '  ^ Allenby insisting that British 
policy required the maintenance of the Condominium; while the Foreign 
Office wavered between the demands of diplomacy in Egypt and of security 
in the Sudan, Allenby pointed out that though Sterry*s proposals might 
not be a breach of 1899 Convention, they would certainly be so regarded 
by Egyptians, He added that the British Government had already attained 
its object with regard to Military organisation in the Sudan, Now that 
there was a friendly Government in Egypt, it was desirable to avoid 
alienating it by measures such as those proposed by S t e r r y , A f t e r  
further consideration the Foreign Office agneed to retain the Egyptian 
Flag,(4)
(1) FO 371/IO885; FO Minutes on Schuster's letter on the situation in 
the Sudan, 14th December 1924.
(2) FO 571/10054; Allenby to FO; No: 53 urgent, 14th December 1924.
See also FO 571/10054, FO to Allenby, No:505; l6th December 1924®
(5) FO 571/10055; Allenby to FO; No: 551; 18th December 1924.
(4) FO 571/10879; FO Mnutes on Allenby to FO; No, 14; 4th Januar^ r 1925,
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The withdrawal of the purely Egyptian (Pallah) units of the
Egyptian army and Egyptian officers serving with the Sudanese and Arab
units from the Sudan completed the first phase of the reorganisation
of the Egyptian army. The next phase was the formation of the Sudan
Defence Force, This was, however, postponed till the appointment of a
new Governor-General,
The Foreign Office in London set aside the precedent of appointing
a senior military officer as the Govemor-Gdneral and wanted to appoint
a civilian to that post, Mr. J.S. Ameiy, the Colonial Secretary, when
asked by Chamberlain to recommend a successor to Stack, suggested Sir
Geoffrey Archer's name.^^  ^ Archer's experience as Governor of British
Somaliland (1914-1922), and Governor of Uganda (1923-1924) must liave
weighed in his favour for his selection. He was therefore appointed
Governor-General of the Sudan, while Maj, Gen, Huddleston was confirmed
as Sirdar of the Egyptian army both inlEgypt and the Sudan,
On his arrival in the Sudan, Archer'g first;6ask was to form the
Sudan Defence Force in accordance with the ultimatum delivered to Za^lul
by Allenby on 22nd November 1924® The immediate problem was the issue of
new commissions to the British and native officers who would serve in
the new force. All the native officers had taken the oath of allegiance
to the Sultan of Egypt, Since the Condominium had not been dissolved
V after Stack's assassination the new Commissions should have to be signed
jointly by the King of England and the Sultan of Egypt, But George V
in
declined to sign jointly with Fuad and/this dilemma, and in the absence 
of any alternative, Archer was instructed by Chamberlain to issue the
(l) Sir Geoffrey Archer: Personal and Historical Memoirs of an East 
African Administrator, PP. 178, 190. London (1963).
274
Commissions in his own name as the representative of the tv/o monarohs, ^ ^
Archer proposed to inaugurate the Sudan Defence Force on iyth 
(2)
January 1925. He informed Allenhy that the inauguration would he 
followed by a ceremonial parade at Omdurman. Then he would tour the 
main military centres in the provinces where oaths of allegiance would
be first administered by the Mudir followed by the presentation of
Commissions by himself. Officers would sign the receipt for the Commissions, 
llaj, Gen, Huddleston was to be given liberty to exercise his discretion 
regarding the officers to be re-engaged. Those whom he did not wish to 
retain in the Sudan Defence Force and those who were unwilling to 
subscribe to the conditions governing the issue of the new commissions 
would be informed that their services were not required in the new 
force,
The terms of the proposed proclamation were as follows:-
(1) The new army was to be styled the 'Sudan Defence Force', and
would owe allegiance to the Governor-General of the Sudan,
(2) The Governor-General would appoint and dismiss all officers, 
and all commissions would be issued in his name,
(3) The Egyptian Government being unable to employ any longer the 
officers of the Egyptian army who were natives of the Sudan, those 
officers who were considered worthy would be accepted for service in 
the Sudan army on terms governing the issue of commissions which would 
be communicated to the officers that day,
(1) Archer,' Op cit., P.210,
(2) FO 371/10879, Allenby to FO, No, 21(r), 13th January 1925.
(3)-:There were twelve such officers. FO 371/10879, Governor-General to 
Allenby, No,10, in Allenby to FO, Nos. 24 and 25, 15th January 1925.
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(4) On the issue of the new commissions, the Sudan Government
would accept responsibility for payment of pensions and gratuities to which
the Sudanese officers were then entitled under the conditions of service
( '1 ')in the Egyptian army,^ ^
However, the main difficulty in the way of inaugurating the new
force was, would the native officers in the Sudan, as strict Muslims,
he ready to go hack on their oath to Egypt and surrender the commissions
(2)
which they already held?^  ^ Huddleston had now to prepare the ground 
hy enlisting the support of the grand lîufti and the Qadi and the other 
religious leaders to set at rest the Muslim conscience. On the day fixed 
for the inauguration, 17th January, the British and Sudanese officers 
alike paraded, the Mufti stood hy and the whole ceremony was carried out 
without a hitch,
The Sudan Defence Force was organised on an area hasis. The company 
of 150 to 200 men, commanded hy a British officer, became the tactical 
unit whether it was in an infantry, camel, mule or horse company. In 
most of the units, the men were enlisted as irregulars; they provided 
their own rations and accommodation, thou^ their training or equipment 
was similar to that of regulars. The general result of this organisation 
was a highly mobile force which lent itself to the formation of detach­
ments required in controlling wide areas and to rapid reinforcements 
in the event of trouble, A high proportion of machine-guns provided
(4)the force with plenty of fire power when necessary,'
(1) FO 37I/IO879, Governor-General to Allenhy, Ho,17, in Allenhy to FO, 
No: 25, 15th January 1925,
(2) Sir G. Archer; Personal and Historical memoirs of an East African 
Administrator, P,210,
(3) IMd. P.211,
(4) Gvynnt Imperial Policing. P.180.
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After the inauguration of the Sudan Defence Force, Allenhy informed 
the Egyptian Government that the Sudan Government had assumed responsi­
bility for all expenditure on the new force. This statement formally 
announced the financial separation of the Egyptian army and the Sudan 
Defence Force, But the precise date from which the new arrangements would 
come into force was to he decided hy mutual agreement with the Egyptian 
Government, The British Foreign Office was told that the separation 
would not affect the wider question of Egypt’s contribution to the Sudan 
administration,^ '
For some time Allenhy had been discussing with the Egyptian 
Government the question of the Egyptian contribution to the Sudan, The 
Egyptian Government was willing to meet the whole cost of the Sudan 
Defence Force, hut the question centred round the phraseology which 
Sidqi Pasha, the Egyptian Minister, wanted to use, Sidqi wanted to 
describe the offer in the following words;-
"Egyptian Government are happy to pay charges incurred hy Sudan 
budget in virtue of incorporation in the budget of cost of maintenance 
of Sudan troops hitherto paid by the Ministry of ¥ar as these troops 
contribute to defence against internal and external dangers of Sudan
territory whose ties with Egypt continue to subsist inspite of measures
(2)
recently taken which Egypt trusts to see withdrawn,^ ^
The Sudan officials were against the use of the above phraseology. 
They feared that it would create a bad impression in the Sudan if the 
Egyptian contribution was so described, as an outward sign of her share
(1) FO 371/10900, Allenhy to FO, No,31, Urgent, 19th January 1925; 
FO 371/10879, Allenhy to Ziwar Pasha, 26th January 1925 in 
Allenhy to Austin Chamberlain, No: 78, 1st February 1925.
(2) FO 371/IO883, Allenhy to FO, Tel, No: 16(r), 12th January 1925.
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in the condominium,  ^The Foreign Office agreed with the Sudan officials
tliat Sidqi’s phraseology was intended to re-estahlish in Egyptian opinion
the Egyptian contacts with the Sudan, The British Government could not
approve any attempt hy the Egyptian Parliament to vote and control the
expenditure of an annual grant in aid to the S u d a n , M u r r a y  suggested
that a joint loan could he made to the Sudan hy British and Egyptian
Governments at a low rate of interest and which should he repayable in
a short time. This loan should be for a general and not for specifically
military purposes. But this, according to Murray, need not be insisted
upon. The Sudan Government was at liberty to make use of the money in whatever
(■z)
way and for whatever purpose it might suit them,^^'
\ïh±le the above was still under consideration, Archer submitted that 
the phraseology of the proposed Egyptian offer would create the impression 
in the Sudan that (l) Egypt was still the pay master of the Sudan Defence 
Force and that (2) there was a possibility of the return of Egyptian 
troops to the Sudan and of Egyptian officers to the Sudan Defence Force, 
According to Archer the advantages of a financial contribution were nat 
sufficient to outwei^ all the political considerations at stake. If 
Sidqi’s conditions were accepted, Archer feared that there was no 
guarantee that further conditions would not be attached by the Egyptian 
Parliament later while voting money for the Sudan, The Egyptian Parliament 
might claim control over its expenditure or assert its right to re-
(1) FO 571/10883, Allenhy to FO, Tel, No: 17, 12th January 1925.
(2) FO 371/10883, Draft Tel, from FO to Allenby, January 1925.
(3) FO 371/10883, Draft Tel, from FO to Allenby, January 1925.
(4) FO 37I/IO883, Sir G, Archer’s proposals. No, 20, 15th January 1925.
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introduce Egyptian troops in support of the Egyptian flag in the Sudan,
Each condition could he represented as hardly significant enough in itself 
to afford ground for abandoning the advantages of Egypt’s contribution.
But the cumulative effect would enable Egypt to regain the power of 
interference in the S u d a n . A r c h e r  proposed that a fixed annual 
contribution should be an indispensable condition of the maintenance of 
the condominium, and that the likely way to secure the compliance would 
be to indicate the readiness of the British Government to dispense with 
Egypt’s subsidy. Failing this he suggested that (1) financial assistance 
as required by the Sudan should be provided equally by Britain and 
Egypt, (2) this assistance should be contribution to the general revenues 
of the Sudan; (3) that it should take the form ef a fixed subsidy 
subject to revision at reasonable intervals,
Allenby concurred with Archer’s views. But he said that whatever 
the contribution might be, the Egyptian Parliament would claim a voice 
in the manner of its expenditure. If the Foreign Office rejected Archer’s 
proposals, it remained to be decided whether the British Government ~ 
preferred that Egypt should contribute £E 730,000 p,a, with a likelihood 
that it would be specifically granted as ’payment of cost of Sudan 
defence force’ or only half a million pounds, which the Egyptian Government
(2)
might agree to grsrt simply as a contribution to defence of the Sudan,^ ' 
Archer’s proposals were, however, rejected. The Treasury considered 
that since it was not proposed to deprive Egypt of her share in the 
Condominium except in the last resort, there should be no objection to
(1) Ibid.
(2) FO 37I/IO883, Allenby to FO, Tel. No: 48, 31st January 1925.
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accepting the largest contribution that Egypt was willing to make
f 1 ')towards the Sudan expenditure whether military or otherwise.' ' The
Treasury added that Egypt was willing to pay £E 750,000 annually.
With this amount the Sudan administration could pay its way. Since the
cost of the Sudan defence force would be incorporated in the Sudan
budget, there need not be any fear of any Egyptian control over the 
(2 )
Sudan expenditure,' * The Foreign Office proposal that Egypt should make 
a loan of part of the expenditure would, on the other hand, involve a 
claim to control. According to the Treasury, an annual lump sum would 
be forgotten but a loan involved expectation of repayment and as a 
natural corollary, a claim to be satisfied by supervision over the 
debtor that such repayment would be forthcoming.
The Foreign Office now decided to accept the Treasury point of 
view, Austen Chamberlain minuted on the Treasury communication that the 
original intention of the British Government in the ultimatum to Za^lul 
was that Egypt should contribute £E1,000,000 a year to the cost of her 
southern frontier provided by the existence of the Sudan defence force.
He now wanted to revert to this idea. He felt that it was always in the 
power of the British Government to disallow interference though it might
(5)not be in her power to obtain the subsidy whilst disallowing interference,^ ' 
Accordingly, Allenby was informed that in the existing circumstances it 
was impossible to make the Sudan financially independent of Egypt as 
suggested by Archer, He was asked to accept £E 750,000 offered by Sidqi
(1) FO 371/10083, Treasury to FO, No: J.367/22/I6, 4th February 1925.
(2) Ibid.
(3) FO 371/10883; FO Minutes on Treasury to FO; 4th February 1925.
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Pasha who should he warned that any attempt to use the Egyptian contribution 
as a means of interference in the Sudan administration would not be 
tolerated.
The vote of £E 750,000 for the Sudan Defence Force was discussed in 
the Egyptian Parliament on 7th September 1 9 2 6 . The opposition to the 
granting of this credit was led by the Watanist deputy Abd al-Hamid 
Sa’id who said that since the departure of the Egyptian units from the 
Sudan the forces in that country were no longer under the control of the 
King of Egypt, According to him this was a clear aggression on the ri^ts 
of Egypt and its King, He declared that Egypt and the Sudan were indivisible 
and requested/he members of the Parliament not to pass the credit unless 
the Egyptian array returned to the S u d a n , A f t e r  further discussions 
the resolution was moved that, "The Chamber of deputies approves the 
credit of £E 750,000 provided that this approval is not considered as a 
recognition of the new regime in the Sudan, nor as an acknowledgement 
that the Sudan has any right to claim this subvention, nor that the 
Sudan be exempted from repaying its debt to Egypt, and provided also 
that the Chamber should retain the ri^t to discuss the origin of credit, 
its amount and d u r a t i o n , " T h e  Parliament passed the resolution 
against three votes.
The Foreign Office considered thèse conditions as mere verbiage
(1) FO 371/10883; Foreign Office to Allenby, Tel, No; 51» 14th February 
1925.
(2) FO 371/11613» Secret Intelligence Report, No: 7; by S. Hillelson; 
(Acting Director of Intelligence) 4th October 1926.
(3) FO 371/11613; Secret Intelligence Service, No. 7; By 8, Hillelson, 
Acting D.lo, 4th October 1926,
(4) Ibid.
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and of no practical effect. The question of the Egyptian subvention 
to the Sudan had been the main obstacle to the settlement of the Sudan 
on the basis of a more exclusive British control. The British officials 
in Egypt and the Sudan had been advocating, especially during the post­
war period when the question of the future status of Egypt under the 
Protectorate was being discussed, the separation of the Sudan from Egypt 
both militarily and financially. To the British Government these proposals 
were not feasible until an agreement was reached with the Egyptian Govern­
ment on the future relations between the two countries. Meanwhile, the 
Sudan Government was left to maintain security in the Sudan as best as 
they could. It required Stack’s death to bring about the changes which 
he wanted to carry out.
CHAPTER X
Security Situation in the Sudan 
during 1923 - 1926.
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Neither the reorganisation of the Egyptian army nor the formation 
of the Sudan Defence Force solved the problem of security in the Sudan. 
The doubtful loyaltÿ of the Sudan Defence Force, the revival of Mahdiism 
under the forceful personality of ’Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi" and the 
emergence of ’educated’ nationalism created new problems for some of 
which there was no solution to be found in the field of strictly military 
security. Some of these problems are discussed in the following pages.
The Sudan Defence Force and the Black Officers
The formation of the Sudan Defence Force created much frustration 
among the ’Black’ officers. They had hoped that after the departure of 
the Egyptian officers they would be promoted to the ranks vacated by 
the latter. Unfortunately for these officers, the mutiny of the XI 
Sudanese battalion in November I924 and the general discontent among 
the Sudanese battalions, which had subsequently come to light, had 
destroyed their chances of promotion to higher ranks. Moreover, the 
original scheme submitted by Stack had contemplated an increase in the 
proportion of British officers and NCOs and a reduction of native 
officers. These changes added to the discontent of the ’Black’ officers 
who interpreted the increase in the proportion of British officers as 
lack of confidence in then.^^^ Further, the disbandment of the XII,
XIII and XIV Sudanese battalions and absorption of their officers and 
men into the IX Sudanese battalion led to a certain amount of talk 
that'the Government had been ungrateful to the ’Black’ troops who had
(2)done so much for it at and since the reconquest of the Sudan.
(1) FO 371/11615, S.I.R., No. I, 18th March 1926.
(2) FO 371/11613, S.I.E., No. 3, 25th May 1926.
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The discontent of the ’Black' officers was an object of especial 
attention to the anti-British elements in Egypt and the Sudan. The a m y ’ s 
allegiance was not only the biggest prize which the enemies of the 
Government could possibly win, but it was a prize which the events of 
1924 encouraged them to consider as not beyond their reach. In this they 
were supported by those certain (black) officers who had been either 
discharged and pensioned off or liad opted for service with the Egyptian 
army.
The discontent amongst the black officers had reached such a state 
that they viewed with suspicion even their brother officers of Arab 
origin whom they considered as spies of the British officers. They 
avoided the Arab officers and were reported to be in secret agreement 
never to divulge their own doings to them.^ **^
The rank and file of the Sudan Defence Force, on the other hand, 
loyal to the Government. This was partly due to the influence of 
British officers which was brought to bear on them even more directly 
than had been the case in the Egyptian army; and partly to the fact that 
the abolition of the Khartoum Military School had thrown open for them
(2)wider prospects of promotion.^  ^ They would not therefore easily risk 
their chances of promotion at the instigation of the disaffected members 
of the cadet officer class.
(1) FO 371/11614; Secret Intelligence Report No, 8; 4th November 1926,
(2) FO 371/11613; Sudan Intelligence Report No. I, 18th March 1926.
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Mahdiism in the Sudan during 1925-1926
The revival of Mahdiism under the guidance of al-Sayyid ’Ahd al- 
Rahman al-Malidi during the postwar period further complicated the 
security problem in the Sudan. The policy of the Sudan Government until 
1914 was to repress open manifestations of the belief in Muliammad Ahmad 
al-Mahdi, whose descendants and those of the Khalifa ’Abdallahi were 
kept under close supervision. ‘Abd al-RaWan, the Mahdi's son, had come 
to live in Omdurman in I906. Though there was no Mahdist organisation, 
he was acknowledged as leader by his father’s followers and by 1914 he 
could count on a considerable following in the Gezira.
Shortly after the outbreak of the Great War, ’Abd al-Ra^an was 
regarded as sufficiently important to be of use to the Government by 
spreading anti-Turkish propaganda in the Sudan. The Government therefore 
modified its policy towards the I-Widists and ’Abd al-Ralimah’s support 
was e n l i s t e d . H e  was, however, warned in 1917 against using this 
opportunity in order to organise the Mahdists. Nevertheless, by 1919 
’Abd al-Rahman had become head of a powerful organisation, holding 
Mahdist tenets and observances; he was able to complete the organisation 
of the I-Hahdists of the Gezira inspite of the warning of 1917* He had, 
however, been loyal to the Government and in recognition of his services,
( 2 )he was sent as a member of the Sudan delegation to England.  ^ ' By 1921 
the Governors of Kordofan and Bar Pur were aware of a vigorous and 
successful Mahdist propaganda in the west, which was conducted by
(1) PO 571/11613» A Note on the Recent History of Mahdiism by R. Davies, 
17th April 1926.
(2) Ibid,
agents of ’Abd al-Rahman who also collected’Zaka from his followers and
(2)
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I ' n ' t
kept him informed of matters affecting them.
The collection of ’Zaka’ by the I'feihdist agents was resented by the 
Nazirs of the tribes, and ’Abd al-Ralman therefore was informed in March 
1923 that the Government could not permit any organisation which would 
encourage a belief in the possibility of a reconstruction of the Mahdist 
regime. He was therefore ordered to discontinue the pra,ctice of authori­
sing agents to collect’Zaka’,
By now Aba Island had become the cradle of Mahdist activity and 
propaganda. ’Abd al-Rahman’s private prosperity had marched with his 
public recognition. He had made large profits from the wood contracts 
during the war and was able to buj^  a good house in Khartoum. It was 
estimated that about 12000to 13003^ilgrims worked for him at various 
centres in the Gezira who received no remuneration beyond their food 
and an outfit of clothes twice a year.^^^ When it was reported that a 
\large number of pilgrims had assembled at Aba in 1923, ’Abd al-Rahman 
was summoned to Khartoum and ordered to disperse them, which he did. 
Governors of provinces were also instructed to take steps to discourage 
this pilgrimage at its source.
The Government's check on the activities of 'Abd al-Ra^an was of 
short duration. His influence in the Sudan was again needed in 1924 to 
assist the Government in countering Egyptian propaganda. In May he
(1) ’Zaka’, poor tax.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid.
(4) PO 371/11613; Secret Intelligence Report, No. 5; 31st July 1926.
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visited the Gezira twice which resulted in petitions of loyalty to the 
Government pouring in from the various sections of the community. These 
demonstrations of loyalty did not blind the authorities to ’Abd al- 
Ra^an’s political ambitions. He was an ambitious man and in his 
relations with the Government had displayed considerable adroitness in 
abandoning positions attacked by the authorities and swiftly consoli­
dating others equally useful to himself before the Government realised 
that he had changed his ground. As an example when he was ordered to 
discontinue the use of agents to collect ’Zaka’ amongst the western 
tribes, he readily complied with the orders, but at the same time 
established on or near Aba Island representatives of different tribes 
and regions whose business was to keep in touch with their constituencies. 
Again when in 1923 he was ordered to disperse colonies of westerners 
from Aba Island, he obeyed the letter of the order, but established the 
colonies on the west bank of the Nile, on sites just as convenient as 
the Island itself from his point of view, and just as undesirable from 
that of the Government’s. Two years later the Government was still 
insisting on the enforcement of this order.
The Mahdist movement in the Sudan developed on two different lines 
during the period under study. The Malidists in the Central Sudan were 
more or less under the direct influence of ’Abd al-Rahman who was as 
noticed earlier, not prepared openly to defy the Government . Like him, 
they professed to have established Mahdiism on a new basis as a purely 
religious movement and were deferential to the constituted authority.
(l) FO 371/11614; Secret Intelligence Report No. 8; 4th November 1926.
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But the disquieting element in the Mahdist movement was the spread of 
Messianic prophesies and the recrudescence of Millenarian heliefs^^^ 
in the west. The Mahdists of the western Sudan, to whom ’Abd al-RaWan 
had no open access, formed the majority of the pilgrims who visited 
Aba Island to acquire merit by working for him, and returned to spread 
his influence in the west. These western Mahdists believed in the second 
coming of the prophet Jesus; and according to them ’Abd al-Rahman himself 
Kwas the Prophet Jesus who would over throw the government. It was the 
I spreading of this belief in the west which made Mahdiism a serious threat 
I to security in the Sudan. A notable of Western Kordofan warned the 
Government that if ’Abd al-Rahman was not removed to a far off place, 
he would be the ruin of the Sudan as his father had been before him. 
"Every day", he added, "people are praying to him as the Nebi ’Isa and
( 2 )no oath is used or accepted unless it is in his name."  ^ '
Doubts were now raised whether or not the increase of Mahdiism among
the western tribes implied a corresponding increase in Mahdist sympathies
among units of the Sudan Defence Force recruited in Kordofan and Dar Pur.
This question was seriously taken up by the Intelligence Department and
by November 1926 an uncorroborated report was received from an agent
(■z)
who submitted the following particulars:-^ '
Station Mahdist Millenarians
el Obeid 20^ 2^
Bara 5^ Not known
Pasher 75^ 10^
(1) PO 371/11613* A Note on the Recent History of Mahdiism by Davies, 
17th April 1926.
(2) PO 371/11613? Secret Intelligence Report, 25th May 1926.
(3) PO 371/11614* Secret Intelligence Report No. 9* 30th November 1926.
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Station Mahdist Millenarians
Kahkahia a minority 1^ or 2^
Geniena 55% 5%
Nyala 35% to 40% . 3% to 4^
It is not clear how the above analysis was arrived at by the secret
agent. Whatever be the number of Mahdists in the army units stationed
in the Western Sudan, Davies, the Director of Intelligence, did not
consider them dangerous enough to cause immediate alarm. But in an
atmosphere charged with fanaticism Mahdiism in the army was definitely
undesirable. He therefore suggested two remedies to eliminate the
Mahdists from the army. The first remedy was not to recruit from certain
tribes known to be prone to Mahdiism and the other was gradually to
eliminate soldiers known for their Mahdist activities on the expiration
of their service. The number of IWidists in the arn^ y would then be
Cl
reduced with a minimum of undesirable publicity.^ ^
Nationalism in the Sudan.
A new generation of educated Sudanese had risen in the Sudan who 
did not escape the psychological influence of successful nationalist 
movements in Egypt and other neighbouring countries from where they derived
I
the notion of Sudanese nationalism. They had acquired definite conceptions r
as regards their rights and were in a frame of mind which made them
readily responsive to the promptings, subversive or other-wise, of any
(2 )
who would show them a way to the realisation of their desires.^ '
(1) PO 371/11614» Secret Intelligence Report; No.9» 30th November 1926.
(2) PO 371/10905, Mr, Ewart to Private Secretary, Governor General;
21st April 1925 in Mr. Henderson to Sir A. Chamberlain, No. 467,
27th June 1925.
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In their attempt to foster the idea of the Sudanese nationality, 
they were faced with the fact that in secular matters, the vast hulk 
of the people of the Sudan showed no inclination to think nationally 
hut only trihally and individually, '
In order to cut across tribal barriers, different lines of approach 
towards the nationalist ideals were explored by the leaders of the 
educated class. They claimed that by reason of their education and 
enlightenment, they were better qualified;: to represent to the Government 
the views and needs of the tribes than were the tribal leaders. This 
line of approach was especially popular during 1924 when suggestions 
from Egypt were made that the Sudan should have seats in a Parliament 
of the two countries. They began to formulate demands for something 
equally attractive from the British Government such as the declaration 
of a fixed period within which self-government would be granted to the 
Sudan as a prize for their support.
This line of approach having failed, the educated class looked 
to the other alternative of developing the Nationalist idea under the 
leadership of the chief religious notables. Thus the editor of al-
(2)
Hadara * wrote leading articles exhorting the religious leaders to 
sink their differences and combine to turn the Sudanese into a nation.
He was particularly referring to ’Ali al-Mirghani and ’Abd al-HaWan 
al-Mahdi.The former was the head of a purely religious Tariqa and the 
latter led a politico-religious party which was in itself a barely 
veiled nationalist movement,
(1) PO 371/11613; S.I.R., No. I, 18th March 1926.
(2) A newspaper which was actually launched by the three religious heads.
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The left wing of the educated classes, however, believed in 
subversive activities. They avoided public meetings and open propaganda, 
and organised themselves as a conspiratorial secret society of which 
each member knew and was known to only his immediate contacts. The 
involvement of the discontented black officers in these subversive 
activities made the left wing nationalists doubly dangerous for security 
in the Sudan,
External dangers to security in the Sudan
For some time the communists had been active in the Sudan, but the 
effect of their activity on the Sudanese Nationalist Movements had been 
limited and narrow. This was confined to the techniques and methods of 
political organisation and agitation as noticed a b o v e . R e a l i s i n g  
that their doctrines were not acceptable to sincere Muslims, the 
Communists confined their activity to fostering subversive tendencies and 
to give an anti-British turn to any local discontent. Their objective 
was to destroy the British and French domination over Muslim countries
(2)
in order to set up a communist regime on the ruins,^ ' Close connections 
between the communists and the Egyptian nationalists and the keen interest 
they evinced in establishing bases in the Sudan made the Communists and 
the Egyptian Nationalists external sources of subversive influence on the 
Sudan.
(1) For further details on the Communist activities in the Middle East 
between 1919-1927 with special reference to Egypt and the Sudan,
see Dr, Jaafar Muhammad Ali Bakheit’s paper on the subject. University 
of Khartoum, October I968.
(2) FO 371/11613, S.IoRo No, I, 18th March 1926,
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Governmental Measures to meet the threat to Security in the Sudan,
The Intelligence Department,
The first step the Sudan Government took to meet these various
threats to security was to reorganise the Intelligence Department, Just
before his death, Stack had secured the services of Mr, J.M. Ewart of
the Punjab Police to reorganise the Intelligence Department in the Sudan,
In February 1925 Ewart was appointed Chairman of a Special Committee
which was directed to undertake a review of all information regarding
the political events culminating in the mutiny of the XI Sudanese in
November 1924, In his report, after reviewing the political situation
in the Sudan from 1919 - 1924, Mr, Ewart pointed out that "the most
marked defect in the machinery which the Government had at its disposal
to meet political situation was the lack of any investigating agency
or preventive system,Although the investigations that had been so
far carried out by Governors and deputy Governors had resulted in some
remarkable results, according to Ewart, this was no justification of the
system. There was no agency in existence which could check the propaganda
material, such as literature and money, passing across the frontier into
the Sudan, In Ewart’s opinion a minor, but still important matter was
the control of persons, officials or othenmse, suspected of undesirable
political activities, but against whom no definite charge could be
preferred. Unfortunately there was no means for exercising effective
surveillance over the activities of the political suspects on their
(2)
release^from detention.^ ^
(l) FO 371/10905, Report on 'The History of Politics in the Sudan from 
1919-1924' by Mr, Ewart, 21st April 1925 in Mr, Henderson to Mr, A, 
Chamberlain, No: 467, 27th June 1925.
(2) Ibid.
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In November 1925 Archer submitted certain proposals to Lord Lloyd, 
then the British High Commissioner in Egypt, advocating certain changes 
in the Government organisation at Khartoum.^ Among other proposals, 
which are not relevant to the subject, Archer wanted to regulate the 
functions of the Director of Intelligence. He pointed out that the 
existing system throu^ which the native information reached the Governor- 
General was open to objection. In his opinion the organisation of the 
Department had been over-taxed and was unable to keep pace with the 
needs of the Government in respect of purely intelligence work. Another 
point which Archer raised was that the Director of Intelligence had 
been treated as having responsibility not merely for the supply of 
information but also for giving advice as to policy. This led to friction 
and overlapping of functions with the Civil Secretary, There was also 
the danger in such cases that intelligence might be so construed as to 
confirm personal opinions previously expressed by the Intelligence officer 
himself. Finally, Archer added tha.t the Director of Intelligence worked 
in the provinces through his own agents and not through the provincial 
Staff, According to Archer this again led to friction between the 
Intelligence Department and the provincial authorities. In view of the 
above objections. Archer proposed to create a post of Adviser for Native 
Affairs within the Secretariat to be filled by a senior and experienced 
political officer. The Adviser for Native Affairs would be in closest 
touch with the Governor-General on the one hand and with the Secretary 
to the Administration, another post which Archer wanted to create, and 
the Director of Intelligence on the other, in regard to all matters
(1) FO 371/11609, Archer to Lloyd, No, 189, 17th November 1925 in 
Lloyd to Chamberlain, No: I63, 18th March 1926,
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affecting the native interests. The most important duty of the Adviser 
for Native Affairs would he to visit provinces frequently as the liaison 
officer for all native questions between the Governor-General and 
provincial Governors and to enquire on the spot into the complaints 
submitted to the Governor-General by the natives of the provinces.
As regards the Intelligence Department, Archer wanted it to be a 
separate entity closely associated with the Secretariat rather than 
directly under the Governor-General, It would be in charge of a 
especially selected officer of moderate seniority whose duty would be 
to assist both the Secretary to the Administration and the Adviser for 
Native Affairs by keeping them fully informed on all matters falling 
within their respective spheres. Eg would also be directly responsible 
for furnishing proper intelligence to the Military authorities and would 
be in a position of a Staff Officer for Intelligence to the Governor- 
General,
Lord Lloyd approved Archer’s proposals for the creation of a post
of Adviser for Native Affairs and the reorganisation of the Intelligence
il !
(2)
(1 )Department,^ ' The Adviser would be placed under Civ Secretary, with
the title of Deputy Civil Secretary (Native Affairs),
The reorganisation of the Department of Intelligence followed the 
lines recommended by Mr, Ewart who completed his assignment in the Sudan 
by February 1926 before returning to India. The first report of the 
Intelligence Department was published in March 1926, It was divided
(1) FO 371/11609, Lloyd to Chamberlain, N0 .I63, 18th March 1926,
(2) Ibid, Lloyd was against abolishing the post of Civil Secretary to 
the Government,
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into three main headings dealing with (a) External Influences;
(Td) Channels of Communication and (c) Internal elements.
The publication off monthly reports was, however, continued as
before, but their scope was not limited to matters affecting public
security within the Sudan, They provided an upto date appreciation of
the political situation to the concerned departments. Therefore while
giving the most accurate information available and considered judgement
thereon, they would have this object in view rather than any ideal of
(2 )
departmental infallibility.  ^These reports were to be published on 
the sole responsibility of the Director of Intelligence and were intended 
for a wider circle than the Secret Reports, They were to be supplemented 
by special Reports in greater detail on particular topics addressed to 
those officials more immediately concerned.
According to Ewart the political opposition in the Sudan, inspite 
of its ability to cause serious trouble, was elementary in its organi- 
sation and t e c h n i q u e , T h e  politics of open violence and of the 
assassination had failed to win effective support, and elaborations 
such as ciphers or secret inks had not been utilized. He added, however, 
that while the significance of the recent events should not be exaggerated, 
it would be dangerous to minimise them. In his opinion the indigenous 
political sentiment was basically a national one. The attitude towards 
Egyptian politics was subservient to national self interest. The cry for
(1) PO 371/11613, Secret Intelligence Report, No. I, 18th March 1926,
(2) Ibid.
(3) FO 371/10905, The History of Politics in the Sudan from 1919 - 1924, by 
Ewart, 21st April 1925 in Mr. Henderson to Mr, Austen Chamberlain,
No, 467, 27th jWer.192592",=
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the "Unity of the whole Nile Valley" was at best a temporary expedient 
to get rid of the British before turning on the Egyptians,  ^^ ^
Referring to the incidents of 1924» Ewart warned the Government 
that it would be futile to suppose that the subversive elements had 
been crushed once for all. For the moment there was quiet in the Sudan 
but next time the subversive elements might employ more sophisticated 
techniques against the Government, He therefore suggested that the 
Government could make use of the period of quiescence to destroy the 
potential machinery of future seditious movements and make the ground 
unfavourable for their growth. Preventive action should be taken against 
possible dangerous outside agencies like the Egyptian Irrigation Department 
(which still operate^in the Sudan) and against communist propaganda;
(2 )
and there should be closer surveillance of important Sudanese suspects,' * 
As regards making the ground unfavourable for anti-Govemment 
propaganda, Ewart suggested that the reasonable aspirations of different 
classes of people should be sympathetically considered. Publicity as to 
the aims and intentions of the Government would also prove effective in 
forestalling agitation (3), It was in fact this policy which Archer 
pursued in his dealings with the Sudanese leaders in general and ’Abd al- 
Rahman al-Mahdi in particular whom he considered as an accredited and 
highly esteemed hostage in his hands and with whose cooperation he hoped 
to curtail the activities of his followers,
(1) FO 371/10905; The History of Politics in the Sudan from 1919-1924 by 
Mr, Ewart, 21st April 1925 in Mr, Henderson to Mr, Austen Chamberlain; 
No, 4 67; 27th June 1925.
(2) Ibid,
(3) Ibid,
(4) FO 371/11612, FO Memo submitted to the Cabinet; 26th April 1926,
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The British Troops in the Sudan
The maintenance of security in the Sudan, however, rested ultimately 
on the British garrison as had always been the case. The only difference 
was that in the early days of the Condominium one British battalion was 
considered sufficient to maintain security in the country. But the 
troubles in the Sudan culminating in the mutihyg of the XIth Sudanese 
in November 1924 had necessitated an increase in the British garrison 
by at least two additional British battalions. Due to lack of proper 
barracks accommodation the third battalion had later returned to Egypt, 
leaving in the Sudan only two British battalions. It was originally 
considered that the stationing of the second battalion in the Sudan was 
merely a temporary measure. But it was soon clear that the strength 
of the British garrison could not be reduced in the near future. The 
strength of the British troops in 1926 was as follows
2 Infantry Battalions (15OO bayonets)
1 Detachment Artillery (one 4.5" Howitzer and two immobile
4.7" guns),
1 Flight R A F  (4 D,H. 9a Machines),
The above was concentrated at Khartoum with the two exceptions
of
1 Infantry Company at el-Obeid,
1 Infantry Company at Atbara,
In a memorandum which he handed over to Ld, Lloyd, Huddleston 
discussed the question whether any reduction could be made in the above
(1)garrison without running any military risks.'  ^ He divided the factors
(1) FO 371/11587; Memorandum by Huddleston on the strength of British 
garrison.
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concerning the problem under two sub-heads, viz, (a) Purely Military, 
and (b) Military-Political, In discussing the former he said that the 
main reason for the maintenance of a British garrison in the Sudan 
was the possibility of having to cope with disaffection or open mutiny 
on the part of the Sudan Defence Force, In April 1927, by which time 
the organisation of the Sudan Force would be complete, the total strength 
of the Fighting Troops would be approximately 5,700. The proportion of 
British troops to Sudanese troops would then be about 1 to 4; and if 
the British garrison was to be reduced to one battalion, the proportion 
would be 1 to 8 , Huddleston considered the latter figure very low. In 
his opinion, apart from an increase in the strength of the British 
garrison, this disadvantage could only be remedied in three ways:-
1, Reduction of the numbers or modifications to the armament of 
the Sudan Defence Force. Huddleston thought that maximum reductions 
possible, compatible with the maintenance of internal security had 
already been planned and would be complete by April 1927. Until communi­
cations throughout the country were better developed, he opposed any 
further reduction in numbers or modification to the armament of the 
Sudan Defence Force,
2, Utilising racial differences in the Sudan with a view to 
minimising the risk of general action against the Government,
Huddleston did not think that any improvement could be effected in 
this direction. The matter needed watching and would have to be revised 
from time to time ,
3, Making provision for immediate reinforcement of the British 
troops from external sources should a situation arise which demanded 
it.
For such an eventuality Huddleston had submitted to the V.O. a
29 9
scheme which would bring the total British force in the Sudan upto;- 
Brigade Headquarters,
4 Battalions Infantry 
1 Pack Battery 
1 Armoured Car Company
Necessary signal units and Administrative services. This was the 
minimum force with which he hoped to cope with a situation where all but 
Europeans in the Sudan were hostile.
Summarising the purely military point of view, he added that with 
one British battalion he could hold in check any probable disturbances 
in or near Khartoum, but nothing more. He would not be able to send 
detachments to outlying districts or centres of potential unrest. It 
would also be difficult to guard the line of communication to Port 
Sudan on which he would have to rely for reinforcement from Egypt or 
elsewhere. Finally he pointed out that even if there were no signs of 
unrest in Khartoum, he could not send troops to outlying districts to 
prevent risings by their passage, Thou^ the main role of British 
garrison was to prevent and suppress mutiny in the Sudan Defence Force, 
a subsidiary, but hardly less important function was to steady by 
their presence units which might be wavering and thus check the spread 
of any conflagration and exercise a stabilising influence in areas 
where native inhabitants might show signs of unrest or disaffection.
He therefore considered that two British battalions were the minimum 
safe strength of the British garrison.
Of the Military-Political factor the most important was, according 
to Huddleston, the probability of increase or decrease of unrest in 
the country. If prosperity produced tranquility and contentment amongst 
the Sudanese, one British battalion was sufficient in the Sudan, But
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if it produced agitation and unrest as in Egypt, he would recommend an 
increase in the future British garrison. He was convinced that there 
were no signs of unrest in the units of the Sudan Defence Force for 
the time being and he hoped that the precautions against the infiltration 
of Communism and sedition from Egypt would prevent any repetition of 
the mutiny.
Gen, Haking, who examined Huddleston’s proposals, did not have
much faith in the expedient of utilising racial differences in the
Sudan at a time of fanatical outbreak such as Mahdiism,^ He doubted
whether pagan troops would be reliable in any case against Muslim troops.
He also pointed out that the Sudanese troops were so scattered that
any general proportion of British to native troops was not a reliable factor 
(2 )
to work upon,^  ^ But he agreed mth Huddleston on the dangers resulting 
from the doubtful loyalty of the Sudanese troops, and one British battalion 
apart from keeping order in Khartoum could neither be utilised for 
quelling disturbances elsewhere nor keep open communication between 
Khartoum and Port Sudan.  ^^ ^ He considered the last two reasons strong 
enough to preclude the possibility of removing the second battalion 
from the Sudan for several years to come, unless Egypt became absolutely 
quiet and a reliable ally to Great Britain, when Egyptian troops could, 
as in the'past, supplement British troops in the Sudan and make it 
possible to withdraw the additional battalion. But he saw no immediate 
prospect of this.




After further correspondence between the home authorities and Ld, 
hloyd, the War Office agreed to station two British battalions in the 
Sudan.
Apart from the British garrison in the Sudan, the presence of the 
Royal Air Force helped considerably to keep the subversive elements 
under control. The Air Force had first participated in the Sudan during 
the expedition against Ali Dinar, Sultan of Dar Fur, in I916 at the 
request of Wingate, Its importance was further demonstrated during the 
1924 troubles in the country when aeroplanes were sent to the Sudan to 
transport officers and also to overawe the mutineers. The Sudan Govern­
ment was willing to pay upto £E 20,000 p,a, if the Air Ministry could 
agree to station a squadron but the Treasury insisted that the Sudan 
Government should meet the full cost which was much larger. Under these 
circumstances the Sudan Government gave up the idea of proceeding ivith 
the proposal, knowing that in the event of real trouble a flight of
(2 )aeroplanes would certainly be sent to Khartoum.^ ^
In the final analysis security in the Sudan was dependent on the 
British garrison. Back in 1898 the British authorities had advanced 
cautiously into the Sudan, The country was generally little known, 
except perhaps the region in the immediate neighbourhood of the Nile, 
Dangers too were unknown, Mahdiism was considered a serious threat 
which should be crushed. Any movement, religious or otherwise, was
(1) FO 371/11587; FO to Lloyd; No: 107(h); 23rd April 1926; Lloyd to FO; 
No, 107; 25th April 1926; FO to War Office, No: J973/32/16 dt,
28th April 1926, WO to Foreign Office; No: 0143; 2246 (M.0.2), 29th 
July 1926.
(2) FO 371/11581; Treasury to FO; No. S.28327; 2nd January 1926;
FO Minutes by Mr, Murray on the above; 4th January 1926;
FO to Ld, Lloyd; No, 23; 6th January 1926;
Ld, Lloyd to FO; No: 79; 13th February 1926,
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interpreted as an attempt to overthrow the Government, Wingate, who 
had been director of Intelligence before he became the Governor-General, 
and Slatin, the Inspector General, who had spent ten years of his life 
as a Mahdist prisoner, appear to have been obsessed with Mahdiism, In 
fact, as long as these two worked together there was little chance for 
the ex Mahdists, particularly the leading figures, to prove that they 
could dilute their belief in Mahdiism with practical co-operation 
with the Government, Only on the outbreak of the Great War and the exit 
of Slatin from the Sudan, t’dàd the Sudan Government modify its policy 
towards Mahdiism and give *Abd al Ralmah al-Mahdi, its leader, a chance 
to cooperate with the Government, After the war Mahdiism once again 
became a potential political danger to security in the Sudan, But this 
time it was not "kill the Turk" type of Mahdiism which was prevalent 
only in the remote rural areas, *Abd al-Rahmân knew that there was much 
more to gain by cooperating with the Government than by open opposition.
He took care to keep his followers under control while he himself was 
consolidating his position. The appointment of Archer as Governor-General 
in 1925, opened up a new era for Mahdiism in the Sudan, ’Abd al-RaWan 
had become so indispensable that the Government had to look to him to 
maintain peace in the \Jhite Nile region and the West where he enjoyed quite 
a regal status. One reason for the sudden increase in power of 'Abd al- 
Ra^an al-Mahdi in 1925-26 was the patronage extended to him by Archer 
himself, for which he had to resign early in 1926, It appears that in 
accordance with a promise which he had made to 'Abd al-Rahman while 
passing by the Aba Island on his original journey down the Nile from 
from Uganda to Khartoum^^^to visit him. Archer decided to pay a visit 
to 'Abd al-Raliman, He consulted Sterry, Schuster, Willis and îfec Michael,
(1) Sir G, Archer: A^ Political and Historical Memoirs of an East African 
Administrator, P,185,
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members of the Governor-General’s Council, on the above subject and with
('1')the exception of MacMîchael all supported him^ but they laid stress on
( 2)the importance of his visit being unostentatious,^  ^ Archer, however,
went in uniform and the visit was attended with full ceremonial and
ended with the acceptance by Archer of the gift of a s w o r d , T h i s
seemed to have increased the importance of ’Abd al-Rahman in the eyes
of the Sudanese which the members of the Governor-General’s Council
feared would give further impetus to the force of Mahdiism throu^out
the country, According to Archer, MacMchael’s opposition to his
visit to ’Abd al-Rahman was personal. He did not wish to see ’Abd al-
- - (5)
Rahman rising in competition with his protege ’Ali al-Mir«^ani,
In the end Sterry also joined mcMichael,^^^ Sterry reported the
matter to Lloyd who wired to Archer, who was at Mongalla at the time,
asking for his observations on Sterry’g report, Archer did not
agree with Sterry that by his visit and the speeches he had delivered
had
during the visit, he/created a grave situation in the Sudan, The worst 
Archer saw was a temporary disturbance of the balance between the two 
rival religious leaders and this could be set right by his visit to
(1) Ibid, PP, 241, 242,
(2) Confidential Annexes 1923-1937, PRO,, Addendum to Cabinet 19 (26), 
28th April 1926,
(3) Ibid,
(4) Sir G, Archer: A Political and Historical Memoirs of an East 
African Administrator, P. 251,
(5) Ibid, P,244.
(6) Ibid, P, 224; Sterry was one of those who expected to succeed Stack 
as Governor—General and resented Archer’s appointment,
(7) Ibid, P. 251.
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•Ali al-Mir^hani, which he had already announced,^ ' Since he felt
that he had last the confidence of the Council, Archer decided to
resign. In order to avoid any awkward situation in the Sudan or Egypt
it was given out that he had returned home on medical grounds.
As an official from outside the Sudan Service, Archer immediately
realised how important it was to have ’Abd al-Rahmân under control to
keep the I4ahdist activity in the Sudan in check. Archer found him a
big force and wanted to have him on his side, "If you hold the leader
in hand", he wrote in his memoirs, "you control the mob. If, on the
other hand, he is embittered by his treatment, then he might possibly
drive another Dervish movement under ground. So I would rather have
(o\
him as a friend than as a foe,"^ ’
The Sudan officials, obsessed by the fear of I4ahdiism, held the 
diametrically opposite view. To them Mahdiism was undoubtedly of 
potentially dangerous character and widespread in its reactions.
Though ’Abd al-Rahman’s support was welcome, a close watch had to be 
kept on his movement and the activities of his followers.
(1) Ibid, 0 ,251.




During the period under study the major threat to 
security in the Muslim Sudan was Mahdiism. The Mahdist 
movement, initiated by Muhammad Ahmad al - Mahdi early in 1880s, 
had transformed itself into a state, and even after the death 
of the founder, it controlled the destiny of the Sudan under 
the Khalifa 'Abdallahi until September 1898. The battle of 
Karari during that year and the I^lifa*s death in November 1899 
dealt a death blow to the Mahdist State; but Mahdiism, as a faith 
survived. Thou^ not a sufi order (Tariga) like the Khatmiya, 
Mahdiism had captured the imagination of many groups of Sudanese.
The Baqqara tribes of the souther* and western Kordofan were, 
for the most part, moved by the resentment of close administration 
and desire of loot. They, however, had formed the major fighting 
force of the Mahdi during the early days of the revolution and 
later constituted the elite of the Mahdist aristocracy. The 
defeats and the death of the Khalifa had stunned them and deprived 
them of their leaders. The numerous Mahdist risings noted in the 
present work(^ ) and the reverence in which the Fuqaha^(Sing.
Paqih,  ^ Jurist ) : were held, especially in the Gezira and
in parts of the west, proved to the authorities that Mahdiism 
was far from extinct. It only required a single defeat of the 
Government troops to rally many of these ex-Mahdists in an 
attempt to overthrow the Government.
The main difficulty that the Sudan Government faced 
in suppressing subversive religious activity was the inaccessibility 
of the regions in which it arose. Of the centres of Mahdist 
activity, the Gezira was, however, comparatively accessible. Any 
movement of resistance originating in the Gezira, like the rising 
of Wad Habuba in 1908, could be effectively dealth with by sealing
(^) Supra, Ch. Ill-
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it off from other sensitive areas to the East and West. The 
situation in Kordofan was different. Sere was a vast province, 
inaccessible and inhospitable, largely unmapped and with poor 
communications. The Anglo-Egyptian troops, trained to face the 
enemy in the open country could not operate effectively in the 
♦bush' country; nor could they move, in any strength, very far 
from the rivers which formed their principal line of communication. 
The lack of knowledge of the military geography of the land was 
the principal difficulty in finally crushing the Khalifa during 
1898 - 1899^^^* During these early days after the re^conquest , 
the country beyond a few days journey from the river was practi­
cally unknown to the conquerors. Every expedition had to be 
preceded by careful enquiry, and organisation. Unless all details 
concerning water and other resources of the country were collected, 
it mi^t be very dangerous to launch an expedition.
Even later, until 1908, military operation in Kordofan 
were not an easy task. The Nuba Mountains in southern Kordofan 
offered a safe refuge to potentially dangerous elements and unless 
the Nuba hills were pacified, security in the surrounding regions 
could not be established. The pacification of the Nuba Mountains, 
as noticed in the thesis(2)+ was a very slow process. Meanwhile, 
the Nuba Mountains served as a safe refuge for subversive elements, 
religious or otherwise. At least two of the potentially more 
dangerous movements had originated in or around the Nuba Mountains, 
the first initiated "by Muhammad al - Amin around Taqali in 190) 
and the other the rising of the Talodi Arabs in 1906. These
Supra, Ch. I. 
Supra, Ch. IV.
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movements could easily have spread to the neighbouring tribes 
if they had not been promptly put down. Trouble in Kordofan 
was far more dangerous than elsewhere, and the only remedy was 
to put down any subversive activity in the bud. But it was 
not easy to discover subversive movements before they came out 
in the open.
For the suppression of potentially subversive move­
ments Wingate relied on the skill of the Intelligence Department 
of the Egyptian army. As the former Director of Intelligence, 
Wingate knew the Sudanese tribes and could predict to some extent 
their reactions to Govermental measures. In this work he was 
assisted by Rudolf Karl Von Slatin, popularly known as Slatin 
Pasha, who, as assistant-director of Intelligence had played a 
significant role in the re conquest of the Sudan. Slatin had 
resigned from the Egyptian service soon after the reconquest, 
but was appointed as Inspector - General in I9OO by Wingate. 
Slatin*s special knowledge was in the politico-religious field - 
and especially in his acquaintanceship with Mahdists and ex- 
Mahdists. After his appointment, Slatin exercised supreme 
influence over Wingate in connection with the administration of 
tribal affairs. Though his experience as a Muslim during the 
Mahdiyya had made him familiar with the Islamic customs, he still 
relied for advice on the Board of ’Ulama’ and several other 
religious ShayWis and notables.
Apart from the useful work done by the Intelligence 
Department, Wingate made full use of the local collaborators 
for maintaining security in the Sudan. Soon after the reconquest, 
the Sudan Government sou^t the co-operation of the religious 
and tribal Shaykhs in order to impose the new administration on
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the country. Those who had opposed the Mahdists were the first 
to be absorbed in the new administration. But it was made clear 
to them that the Government regarded them as its subordinate 
agents who could be appointed, over-ruled and dismissed just 
as any Government official.
The support of Religious giaykhs was needed for another 
reason. Despite the Government's measures to encourage orthodox 
Islam as propounded by the Board of 'Ulama*, it could not disregard 
the impact of Sufi orders on the Sudanese Muslims. Df tjie 
religious Shay^s, Sayyid *Ali al-Mirghani was a special favourite 
with the Government. His father Muhammad *Uthman al-Mirghani II 
had denounced the Mahdi and had fled to Egypt after the successful 
establishment of the Mahdist state in the Sudan. The Mirghahi 
family lived in Egypt where it continued to receive financial 
support from the Government. After taking over Kassala from the 
Italians in 1897» the Anglo-Egyptian authorities invited *Ali 
al-Mirghani to return and allowed him to settle there. The Kassala 
district once again became the headquarters of the Khatmiya order 
and the Government could count on the support of the large section 
of the Sudanese Muslims who followed *Ali al - Mirghani as their 
religious head. Khatmiya support was especially useful to the 
Government in suppressing the subversive elements in the Sudan 
during the early years of the reconquest.
The use of military force was, however, necessary for 
the maintenance of security in the Sudan. Wingate * s policy was 
to strike very hard at the outset and punish the subversive 
elements severely. He advocated the use of force as a kind of 
fire fighting weapon to crush subversive movements before the
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agitation had time to spread. He always defended his agents in 
the Sudan when they had overstepped the limits of moderation by 
carrying out severe sentences on persons charged with sedition^^^. 
It was, in Wingate*s view necessary instantly to suppress anything 
in the nature of religious agitation. The comparatively small 
military force by which Government authority was maintained 
in the Sudan necessitated the summary execution of those suspected 
of seditious activités. It was a common belief amongst Sudan 
officials that it only required a single defeat of the Government 
troops to upset the delicate balance between the subversive forces 
and the maintenance of security. The Sudan Intelligence Reports 
and official despatches are full of assertions that even a local 
success of a subversive movement would gravely jeopardize 
government authority possibly over a wide area and would in 
all likelihood necessitate the despatch of a costly expedition 
to re-establish control.
This situation presented Wingate with a deployment 
dilemma. He could either concentrate the bulk of his troops at 
Khartoum, with the penalty that the garrisons on the spot mi^t 
be dangerously weak, and relief from Khartoum dangerously slow; 
or he could distribute his troops in small packets so as to cover 
a large number of sensitive points and lose thereby the advantages 
of concentration. Above all, he would weaken the vital garrison 
of the capital. Wingate favoured the first Alternative. But poor 
communications between the capital and the outlying posts greatly 
increased its inherent risks. The subversive activities in the 
southern Kordofan and the Gezira convinced him that the best method 
of preventing or repressing subversive activities was to improve
(1) See Talodi outbreak, Supra, Ch. IV.
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internal communications.
The Wad Habuba rising in the Gezira in 1908 gave Wingate 
the opportunity to demand money from the Home Authorities for 
the construction of additional railways. The British War Office 
offered him an additional battalion instead. In a number of 
despatches to the Home Authorities Wingate argued that the proposed 
additional battalion althou^ improving security in the Sudan 
would not solve the problem permanently. Besides, the cost of 
construction of barracks for the additional battaliorjwould be 
unremunerative. According to him the Egyptian Government 
would not bear this additional expenditure; but if the' British 
Treasury was in fact willing to meet the cost of construction 
a similar sum could be more profitably spent on improving 
communications.
The British War Office, however,failed to see how 
imporved communications would solve the immediate problem of 
security in the Sudan, which had resulted from the rising of 
Wad Habuba. Gen. Ewart, the Director of Militaiy operations, 
thou^t indeed that construction of railways would actually faci­
litate the spread of sedition by bringing the inhabitants of the 
distant provinces into closer touch with each other and with the 
capital. After further correspondence the War Office became un­
willing even to send an additional battalion to the Sudan and de­
cided instead to maintain a striking force in Egypt which would be 
available for any eventuality in the Sudan,
Having failed to induce the Home Authorities to sanction 
a loan for improvement in internal communications, Wingate fell 
back for the necessary finance on the Egyptian Treasury. Early
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in April 1909 the extension of the railway southwards from 
Khartoum was commenced and by the end of the year 110 miles 
had been laid and the line was opened to Wad Medani. The 
cost of this construction and the necessary funds for con­
tinuing the line as far as the White Njle near Gbz . abu Guma 
and the construction of the bridge over the river at that 
place was provided by Egypt,
During the first quarter of the next year the Blue Nile 
Bridge linking Khartoum North with Khartoum itself was declared 
open and the year ended with the completion of the bridge across 
the White Nile at Rabak and the extension of the line across 
the Gezira to Kosti. Further extension of the Railway into 
Kordofan connected el-Obeid with the capital during 1912; 
this extension, together with other projects connecting different 
centres by telegraph and the construction of roads where the 
railway could not be constructed, gave Wingate quicker communica­
tion with sensitive areas.
Ultimate responsibility for the maintenance of security 
in the Sudan, rested with the Egyptian army and the British garrison 
in the Sudan, Unfortunately for the Sudan Government, the Junior 
officers of the Egyptian army were disaffected for reasons dis­
cussed in the thesis ), This disaffection contributed to the 
mutiny in the ranks of the XI and XIV Sudanese battalions in 1900, 
This mutiny coincided with the appointment of Wingate as Governor- 
General of the Sudan and Sirdar of the Egyptian army. His first 
task in the Sudan was to suppress the mutiny which he did with 
the help of the loyal ’ portion of the Egyptian army and the two 
companies of the British garrison. The mutiny, however, brought out
(1) Supra, Ch. II.
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the risk the Govemmenment was running in the Sudan, The counlcy was 
large, Mahdiism as a faith was not extinct and the districts, 
south and west of Khartoum, which were the centres of Mahdiism 
were as yet inefficiently held. Above all, the Egyptian army 
on which security in the Sudan so largely depended had proved 
itself unreliable, Wingate*s solution was to decrease the number 
of Egyptian officers serving with the black units of the Egyptian 
army and to bring these units under the direct command of the British 
officers. For this he needed not only more British officers but 
also the authority to retain these, if he found them useful, for 
periods longer than the conditions of their service permitted^
But Wingate encountered considerable difficulties, which are 
discussed in the text, before he received approval for his plans.
The second step that Wingate took in strengthening the 
Government’s hold on the country was to press for an increase in 
the British garrison in the Sudan from two companies to one battalion, 
to be permanently stationed in the Sudan^^). The War office again 
made difficulties on climatic and health grounds in approving these 
proposals, but eventually agreed to sanction an increase in the 
strength of the British garrison to one battalion and to construct 
barracks which would enable the garrison to stay in the Sudan 
throughout the yean A scheme for the defence of Khartoum was 
simultaneously taken in hand, which included a number of fortifications 
which, it was hoped, would serve as a place of last defence in 
case of a general rising in the Sudan,
The stength of the British garrison in the Sudan was inever more 
than a battalion during the early years after the re-conquest.
As noticed earlier, Wingate saw in improved rail communications a
(1) Supra, Ch. V,
(2) Supra, Ch. V.
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lasting solution to prevent or suppress potentially subversive 
activity. Though he had no objection to accepting additional 
British troops, he realised that these could not be usefully 
employed in unhealthy regions in the central and western Sudan 
which were centres of sedition.
The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 created 
new problems of security for the Sudan Government, The Sultan 
of Turkey was also the Khalifa of all Muslims and it was feared 
that his involvement in the war on the side of the Germans would 
shake the loyalty of the Egyptian army and the Sudanese Muslims,
In order to counteract the effects of the Turco-German propaganda 
on Sudanese Muslims, Wingate played upon the traditional hostility 
of the Mahdists to the *Turk* and accepted al-Sayyid *Abd al-Rahimn 
al-Mahdi* 8 offer of co-operation. Thou$^ Mahdiism was still 
considered dangerous to security in the Sudan, the ban on the 
movements of *Abd al-Rahmah was lifted and he was permitted to 
move among his followers to advocate support for the Government.
The outbreak of the Egyptian revolution in 1919 
shifted the centre of the threat to security from the Sudan to 
Egypt, But the Sudan could not remain unaffected by the develop­
ments in Egypt. There was a considerable number of Egyptians 
living in the Sudan, mostly in towns north of Khartoum. These 
were generally Egyptian merchants, Egyptian Junior officials and officers and 
the purely Egyptian units of the Egyptian army. Apart from 
these a student class was growing up amongst the Sudanese population 
which included a high proportion of Egyptian-bred Sudanese, 
and the educated officers of southern Sudanese origin who formed 
a favourable soil for the working of the Egyptian Nationalist
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agitator. The Government was particularly afraid of the younger 
officers and officials of southern Sudanese origin. The officers 
belonging to this class had been educated on western lines and were 
keen , on improving their social status. As a result they were 
sensitive to the temptations offered by the Egyptian Nationalists 
who used religion, ’Sudan for the Sudanese', personal grievances 
or any other slogan which they could find to spread anti-British 
and pro-Egyptian propaganda in the Sudan, By 1924 the Egyptian 
Nationalists had established close contacts with 'Ali^Abd al-Latif, 
a former officer of southern origin,; who had founded the White 
Flag League which became the hub of the nationalist activity in 
the Sudan, The Egyptian nationalists had also succeeded in 
spreading subversive propaganda in the Egyptian army through the 
discharged and pensioned southern officers.
Stack, who was at the time Governor-General of the Sudan 
and Sirdar of the Egyptian army, was aware of the serious threat 
to security in the Sudan, He had submitted a number of memoranda 
to the Home Authorities proposing the re-organisation of the 
Egyptian army. The gist of his proposals was not only that the 
Egyptian element in the Egyptian army in the Sudan should be with­
drawn but that the number of Sudanese officers should also be 
gradually reduced. He was in fact proposing to form a Sudan Force 
generally under British officers. Stack’s main problem was that 
since the formation of the Egyptian Nationalist Ministry in 1924 
under Zaghul Pasha, the Egyptian army had become more and more 
dependant on the Egyptian Ministry of War, Stack saw in the 
increasing influence of the Egyptian Government in the Egyptian 
army an attempt to undermine his own authority and that
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of other British officers. Clearly, Stack would not permit the 
Egyptian army to pass under the sole control of the Egyptian 
ministry.
These proposals were under the active consideration 
of the British Government, \dien on 19 November 1924, Stack was 
fatally wounded. The death of Stack and the subsequent evacuation 
of purely Egyptian units of the Egyptian army and of Egyptian 
officers serving with the Sudanese units^^^, temporarily checked 
subversive activities in the Sudan, But the Egyptian Nationalists 
had been so active amongst the Sudanese battalions that at least 
two of the Sudanese battalions, viz, X Sudanese in Talodi and the 
XI Sudanese in Khartoum, were completely disaffected.
The evacuation of the Egyptian units from the Sudan 
and the formation of the Sudan Defence Force, however, failed to 
solve the security problems of the Sudan, The dismissed and 
pensioned officers of southern origin with many grievances of 
their own and no jobs now formed a centre of subversive activity. 
Since they were in close touch with the men of the Sudan Defence 
Force on the one haiid and the Egyptian Nationalists on the other, 
they became potentially dangerous to security in the country.
Besides the disaffected officers and officials of 
southern origin, the steady spread of Mahdiism under *Abd al-Rahman 
was causing no less anxiety to the Sudan Government during 
1925 - 26, Although *Abd al - Rahman and his immediate followers 
in the Gezira were ready to co-operate with the Sudan Government, 
the revival of mill&narian beliefs amongst his followers in 
southern and western Kordofan and the infiltration of Mahdiism in 
the army ranks further complicated security in the Sudan,
(1) Supra, Ch. IX
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Once again during 192) - 26 internal security in 
the Sudan was threatened by the nationalist movement on the 
one hand and neo-Mahdiism on the other but the expected dnager 
for the future did not materialise. So far as the northern 
Sudan was concerned, the years from 1926 to the outbreak of the 
war in 1939 were a period when the administration was never 
seriously threatened either by overt resistance in the old 
style or by the more intractable advers^^ay of nationalist 
propaganda and agitation.
The nationalist movement had, in fact collapsed 
in the Sudan, at least for the time being, soon after the 
events of 1924^^)* The movement had been led by, and confined 
to the educated class who, under Egyptian influence, advocated 
close co-operation with Egypt, The Sudanese nationalists, however, 
had failed in fostering the idea of Sudanese nationality anongst 
the masses, who, living away from the principal towns, the centres 
of educated nationalism in the Sudan, showed no inclination to 
think nationally but still thou^t tribally or locally or in 
terms of their tariqa-connections.
Political developments in Egypt and the Sudan during 
the post - 1924 period further weakened the relations between 
Sudanese and Egyptian nationalists. The signing of the Anglo- 
Egyptian Nile Waters Agreement in 1929, by which the Sudan re­
ceived only one twenty-second part of Egypt’s share , was strongly 
resented by the Sudanese, The signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty 
in 1936 further embarrassed the Sudanese nationalists, Egypt had, by 
this treaty, not only endorsed the Agreement of 1899 but had also
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advertised her status as nominal co-ruler of the Sudan by 
sending a token force to be stationed there' * , The Sudanese, 
both the pro-Egyptian nationalists and their opponents, were 
also disappointed by the growing moderation of the Wafd and 
the Egyptian nationalists. They began to feel that Egypt,
(p)
save for intrigue, had little of value to offer \
The main factor which checked the potentially dangerous 
activities in the Sudan was, however, the measures adopted by 
the Sudan Government soon after the assassination of Stack,
The evacuation of the purely fallah units from the Sudan had 
removed one discordant element from the country. The strength 
of the British garrison in the Sudan was now increased to two 
battalions, and the Sudan Defence Force itself was placed under 
undisputed British control. Each company of the Sudan Defence 
Force, 150 to 200 strong, was commanded by a British officer, 
British command at Company level lent itself to the formation 
of mobile detachments which could control extensive and remote 
areas, and act as rapid reinforcments in the event of trouble. 
Improved rail communications had brought K^rtoum 
within easy reach of those sensitive areas, particular^ in the 
Gezira and in southern and western Kprdofan, where disturbances 
were most likely to occur. Apart from improvement to rail and
(1) Ahmad Khair, Kifah Jjl. (Cairo 1948) PP 46 - 50 and 72, cited 
by M. Abd al-Rahim in Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan, 
(OTJP 1969) P.120.
(2) Political History of the Sudan, 1924 - 31 (Public security) 
Archives, Khartoum cited by M, Abd al-Rahim in Imperialism 
and Nationalism in the Sudan, (OUP 1969) P.115#
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river connnunications, the increasing use of motor transport 
gave a new mobility and flexibility to the security forces.
Experiments had been made, as early as 1904, to find out how 
far motor cars were adoptable in the Sudan, However, the first 
occasion when mechanical transport was put to military use was 
during the rising of Wad Habuba in the Gezira in 1908, Two 
Arrol-johnston cars - specially designed with sand-proof casing - 
and two motor-lorries were used to transport officers and stores 
between I&artoum and Kamlin, Motor transport was employed on a 
more significant scale in the campaign against *Ali Dinar, By 
the 1930*8 the use of motor transport in the routine patrols and 
inspections of District Commissioners was becoming normal rather 
than exceptional in many regions, including some (the Gezira,
Kordofan) which were potential security risks. The closer and 
more frequent supervision which motor transport had made possible 
was an effective deterrent to any potential organisers of insurrec­
tional resistance.
The increased participation of British officers and 
officials in the Sudan, coupled with the increase in the British 
garrison and imporved communications, therefore acted as a deterrent 
to subversive activity in the Sudan during the post-1924 period, 
at least until 1939. During this period, the nationalists did not 
attempt to organise on. a nation-wide political basis. The senior 
nationalists had either retired from politics or had been suppressed 
by the Government; the younger generation had not yet found their 
feet; and the Goveenment was not prepared to allow freedom of expression 
and political action, except on a very limited scale to the great
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religious leaders.
But even the politically ambitious, *Ahd al-Rahnian al-Mahd^ 
recognislag that insurrectional resistance and even overt political 
resistance, were alike hopeless, followed an extremely cautious 
policy during these years. He usually co-operated quite genuinely 
and effectively with the Government; but at the same time he 
consolidated and extended his semi-clandestine network of influence 
and control. His time, he hoped, would come; but he was shrewd 
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